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The dissertation investigates the issues pertaining to China’s fixed exchange rate policy 
and attempts to appraise the case for greater exchange rate flexibility. The thesis addresses 
three objectives: First, a critical appraisal of China’s exchange rate policy in the light of 
theoretical and empirical literature supporting greater flexibility in exchange rate; second, it 
builds a monetary dual exchange rate model and analyses in a dynamic theoretical framework 
the impact of nominal demand and price shocks due to over and undervalued currency. Third, 
using Chinese macroeconomic data it empirically examines the factors determining China’s 
real exchange rate fluctuations. 
After presenting a brief history of China’s exchange rate policy in the post-war period, an 
assessment of China’s fixed exchange rate policy is made, including the costs of maintaining its 
current peg.  It is argued that the literature on China’s exchange rate regime has not reached a 
consensus, and further theoretical arguments are appraised regarding the reluctance to move to 
a more flexible exchange rate regime.  A theoretical dual exchange rate monetary model, in the 
spirit of Flood and Marion (1983), is then developed to analyse the dynamics in the responses 
to nominal and real shocks.   This provides a theoretical basis for analysing the underlying 
working mechanism and policy implications under some degree of capital control, to resemble 
the Chinese exchange rate regime. In the light of the theoretical analysis, empirical research is 
conducted using a structural vector auto-regression (SVAR) model to examine the effects of 
real exchange rate fluctuations to nominal and real shocks (represented by inflation and real 
GDP), in order to determine the case for exchange rate flexibility. Both the theoretical and 
empirical analyses complement to inform the ongoing debate on whether the current exchange 
rate regime in China should be made more flexible, and whether a more flexible regime is 
appropriate in stabilising the effects of macroeconomic shocks. 
  The empirical findings reveal that the responses of the real exchange rate to nominal 
IX 
 
demand and real supply shocks are consistent with a managed exchange rate system that 
currently operates in China.  In particular, the results show that, as China has been under a 
fixed exchange rate arrangement for much of the estimation period, the real exchange rate 
appreciates immediately in response to a positive nominal shock.  The use of quarterly Chinese 
data in this study, which no previous study on China has used, makes it possible to identify to a 
greater degree the initial appreciation impact of a positive nominal shock on the real exchange 
rate, although the results are generally consistent with the previous study by Wang (2004) using 
annual data.  The study finds that supply shocks are dominant in the fluctuations of output 
growth, and while both nominal and real shocks are significant the nominal contributes more 
than real shocks in real exchange rate fluctuations.  Overall, these findings are consistent with 
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Chapter One  Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Since 1979, China has gradually opened its market to the rest of world. During 
these last 30 years, China’s economic transformation has been remarkable- from a 
poor planned economy with nearly one third of its population living below the 
poverty line to the world’s fourth largest economy at present. China’s economy has 
benefited its people by raising their living standard, and it has benefited the world by 
producing manufacturing goods at cheaper cost, which in turn can be seen as a 
contribution of low inflation to the world’s economy. As a major player in world 
economy today, China’s rapid economic growth is attracting politicians and 
economists’ attention around the world. As of now, China’s huge trade surpluses and 
fast accumulation of foreign reserves have raised tensions with its main trading 
partners, the US and EU. Main economic concerns have been the shrinking 
manufacturing base in industrialized countries and rising domestic protectionists 
against China’s export growth. Lately, US authorities accuse China as “currency 
manipulator” and intensify pressure on Chinese authorities to revalue Chinese 
currency Renminbi (RMB) and change its US dollar pegged exchange rate regime to a 
more flexible one. For many emerging markets, especially export-led growth 
countries, fixed exchange rate arrangement is not a bad choice since it can stabilize 
the exchange rate volatility which is bad for exports. However, as the economic 
environment changes, such exchange rate regime may undergo real exchange rate 
misalignments. This will change the market expectations of the exchange rate 
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accordingly. Without any effective measures to put the volatile international capital 
flows under control, the perceived expectations will usually lead to rampant 
speculative activities that will in turn bring about massive pressure on the fixed 
exchange rate regime. In most cases, such speculations will ultimately lead to 
currency crises.  
  As an emerging market economy, China has maintained a fixed exchange rate 
regime in operation for decades. Coupled with strict administrative restrictions on 
capital flows, such an exchange arrangement has prevented China from the turmoil 
other SE economies experienced from the Asian financial crisis and provided 
favourable conditions for economic development. However, with the rapid growth of 
China’s economy, the misalignment of the existing pegged exchange rate has become 
increasingly more apparent, potentially making Chinese economy vulnerable to a 
future crisis. Whether China should maintain the current pegged regime is now being 
hotly debated.  
Since 2003, a considerable number of papers discussing the issue of RMB have 
appeared. Many academics and some institutions, like Barry Eichengreen (2003, 
2004), Jeffrey Frankel (2004), Morris Goldstein (2004), Rumbaugh and Wang (2005), 
Roubini and Setser (2005), Goldstein and Lardy (2007), World Bank, and 
International Monetary Fund, have stated their viewpoints on this issue respectively. 
These writers have tried to employ different approaches and models to fathom the 
costs and benefits of the current peg of RMB’s exchange rate. Although most of them 
agree that the fixed exchange rate regime is gradually falling out of time due to the 
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already changed economic situations in China, they cannot reach a consensus on the 
steps and timing of adjusting the exchange arrangement. 
 
1.2  Relationship and Motivation of the study   
During much of the 1980s, China had a fixed exchange rate system although the 
renminbi (RMB) was devalued frequently, reflecting economic developments and 
waves of opening up the economy.  Between 1988 and 1993, China had a dual 
exchange rate system in which the official fixed rate coexisted with the 
market-determined rate in the swap centres.  Since 1994, following steady 
depreciation of the swap market rate, the official rate was devalued and unified with 
the swap rate.  Since 1995, China’s exchange rate regime has officially operated as a 
managed float system with the RMB pegged at around ¥8.3 to the US dollar.   
Since the Asian and Latin American crises, however, China’s exchange rate policy 
and the merit of the RMB’s de facto peg has been the subject of growing debate (Xu, 
2000; Roberts and Tyers, 2003).  On the one hand, following China’s WTO 
accession, an influx of foreign direct investment and portfolio capital is expected to 
contribute to RMB appreciation.  On the other, the relaxation of capital controls will 
encourage foreign spending by Chinese residents and allow a possible current account 
deficit fuelled further by booming domestic investment.  To maintain external 
balance, it is clear that China’s exchange rate is likely to require further realignments.  
However, views differ as to whether China’s should adopt a more flexible exchange 
rate as it pursues a policy of trade and capital account liberalisation. Xu (2000) argues 
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that exchange rate stability has served as an effective anchor for price stability and 
suggests a gradual approach towards capital account liberalisation.  Roberts and 
Tyers (2003) argue that liberalisation will increase the likelihood of external shocks 
and therefore China will benefit more with exchange rate flexibility.  Shen (2002) 
suggests domestic and financial sector reforms will be reinforced by the managed 
float that is likely to result from WTO accession.  All these studies present their case 
from a macroeconomic perspective and accept the view that more flexibility will be 
inevitable with capital market reforms, but differ in how this could proceed. 
China’s recent rapid export growth and accumulation of international reserves 
have generated considerable interest in modelling the determinants of the RMB 
exchange rate.  Much of the existing literature has focussed on the valuation of the 
exchange rate relative to its equilibrium.  Chou and Shih (1998) estimate the 
equilibrium exchange rate of the RMB between 1978 and 1994 using both the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) and the shadow price of foreign exchange (SPFE) 
approaches, and find that the RMB was overvalued for much of this period, but came 
close to equilibrium between 1990 and 1994.  Zhang (2001) estimates a behavioural 
equilibrium exchange rate over the period 1952-1997 using a set of fundamental 
determinants of the actual real exchange rate for China, and finds that the RMB was 
overvalued for most of the estimation period, but came close to equilibrium in 1997.  
More recently, Anderson (2003) has estimated a partial equilibrium model centred on 
trade equations for China and finds that the RMB real exchange rate is, at present, 
undervalued. 
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With the liberalisation of trade and investment in coming years, China will most 
likely face an increase in nominal and structural shocks, which may cause significant 
variation in its real exchange rate even though the nominal exchange rate is pegged.  
Instead of estimating the equilibrium real exchange rate, the empirical methodology 
will attempt to gain insight into the underlying forces driving the actual real exchange 
rate for China.  Following the pioneering study of Blanchard and Quah (1989), there 
has been a growing body of literature in which the long-run relationships from theory 
are used to identify structural shocks in an open economy setting. There is some 
empirical literature on the conventional approach of modelling and estimating the real 
equilibrium RMB exchange rate to determine whether China’s high export 
competitiveness is the result of its nominal peg.  Chou and Shih (1998) and Zhang 
(2001) follow this approach and conclude that the RMB was overvalued in the 1980s 
but subsequently came close to equilibrium in the late 1990s.  More recently, 
researchers have used a structural Vector Auto-regression (SVAR) approach to study 
the evolution of the real effective rate and identify the sources of its variability.  
Wang (2004), pursuing this approach, finds that supply shocks are as important as 
nominal demand shocks in accounting for real exchange rate movements in China, in 
contrast with other studies that show that, in industrial countries, nominal shocks are 
more important.  A useful extension of this analysis is to examine the implications 
for the choice of the appropriate exchange rate regime for China, similar to that 
undertaken by Ahmed (2003) who concludes that exchange rate rigidity in Latin 
American countries may not be as costly as conventional economic theory predicts. 
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A key issue in the SVAR approach is to decompose real exchange rate movements 
and gauge the relative importance of monetary and exchange rate policies.  
Underlying this approach is the selection of appropriate variables that constitutes the 
VAR, and the structural approach imposes long-run restrictions from theory and 
allows identification of short-run influences. Such an analysis is a useful supplement 
to the VAR approach of Fackler and Rogers (1995), Reinhart (1995), Edwards and 
Vegh (1997), and Montiel (1997). This line of enquiry follows Ahmed (2003) who 
studies the sources of economic fluctuations in key Latin American countries and 
concludes that exchange rate rigidity may not be as costly for these economies as 
conventional economic theory predicts.  
Therefore, this study seeks to emphasise whether through a review the literature 
surrounding the debate on China’s exchange rate policy there is a case for greater 
exchange rate flexibility and critically assesses arguments for and against greater 
exchange rate flexibility.  
In addition, emphasis will also be placed on whether the current exchange rate 
regime in China should be made more flexible, and the property of such more flexible 
regime in stabilising external shocks. To cater for the specific situations in China, a 
dual exchange rate model, in the spirit of Flood and Marion (1983), is used. Such a 
model can also be used as a framework to organise conflicting views regarding how 
exchange regime in China should be reformed.    
Finally, the empirical methodology, following Ahmed (2003) and Wang (2004), 
will be to estimate a structural Vector Auto-regression (SVAR) model using quarterly 
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data for China over the past ten years, thus covering recent episodes of exchange rate 
crises and financial liberalisation.  The primary goal here will be to examine the 
implications of the results for the choice of the appropriate exchange rate regime for 
China.  
 
1.3  Research Objectives 
China’s rapid economic growth and accumulation of foreign exchange reserves 
has sparked tensions with the US about its ongoing policy of exchange rate 
stabilization, keeping the Renminbi (RMB) pegged at around ¥8.3/US$.  This 
research aims to investigate the issues surrounding China’s exchange rate policy and 
evaluate the case for greater exchange rate flexibility.   
Specific objectives are:      
(i) To critically analyse the debate on China’s exchange rate policy in the light of 
the theoretical literature on the arguments for and against greater exchange rate 
flexibility.  
(ii) To build a theoretical monetary dual exchange rate model which can allow for 
measuring the extent of currency over (under) valuation, after having controlled 
for the intervention effect of nominal and real variables on financial exchange 
rate. This model manifests flexibility by allowing us to examine the effects of 
any combinations of the accommodated variables. It also provides a framework 
to investigate the underlying working mechanism and the policy implication, 
particularly for those regimes with some degree of capital control.  
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(iii) To identifying the variables that can explain changes in the real exchange rate in 
china. And to empirically examine the factors determining China’s real 
exchange rate and conduct empirical research through the structural Vector 
Auto-regression (SVAR) model to study the relative importance of different 
types of macroeconomic shocks for fluctuations in the real exchange rate.  
Hence, to determine whether and how in the light of the empirical results 
China’s exchange rate is overvalued or undervalued.  
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
To accomplish the above objectives, this study utilises both qualitative and 
quantitative analysis. First the study focuses on surrounding the debate on whether the 
current exchange rate regime in China should be made more flexible, and identifying 
the theoretical case for a more flexible regime in stabilising external shocks. To cater 
for the specific situations in China, a dual exchange rate model, in the spirit of Flood 
and Marion (1983), is used. Such a model can also be used as a framework to organise 
conflicting views regarding how exchange regime in China should be reformed.    
In addition, this study also takes the Quantitative approach. The quantitative 
approach is represented here by the econometric analysis (Time Series Analysis) of 
documentary secondary data. The data in the research is gathered from quarterly from 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) June 2005 edition, China Statistical Yearbook 
2004, and China Statistical Bureau. The data covers the period (1994:1 –2005:4). We 
take the two countries- the U.S. and China. 
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In the second stage after gathering the data, a structural Vector Auto-regression 
(SVAR) model will be utilized in the research by using the variables: the real 
exchange rate, domestic and foreign inflation rates, and real GDP and trade-openness.  
Instead of using nominal values, we consider the log of the domestic and foreign (US) 
price levels measured by the Consumer Price indices (CPIc and CPIa), the log of real 
exchange rate REER, the log of real GDP and log of trade-openness TRADE. The 
structural VAR model is used because this research approach identifies the dynamic 
effect of interdependent of one variable on another. In the structural econometric 
approach, it is not possible estimate and interprets each coefficient, especially if signs 
of the coefficients alternate. Furthermore, data and time constraints limited the 
empirical analysis to the more simplified structural VAR approach. 
The tests that will be used in this research in structural VAR model will include: 
Selection of the lag length, Unit root test, Johansen Cointegration test, Impulse 
response function and Variance decomposition. These tests will be examined by using 
Eviews (release 6.0) package. 
 
1.5 The Research Structure 
This study looks at firstly whether the current exchange rate regime in China 
should be made more flexible, and examines the response of the real exchange rate in 
stabilising the effect of external shocks. To cater for the specific situations in China, a 
dual exchange rate model, in the spirit of Flood and Marion (1983), is used. Secondly, 
the empirical analysis evaluates the extent of misalignment of the Chinese exchange 
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rate and determines whether the level of exchange rate China should be more flexible 
than the current situation. To accomplish these two targets, the research is organised 
as follows.  
In Chapter 2, we have an overview on the evolution of the exchange rate regimes, 
and the history of China’s exchange rate arrangements. This chapter consists of 
several parts; it starts from China’s pre-reform period 1949, the first round reform in 
1978 and the Internal Settlement Rate adoption, the foreign exchange swap market 
development, Exchange policy before, during and after Asian Financial Crisis.  
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on the reason of adopting fixed exchange rate 
regime and how China’s exchange rate regime could evolve and contribute through 
greater flexibility. The main thrust of this survey is to analyse from the literature 
whether China should move towards a more flexible exchange rate regime. However 
the aim is not to predict when true exchange rate flexibility is most likely to occur.  
Chapter 4 presents the dynamic model of the dual exchange rate, appropriate for the 
theoretical analysis. The dual exchange rate regime works as fixed exchange rate with 
capital controls as we will see later. The chapter then describes the model and 
analyses the dynamics and its stationary equilibrium. Two cases will be considered: 
one analyzes the effects of a permanent domestic credit expansion on the economy; 
the other analyzes the effects of domestic output movements.  
Chapter 5 is the empirical analysis of RMB revaluation. The research methodology, 
data collection, the model and variables and the hypotheses are discussed. Preliminary 
data analysis and final estimation results are presented and discussed in this chapter as 
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well. The structural VAR decomposition shows that different relative shocks account 
for different level of the variations in real exchange rate changes during the estimation 
period.   
Chapter 6 summarises the main findings from the evolution of China’s exchange 
rate regime, and evaluates the case for greater exchange rate flexibility. 
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Chapter 2  A Historical Evaluation of RMB Exchange Rate  
 
2.1 Introduction 
  China finally unveiled its economy to the world in 1979. Since then its foreign 
exchange policy has never stopped reforming in order to be consistent with its 
economic reform. China’s foreign exchange reform has been a namely gradual 
transformation of its exchange allocation mechanism (Mehran, Quinton and Laurens, 
1996; Lin 2003) from one that was completely controlled by central planner to the one 
where market determination has become important. The reform process took the first 
step by liberalizing trade, then developing an exchange market and finally easing 
restrictions for current account and the establishment of a capital account control 
structure. After nearly thirty years of effort, China is now facing the last formidable 
task of its exchange reform- capital account liberalization. This task would have been 
done before 1997, but the Asian financial crisis reminded policy makers of the high 
risk of opening up the capital account without a sound financial system. In 2001 
China was eventually accepted by WTO, and as a result, as promised, China has had 
to open domestic financial markets gradually and substantially to foreign investors. 
Previous reforms can be seen as China is attempted to focus on the liberalization of 
the current account and attract inward foreign direct investment, aimed at pushing up 
the export of the economy. The next phase of reform is mainly to shape the financial 
sector in a way that can sustain capital account liberalization.    
  The process of China’s foreign exchange policy reform began with introducing a 
system in which exporters would keep a portion of their foreign earnings in 1979. 
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Later on the government introduced the Internal Settlement Rate for trade transaction 
aimed to regulate import and export activities through manipulating an 
administratively determined exchange rate. After the mid 1980’s, market determined 
exchange rate developed rapidly- the first foreign exchange swap centre was 
established; also the authorities allowed trading of foreign exchange to encourage 
inflows of foreign direct investment. At the beginning of 1990’s the swap market 
played a significant role in foreign exchange transaction. Later on further exchange 
rate reform was done by unifying the official and swap market rate. In 1996 China 
liberalized its current account. Since then the Asian Financial Crisis influenced 
China’s decision to delay  capital account liberalization, thus the authorities have 
mainly focused on consolidating current account convertibility while the pace of 
capital account liberalization remained slow.  
    Dynamics of Exchange Rate of RMB against US Dollar since 1949. 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the dynamics of dollar’s RMB rates from 1949 to August of 2005. 
Figure 2.1 
 
Source of data: Ministry of Commerce of the People Republic of China.  
Official Website: www.mofcom.gov.cn  
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From this graph, we can see several inflexion points or discontinuous in the RMB 
exchange rate. These turning points can be connected back to a few crucially 
influential events associated to the change of either international monetary system or 
domestic economic policy. Generally speaking, three periods can be distinguished 
chronologically from 1949 to 2005.    
Period one, briefly states the foreign trade and exchange regimes from 1949 up to 
1979. The second period describes the 1979 reform and 1980’s adoption of Internal 
Settlement Rate (ISR). The third period focuses on the development of foreign 
exchange swap market from later 1980s to 1990s. While the last section concentrates 
on the exchange policy change before and after the Asian Financial Crisis. Part five 
concludes. The rest of this chapter follows this timeline to describe the history of 
China’s foreign exchange rate policy and the process of the foreign exchange rate 
reform. 
  
2.2  1949 -1978: The Period of Planned Economy 
This time span can be again minced into three shorter periods: 1949 to 1952, 1953 
to 1972 and 1973 to 1978. In the first three years or so, the exchange arrangement 
adopted by the central government can be regarded as an exchange rate regime with 
higher flexibility because the RMB rate against US dollar was adjusted with the terms 
of trade from time to time. But the magnitude of fluctuation in RMB exchange rate 
was rather small. Since 1953, the external value of RMB was fixed by the authorities 
at a level of 2.617 Yuan per dollar. Thereafter, RMB underwent a minor devaluation 
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and was finally maintained around 2.46 RMB per US dollar. This exchange rate lasted 
until 1970. Before 1973, the year when intermittent dollar crises ultimately caused the 
Bretton Woods currency system to break down, the RMB exchange rate appreciated 
slightly, from 2.4618 to 2.2401 Yuan per Dollar. From 1973 to 1978, the RMB 
exchange rate was more volatile and seemed to be seeking an equilibrium value. 
Before the early 1970s, the exchange rate of RMB was officially set and was under 
the direct control of the government. The relatively small amount of foreign trade 
meant the exchange rate of RMB has an insignificant effect on the planned economy. 
Although the exchange rate did adjust over time with domestic and international 
economic political situation, it should not be thought of as a real reflection of the trade 
flows of goods, service and capital between China and the rest of the world.  
  China pre-reform foreign exchange system was built on its central planned 
economy and can be seen as being inefficient. China’s foreign trade was mainly 
controlled by a few government owned foreign trade corporations. Before the 1979 
reform there were only ten foreign trade corporations that possessed most of China’s 
foreign trade share. The intention of this monopolistic structure was to help insulate 
the economy against foreign shocks. The authorities could manipulate foreign trade 
plans in accordance with the target of central planned economy in which exports 
generate enough foreign exchange to support imports, while imports were expected to 
fill the gaps of the domestic demand and supply.  
  Under the pre-reform foreign trade system all the foreign earnings were 
surrendered to the state and the requirement of foreign exchange was also allocated by 
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government. The power to control foreign exchange was shared by several ministries 
such as the ministry of foreign trade, the ministry of finance and the central bank. 
These authorities would compensate the loss if the foreign trade corporations suffered 
a home currency loss in the transactions through central budget. Thus all the domestic 
importers and exporters had to hand in the profit to the state. This system can be seen 
as a mechanism of auto tax-subsidy in which exchange rate can ignore the change of 
price level and other macroeconomic variables.  
  However this central planned economy was inefficient in respect to foreign trade, 
as this monopolistic system constrained competition among domestic trading firms 
whilst the central planning deprived firms’ autonomy; also there was little low 
incentive for efficiency for these foreign trade firms as the moral hazard can be 
caused by the central budget.  
  As we can see, before the reform exchange rate was not a functional tool for the 
foreign trade to regulate the market demand and supply. Since the exports were 
relatively small the impact of overvalued or undervalued exchange rate did not 
influence the domestic economy very much. The major role played by the exchange 
rate in the central planned economy was that of the “passive accounting role” (Van 
Brabant 1985).  
2.3  1979 reform and the Internal Settlement Rate adoption          
  The first reform of exchange rate policy was carried out on August 1979. With 
respect to the inefficiency of central planned economy the reform focused on breaking 
up the monopolistic system and the centrally planned economy. Fundamentally the 
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aim of this initial reform was to transform the foreign exchange allocation mechanism 
from one controlled by government to the one more or less determined by the market. 
Some of the foreign trade management power was decentralized, and more foreign 
trade firms were established, in particular central government allowed some major 
cities to set up their own foreign trade corporations. At the beginning of 1980s there 
were estimated four hundred new foreign trade firms established. In mid 1990s the 
number increased to ten thousand. The notable figure during this period is the 
traditional trade firms before 1979 accounted for more than two third of foreign trade 
in early 1980s. In 1992 the shares declined to less than one fifth (see Table 2.1).  
Table 2.1  China’s 10 Foreign Trade Corporations’ Share of Annual Imports and 
Exports 1981-1992 (%) 
 
Note: The 10 foreign trade corporations that controlled most of China’s foreign trade in 1978 are: 
China Machinery Import and Export Corp., China Minerals and Metals Import and Export Corp., China 
Chemical Import and Export Corp., China Technical Import and Export Corp., China Cereals and 
Edible Oils Import and Export Corp., China Textiles Import and Export Corp., China Native Produce 
and Animal By -Products Import and Export Corp., China Light Industrial Products Import and Export 
Corp., China Arts and Handcrafts Import and Export Corp. and China Instruments Import and Export 
Corp. 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. 
  The above reform was accompanied by further reform of the exchange rate policy. 
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Authorities set up foreign currency control department i.e. the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange, and in the same year (1979) government also allowed export 
sector to retain a fraction of foreign earning aiming to introduce incentives among 
exporter, even though it appeared that the export sector was not profitable. The reason 
was due to: firstly, the distortion of the exchange rate before 1979 which caused the 
overvalued domestic currency1, and secondly the abolishment of central budget, 
which led to no central planned allocation. With respect to the unprofitable export 
authorities the introduced RMB Internal Settlement Rate in 1981 was fixed at 2.8 
Yuan. The ISR only covered trade related exchange transaction, as for non-trade 
transaction the authorities still retained the overvalued exchange rate. This dual 
exchange rate system was caused by a debate over the appropriate level of RMB 
exchange rate among economists and politics in 1979. Two conflicting views 
prevailed about whether the RMB was overvalued or undervalued. One group 
suggested that the official exchange rate had underestimated the value of RMB by 
contrasting the price level of other developed countries2
                                                        
1 In 1979 the national average cost of earning one unit of foreign exchange was 2.4 Yuan per dollar while the 
official exchange rate was at 1.5 Yuan. The cost of many exportable goods could not be covered at the official 
exchange rate.  
2 The foreign exchange authorities compared the relative prices of basic consumer goods and services of Beijing 
with New York, London, Tokyo and Hong Kong. The result showed that the RMB should appreciate to around 
0.54 Yuan per dollar.   
. According to the purchasing 
power parity a basket of goods and services mostly favoured foreign tourists. On the 
other hand, the other group believed that official exchange rate was overvalued. This 
view concerned the export sector and growing export subsidies suggesting exporters 
were not able to cover their export costs. Wu and Chen (1989) pointed out that 
unprofitable exports accounted for 66 percent of China’s total exports. Between these 
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views authorities eventually choose to adopt dual exchange rate system in which 
official exchange rate was in charge of non-trade foreign exchange transactions and 
the depreciated ISR took care of trade related foreign exchange transactions. It is 
noted that the official exchange rate did not follow the appreciation view since the 
authorities believe the economic reform could bring the price level up (Wu and Chen 
1989).  
  The introduction of ISR was the first attempt for authorities to adjust the RMB 
exchange rate according to the structure of domestic prices since the new regime took 
charge. It can be seen as one of important events in the development of China’s 
exchange rate policies (Lin 2003). However in about thirty years (1949-1979) of 
central planning and control the price distortion was serious, thus it could not expect 
that the ISR would be at equilibrium level. Even though, the ISR adoption more or 
less alleviated the extent of the RMB overvaluation and to the appreciated official 
exchange rate. However the ISR only played a very limited role in regulating the 
export and import market (Lin 1997). The reason is that although the reform was 
intended to increase the number of foreign trade firms, yet the reform was not 
thorough, and the state still had the power over decision making and finance. The ISR 
hence could not be adjusted by following market supply and demand force. The major 
disadvantage of ISR is that there exists arbitrage opportunities. Foreign trade firms 
could sell foreign exchange to the bank but use the official rate when they bought 
foreign exchange from the bank. For the period when the ISR was in use the overseas 
Chinese remittances through official channels dropped drastically from around $650 
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million annually in the late 1970’s to $171 million in 1985 (Lardy 1992). The ISR was 
in use from 1981 to 1984. During this period domestic prices had increased steadily. 
There was a pressure for the devaluation of the official exchange rate close to ISR. 
The pressure from other countries mounted, such as USA accused China used ISR to 
subsidize export sector. In late 1984 China finally abolished the ISR and official 
exchange rate was devalued to 2.8 Yuan per US dollar.  
 
2.4  The foreign exchange swap market development       
  The aim of 1979 reform was to establish more foreign trade firms at local 
governments level and thus to decentralize foreign trade management. After the 
abolishment of ISR, State Council decided to introduce second round of reform in 
1984. To encourage inflows of foreign investment the government decided to further 
open up the market. Unlike the 1979 reform, the 1984 reform focused on making 
foreign trade firms independent of government controls. Authorities intended to 
separate government control from enterprise management and from financial control. 
Sung (1994) states that the full implementation of this proposal could fundamentally 
change China’s foreign trade sector.  
  However, this proposed reform package was not fully delivered, because of the 
Chinese economic shock in late 1984. From the end of year 1984 to 1985, China’s 
trade balance increased from $1.3 billion to $2.6 billion. At the same time the 
overheated economy caused rapid domestic inflation. These two factors together lead 
to the authorities’ decision of centralization again. Lardy (1992) pointed out that with 
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authorities’ adoption of few administrative measures to control the domestic demand 
and imports, a lot of delegated powers were handed in from local government level. 
Also because of the high trade deficit (low foreign reserve) and domestic inflation, in 
late 1985 the official rate of RMB was subject to devaluation- a series of from initial 
2.8 Yuan per dollar to 3.71 Yuan per dollar.  
  The serial of devaluation of RMB, however, did not solve the problem of the 
overvalued official exchange rate. In order to offset the adverse effect of overvalued 
exchange rate the government had to introduce several distorted policies. The idea is 
that once a distortion is introduced into the economy, according to the theory of 
second best few more distortion policies are worth introducing to offset the adverse 
effect of the first one. During the period from 80s to early 90s the government 
implemented direct and indirect measures, such as direct export subsidies, foreign 
exchange retention system, export tax rebates and swap markets, to offset the 
overvalued RMB. However, these compensating policies motivated the exports and 
increased the exports volume, eventually the growing subsidies turned to a heavy 
burden for government. To offset the adverse effect of export subsidies, from the mid 
80s to early 90s the foreign exchange swap market played a significant role in China’s 
foreign exchange system. 
  The foreign exchange swap market development did not follow the step of the 
foreign exchange retention reform (Lin 2003). In the first round reform, government 
allowed Chinese foreign trade firms to retain a partial of foreign exchange earnings 
which were in the form of quotas. In 1980, government introduced a quota trading 
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system in some major cities. Holders of retention quotas were permitted to transfer 
their quotas to other domestic firms. In later 80s the foreign exchange retention 
system further opened up from 15 percent for the general commodities to 25 percent.      
The overheated economic activity in late 1980s, caused black market rate lower than 
the swap rate. As a result a new foreign exchange swap market was set up in special 
economic zones. The liberalization of FDI also enforced the exchange reform in late 
1980s. To motivate the capital inflows, the government allowed the foreign firms to 
swap foreign exchange among which the buyers and sellers negotiate the swap price. 
Thus a dual foreign exchange rate appeared in China again. Unlike the former one, the 
swap rate was an important tool to offset the distortion effects of the overvalued 
official exchange rate (Lin 2003). In this dual exchange rate system the official 
market relied on the amount of foreign exchange surrendered by domestic exporters 
whereas the activities of swap market depended on the exporters’ foreign exchange 
retention and foreign firms. In this system the importers were the net winner since 
government allocated the surrendered foreign exchange to them at the official 
exchange rate. The exporters also could have some gain generated by the system as 
they can trade their foreign exchange retention with at depreciated exchange rate in 
the swap market.  
  The swap market experienced further developments in 1988 as the government 
allowed the increase of foreign exchange retention ratios and more swap market 
centre. A 70 percent retention ratio was applied in the light industrial products sector 
and the exports of electronic and machinery products could have 80 percent of 
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retention ratio (Lin 2003). All provinces established the swap centres and a central 
swap market was established in Beijing. Thanks to these series of foreign trade reform 
the volume of transactions in swap market increased from $ 1 billion in 1984 to $86 
billion in 1989.  
However, the swap market did not develop smoothly. As Chinese reformers 
persisted in the efforts at price liberalization, the inflation expectation led to serious 
domestic inflation in 1988- the rate of inflation rose to 27 percent. At the same time 
the trade balance deteriorated, the trade deficit reached $7.8 billion. While the official 
exchange rate remained at 3.7 Yuan per dollar, the swap rate fluctuated drastically. In 
the early 1988 the exchange rate was 5.7 Yuan per dollar, in the mid of 1988 the 
exchange rate depreciated to 6.8 Yuan per dollar. The situation worsened in the mid 
1989, the Tiananmen Square “June 4th” students’ demonstration led to low confidence 
of China’s economy. After this incident the authorities tightened the control of the 
economy. The economic situation got better. The trade deficit decreased to $6.6 
billion in late 1989. And in 1990 the trade balance turned to surplus. During this 
period authorities also implemented two rounds of official exchange rate devaluation. 
The first round was on December 1989 the RMB decreased by 21 percent to 4.7 Yuan 
per dollar. The second devaluation was adopted in late 1990 to bring the official rate 
down to 5.22 Yuan per dollar. As for swap market, the exchange rate dropped down to 
5.4 in 1990 (Lardy 1992). During this period the swap market exchange rate really 
play a profound role in the foreign exchange market. The swap market led to the 
realization of the link between the change of money supply and the change of 
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exchange rate in China since the 1979 reform. Since the authorities tightened the 
domestic credit an excess demand for money appeared, and eventually it brought the 
appreciation of RMB in the swap market. 
  The third round of reform took place in 1991. This time the authorities aimed to 
firstly remove the export subsidies, secondly increase the foreign exchange retention 
ratio, and finally abolish the quota system. In order to relieve the burden of the central 
government the export subsidies had faded away through a gradual process, when the 
foreign trade contract responsibility was adopted in 1988 reform. The authorities 
initially did the reform experiments on the foreign trade sectors of light industrial 
products and garments, and the result showed that these foreign trade enterprises 
could survive without export subsidies. Later on government removed the export 
subsidies in all foreign trade sectors. A unified retention scheme was adopted in the 
early 1991. Exports using imported inputs could retain as much as 90 percent of 
foreign exchange earnings. Some special exports such as military product and special 
regions could get 100 percent retention. In the sectors of general commodities, the 
exporters could have the retention ratio of 40 percent, while the rest would be 
surrendered by central and local government. For the export of machinery, electronic 
products, a ratio of 65 percent was applied to foreign trade firms, while the central 
government would receive the other 30 percent at the swap market rate. The 
abolishment of quotas was in action in late 1991. The quota system was a 
controversial issue (Lin 2003). The retained foreign exchange was kept by central 
government and Bank of China. They usually took the foreign exchange in another 
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use. Thus when foreign trade enterprises or local governments intended to exchange 
the quotas into foreign currency it often appeared to experience delay and shortage. 
To resolve this incredible quota system, the authorities experiment a new system in 
which the foreign trade enterprises and local government could retain cash instead of 
quotas in some special economic zones. Eventually, the new system spread out in 
China. By 1993 there were 108 foreign exchange swap market across the country, and 
the volume of transactions is above $20 billion every year since 1991. Before 1991, 
the foreign swap market took 50 percent share of China’s foreign exchange 
transactions, whereas after 1991 it increased to 80 percent (Lardy 1992). The 
increased role of the swap market in settling foreign exchange transactions was 
mainly due to the continuous increase of the retention ratio. 
  In 1992 “the third generation leadership” was formed; the new authorities 
continued to open up the market aiming to establish a socialist market economy. Until 
the mid of 1992, it authorised 24 inland and 14 border cities to foreign investment. 
Also in order to become a member of GATT, China introduced a tariff reduction on 
225 items to liberalize its import policy. In the mid of 1992 China abolished the 
import surcharge that was imposed to control the trade deficit. Furthermore In late 
1992 it announced a second tariff reduction on 3,371 items.  
  Because of the trade liberalization and the rapid economic growth, the demand for 
foreign exchange increased between 1992 and 1993 (Khor, 1993). Thus the swap 
exchange rate reached 6.05 Yuan per dollar in April 1992. In 1993 as China’s 
economy got worse, the exchange rate depreciation worsened. The swap market rate 
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climbed to 8.34 Yuan per dollar. To counter this rapid depreciation, authorities 
imposed a limit on the swap rate at 8.2 Yuan per dollar. However, this policy 
contracted the volume of transactions in swap market and most deals were done in 
black market. Eventually the authorities had to remove the limit and the swap rate 
reached 11 Yuan per dollar in the mid of 1993 while the official rate was still at 5.7 
Yuan per dollar. Aiming to cool down the economy the authorities took drastic 
anti-inflationary measures; also the government took the campaign on cracking down 
the black market. As a result, the swap rate fell back at 8.8 Yuan per dollar in July.  
 
2.5  Exchange policy before Asian Financial Crisis 
  Aiming to get the accession to the WTO, in 1994 China deepened the economic 
reform on foreign exchange, foreign trade and investment. As for foreign exchange 
reform, the RMB official and swap rates were unified at the rate of 8.7 Yuan per dollar 
at the end of 1993. Accordingly the swap market was abolished and the foreign 
exchange retention system was terminated as well. The foreign exchange control on 
imports was also abolished. Importers could purchase foreign exchange needed for 
import activities by showing the authorities import contracts or valid documents 
(Tseng 1994). At the time the exchange regime was named as managed floating rate, 
which allowed the exchange rate for US dollar to fluctuate in the range of 0.15 
percent.  
On 4th of April 1994, the China Foreign Exchange Trading System (CFETS) was 
established instead of swap market. The previous foreign exchange swap centres were 
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transformed in the local branches of the CFETS and were linked to the centre in 
Shanghai. Unlike swap market, the new system was formed by domestic financial 
institutions, and foreign banks. In addition, the central bank also became a participant 
in interbank trading. The CFETS is authorized to approve membership system based 
applications.  
  After the exchange rate unification, the trade balance had changed dramatically. It 
turned from deficit in 1993 into a surplus of $5.4 billion in 1994. At the same time the 
inflow of foreign capital reached $32.6 billion given the overall balance of payments 
surplus of $30.5 billion. Eventually the foreign exchange market faced the excess 
demand of domestic currency pushing the appreciation of RMB in the mid of 1994. 
The exchange rate was up from 8.7 Yuan per dollar to 8.4 Yuan per dollar. To tackle 
this appreciation, the authorities intervened the market by accumulating the foreign 
reserves. Consequently the foreign reserve almost tripled from $26.4 billion to $77.9 
billion. By doing so the RMB exchange rate tended to stable around 8.3 Yuan per 
dollar and closed to 8.28 Yuan per dollar in the end of 1996.  
  At the beginning of 1996 the government announced regulations for foreign 
exchange administration. The regulations were generally aiming to tighten the control 
on capital account, meanwhile to pursue the current account convertibility. In order to 
pave the way to the full current account liberalization, the government relaxed the 
control on private foreign exchange transactions such as allowing traveller exchange 
$500 to $1000 if they go abroad, and allowing domestic and foreign residents to carry 
up to 6000 Yuan out of the country (Shang 2000). In addition, the trade barriers were 
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also lowered to some extent. China’s average tariff level was brought down from 35.9 
percent to 23 percent. Three years ahead of the official timetable, in the later 1996 
China finally attained the current account convertibility by accepting the obligations 
under Article Eight of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement3
  With the advent of the 1997-1998 Asian Crisis, the well known “Asian miracle” 
became “Asian Miserable”. The speculative attack on Thai Baht triggered wild range 
of currency devaluation in other countries such as Korea, Indonesia, Philippines, 
Thailand, Taiwan, and Singapore. Unlike usual currency crisis in Latin American 
countries where currencies were attacked because of bad fiscal policy and currency 
overvaluation in the sense of purchasing power parity, the currency attacks were 
.   
  The capital account control however was still tight. This led to large volume of 
illegal capital flight. Gunter (1996) pointed out that between 1984 and 1994 the 
amount of capital flight could reach $75 billion. Song (1999) disagree this figure and 
suggested that the figure exceeded $20 billion each year after 1993, and in 1997 it was 
over $40 billion. To tackle the illegal capital flight the authorities have enacted 
various measures to control capital outflows, such as adopting a system for 
verification of export receipts and a system for verification of import payments. The 
government also implemented the compulsory surrender system in which domestic 
firms has to hand in their part of the foreign exchange income.  
 
2.6  Exchange rate policy during Asian Crisis 
                                                        
3 For details see IMF www.imf.org. 
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provoked by an undue build up of short-term dollar indebtedness over 1994-1996 
(Mckinnon 2002). Eventually the debtor countries Korea, Indonesia, Philippines, and 
Thailand were forced to devalue and adopt floating exchange rates4
   Beginning with Thailand in June 1997, to Korea in December 1997 and Japan in 
early 1998, the Asian Financial Crisis began to substantially affect the Chinese 
economy in 1998. To boost their credibility, China’s authorities announced a stability 
of RMB exchange rate. In the period of Asian Financial Crisis, the RMB exchange 
rate fluctuated in the range of 0.1 percent. Hence the export growth rate was only 0.6 
percent in that year. In addition, depreciations in its neighbour countries imposed 
strong deflationary pressure on China, the consumer prices grew at a negative rate in 
early 1998. Thus, in March 1998 the authorities enacted a series of fiscal expansion 
. Whereas China 
and Hong Kong retained their dollar pegs. IMF attributes the cause of this crisis to the 
before 1997 system of fixed exchange rate policy in Asian countries. It is because in 
East Asian debtor economies the interest rates were much higher than on dollar assets. 
Thus, in order to make loans in say, RMB, Chinese banks were tempted to accept low 
interest rate dollar deposits instead of high interest RMB deposits. This temptation 
was great since the Yuan/dollar exchange rate was fixed, which causes the moral 
hazard for banks.  IMF thus suggested that if the exchange rates of the debtor 
counties have been more flexible, the banks would be less tempted to over borrow in 
foreign exchange ex ante, and there would be no large depreciation ex post (Mussa et 
al, 2000) 
                                                        
4 Whether these counties really adopt floating rate is debatable as Mckinnon (2002, 2004) argues that the 
fluctuation of their exchange rates is really the phenomenon of exchange rate overshooting during the Asian Crisis. 
We will see more in detail in the next chapter.  
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aimed at getting the economy out of the likely recession. Since 1998 public works 
have increased by 20 percent per year. The announced stimulating pack amounted to 
150 billion RMB, financed by the sale of public bounds and by borrowing from the 
state-owned banking system. In 2002 the official yearly budget deficits rose from 0.7 
percent of GDP in 1997 to 2.8 percent of GDP.   
  The foreign reserves hardly increased in 1998. The authorities thus tightened the 
control of the capital flight. It implemented high standard of requirement on foreign 
exchange transaction and conversion and remittances of foreign exchange. Numbers 
of notices and regulations on foreign exchange supervision were issued and a 
nationwide campaign on cracking down the illegal foreign exchange activities was 
enacted.  
  China’s decision of not devaluating RMB has been well recognized by their 
neighbours during Asian Crisis (Fernald and Babson, 2000, Song, 1998, Tyers and 
Yang, 2000). Frankel (2002), and Mckinnon and Shnabl (2003) argue that China 
played an important stabilizing role during the turmoil. First comparing with other 
East Asian countries, such as Indonesia and Thailand whose GDP heavily depended 
on export; China’s trade was only around one third of its GDP. Due to the relatively 
large proportion of domestic sector, exchange rate plays a less important role in China; 
in turn it is less sensitive to shocks from abroad. Thus with growth mainly contributed 
by domestic factors, China was able to immune itself from most of its Asian Crisis. 
Second, China’s resistance of RMB devaluation dampened the domino effect of 
potential another round of competitive devaluations. The crisis caused most of East 
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Asian counties to devalue their currencies against the dollar in order to promote their 
export, whereas China helped prevent a worse downturn in the East Asian economies, 
by keeping its currency stable. Instead of risking regional repercussions by 
out-exporting its neighbours, China tried to stimulate domestic aggregate demand to 
offset the world economic slowdown. From theoretical point of view, China’s 
effectiveness of fiscal expansion can then be explained by Mundell-Fleming model 
(1963) of how fiscal policy works in an open economy.  Given China’s exchange 
rate, price level and interest rate were relatively stable between 1994 and 1998, thus 
together with the confidence of no deflationary exchange rate appreciation and 
tightened capital control, the expansion of domestic aggregate demand was a 
remarkable success. During a major crisis, this policy limited competitive 
depreciations among the smaller East Asian economies and facilitated their return to 
exchange stability in its aftermath (Zhao Zhijun 2001). On the other hand, stationary 
exchange rate expectations enabled countercyclical fiscal policy within China itself to 
be more effective (Mckinnon, 2002). 
2.7  Since Asian Crisis 
  In mid 1999, the IMF classified China’s exchange rate regime as a fixed 
arrangement. Chinese authorities began to ease the restriction on foreign exchange as 
the effect of the Asian Financial Crisis diminished. In 2001 The ban on the purchase 
of foreign exchange for past overdue debts repayment was removed and the 
restrictions on purchasing foreign exchange for advance repayment of domestic 
foreign currency debts were relaxed (Lin 2003).  
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  In later 2001 the authorities further relaxed the restriction on the foreign exchange 
system. According to the new policy individuals could convert all their expenses 
needed for study as long as they are in higher education. Also the foreign exchange 
authorities decided to relax the requirements for domestic firms to open a foreign 
exchange bank account. Furthermore, in an effort to control the black market, the 
authorities adjusted banks’ buying and selling rates for the US dollar. In addition, 
aiming to join WTO the authorities deepened the liberalization of the foreign trade 
regime which brought the average import tariff down to 15.3 percent.  
  After more than fourteen years of effort, China was finally accepted by WTO. In 
order to meet the requirement of accession, China has liberalized its trade and 
investment policy such as in the area of financial and agriculture sectors. In 2002 it 
also abolished the differential treatment toward foreign exchange accounts for current 
international transactions. The new regulation allows all foreign trade firms to open 
foreign exchange account for current international transactions. Moreover foreign 
financial institutions were allowed to compete in domestic security markets. And by 
the end of 2006 there was meant to be a fair treatment between domestic and foreign 
financial institutions.     
  There was no timetable for capital account liberalization however. In fact the 
freeing of capital account was not included in the negotiation of WTO accession. Lin 
(2003) suggested that this tight control of capital account reflected the authorities’ 
worry about illegal capital flights, macroeconomic instability, and undeveloped 
domestic financial sector. However, in order to gain modern technologies and skills, 
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the capital control is mainly on capital outflow, while encouraging inflow. By the end 
of 2001 the value of China’s capital inflows such as foreign direct investment and 
security investment reached $600 billion, whereas the outflows were only $350 
billion.  
  To further liberalize the foreign exchange regime, China needs to undertake a final 
step, which is to free the capital account. The Chinese authorities learnt the lesson 
from Asian Financial Crisis however, which is that sufficient preparation must be 
done. The liberalization of the capital account is more complex than that of the current 
account since it needs the development of financial markets. Johnston (1997) pointed 
out that lack of a sound financial system could generate distortions and regulatory 
incentives for capital movements that are unrelated to underlying economic conditions, 
thus leading to the instability in capital movement. Greene and Isard (1991) and 
Mathieson and Rojas-Suarenz (1993) emphasized that the importance of prudent 
fiscal and monetary policy, a market-clearing exchange rate, an adequate level of 
foreign reserves, and a developed financial system are the preconditions for RMB 
capital account liberalization.        
  Lin (2003) suggested two aspects need to reform in financial sector. One is the 
liberalization of interest rate. However, the liberalization of interest rate could lead to 
the bankruptcy of low profit state owned enterprises; the chain effect in turn could 
intensify the strain on the banking system. Another obstacle is the inefficiency of four 
major state owned banks. These banks account for over 90 percent of total bank assets 
and 70 percent of all deposits (Shang 2000). Currently the non-performing loans held 
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by the four banks make up over 20 percent of their outstanding loans. This poor 
performance of the major banks severely threatens the stability of the financial sector.  
McKinnon (1998) stressed that the delay of capital account reforms could also be 
costly. Thus in China’s case the reform of financial sector and turning it into a sound 
system is a crucial task facing the China’s authority currently. Especially since the 
requirement of WTO accession leads to a direct competition between foreign and 
domestic financial institutions, the reform seems formidable.   
Following the elapse of the negative effects on China’s economy brought about by 
external crisis, the net export and foreign direct investment grew synchronously, 
which also led the official foreign reserve to accumulate quickly. Sound economic 
fundamentals and improving ability to withstand financial crisis transformed the 
initial market expectation of RMB devaluation to expected revaluation. The quoted 
exchange rate of RMB by People’s Bank of China from 2001 to 2005 echoed such a 
change of market expectation. For instance, in 2001, the fluctuation margins of RMB 
against US dollar was still maintained within plus minus 1 per cent, the daily 
quotation of RMB’s exchange rate was still undulating around the approximate central 
rate of 8.2770 Yuan per US $. However, the situation changed when it stepped into the 
October of 2004. Since then, the exchange rate of RMB manifested extraordinary 
rigidity. In the nearly total ten months from 2004 October to July 20th of 2005, the 
daily closing quotation of the exchange rate of RMB almost unchanged pointed to 
8.2765 Yuan per US Dollar.  
  On the day of July 21st 2005, China modified its exchange rate arrangement from a 
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single peg system against US dollar to a basket peg regime against the currencies of 
its major trade partners5
3.0±
 (but does not reveal the weighting of component currencies). 
The external value of RMB was also realigned slightly, from a centre rate of 8.2770 to 
8.11 against dollar, which meant a mild revaluation of about 2 per cent. Meanwhile, 
the fluctuation margins of RMB were also enlarged to  per cent. It is 
conspicuous that such a modification keeps the principal exchange rate framework 
unchanged. But it may be helpful in improving the working mechanism of the RMB’s 
exchange rate and avoiding related risks incurred by pegging against US dollar. From 
another point of view, if this modification exhibited that the Chinese currency 
authorities and policy makers had realised the pros and cons of the long lasting 
external imbalance, then this action should be encouraged. This will be beneficial to 
the equilibrium of balance of payments and sustainable economic growth of China 
itself in the medium term, and also to the gradual adjustment of global imbalance in 
the long run.     
 
2.8  Summary 
  To conclude, since 1979 the political urge to liberalise caused the economic reforms. 
China had gradually become a market economy country from the one that was 
controlled by central planning. The exchange reform process in particular took three 
stages. Firstly it adopted the ISR, thus the dual exchange rate appeared in China. The 
                                                        
5 On August 9, 2005, Central Bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan (2005) disclosed a list of 11 currencies as constituents of 
the reference basket, he stated that the major currencies in the basket are the US dollar, the euro, the yen, and the Korean 
won. In addition, the rest of the currencies in the basket are the Singapore dollar, the British pound, theMalaysian ringgit, 
the Russian ruble, the Australian dollar, the Thai baht, and the Canadian dollar. The governor said that these currencies 
were chosen because of their economies’ importance for China’s current account. 
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second stage of reform shows that because of the trade deficit affecting the economy 
the authorities adopted foreign exchange swap market instead of ISR. The third round 
of exchange reform was characterized as exchange rate unification which is to ensure 
current account convertibility.  
  In the first round reform the official exchange rate severely undermined the export 
sector. The authorities used the ISR, export subsidies; foreign exchange retention and 
export rebate to compensate the loss in export sector. With the overvalued official 
exchange rate in the mid 80s the authorities introduced swap market to help raise the 
profitability of the export sector. Furthermore, the government increased the foreign 
exchange retention ratio to offset the adverse effect of official exchange rate for 
exporters. In order to join the GATT China embarked on third exchange reform 
aiming to meet international norms. This reform finally leaded to exchange rate 
unification. At last China had the current account liberalization.  
  Even though, the government control in foreign exchange system is still tight (Lin 
2003). The evidence may be given such as transaction verification for import payment 
and export receipt, and evaluation of exporters’ performance in meeting foreign 
exchange market. Still, China has the tight control on capital account partly because 
of the Asian Financial Crisis. However, after the accession to the WTO China has to 
open up the domestic financial markets to foreign investment after all. This seems to 
be a formidable task for Chinese government to resolve the weaknesses of the 
financial sector and inefficiencies of the state owned banks.  
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Chapter 3:  An assessment of China’s Exchange Rate Policy 
3.1  Introduction  
“In the last decade, there has been a hollowing out of the middle of the 
distribution of exchange rate regimes in a bipolar direction, with the share of 
both hard pegs and floating gaining at the expense of soft pegs. This is true not 
only for economies active in international capital markets, but among all 
countries. A look ahead suggests this trend will continue, certainly among the 
emerging market countries. The main reason for this change, among countries 
with open capital accounts, is that soft pegs are crisis-prone and not viable over 
long periods.” (Fischer 2001) 
  The above comment by Fisher suggests, as we have seen in the previous chapter, 
that fixed exchange rates are liable to speculator attacks and it is played crucial 
negative role in Asian Crisis. Hernandez and Montiel (2001) find that most of the East 
Asian countries, such as Korea, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand now 
have more flexible exchange rate systems than before the crisis. However, China still 
has a managed pegged exchange rate regime (with permitted fluctuations), the so 
called managed floating exchange rate. Mckinnon and Schnabel (2002) argue that 
there are inevitable factors for emerging markets to adopt fixed exchange rate policy 
despite the objection by IMF. Empirically Mckinnon and Schnabel (2002) found that 
the fluctuation of East Asian countries’ exchange rates is not the sign of flexible 
exchange rate; rather as the over depreciation during crisis leads to appreciation, there 
is trend for exchange rates to be pegged against the dollar. Also Hernandez and 
Montiel (2001) observe that the official foreign reserves in China, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand have increased surprisingly 
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fast since 1998. In Korea, Indonesia, and Philippines, foreign exchange reserves 
accumulation have been far above their pre-crisis levels. The rise in foreign exchange 
reserves can be seen as an attempt to dampen exchange rate appreciation after the 
over depreciation during crisis. Furthermore, the reserve accumulation could also 
support future official interventions to secure dollar pegs. Empirically, countries, such 
as Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, who have large foreign reserves have 
successfully defended their pegs against speculative attacks, or even, prevent the 
attacks from happening ex ante. This implies that emerging countries are fit enough to 
sustain fixed exchange rates. However, the literature offers little by way of consensus 
on the viability of exchange rate regimes for emerging markets apart from 
highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of specific cases. 
  In this chapter we mainly focus on the literature in two respects, first in why 
emerging markets are so prone to adapt fixed exchange rates. We focus on this point 
from a theoretical perspective. Second, we review the literature on currency China’s 
exchange rate regime, and the discussion of its future exchange rate regime.   
3.2  Why fixed exchange rate regime? 
  There are several reasons to adopt a fixed exchange rate regime, among them all, 
perhaps the nominal anchor argument for monetary policy is of most interest by 
academic economists. The argument is first derived from a closed economy case by 
Kydland and Prescott (1977), who show that the central planner has a time 
inconsistency problem when they conduct monetary policy. There can be inflationary 
bias when monetary policy is fully discretionary. Nominal anchor is just based on the 
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idea that discretionary policy can cause central planner’s inflationary bias, and 
pegging currency to a relatively low inflation country may prevent domestic 
government from building inflation bias, thus ensuring price stability. The implication 
of adapting a nominal anchor for the exchange rate is as follows: assuming capital is 
relatively mobile, a nominal peg to US dollar, say, indicates targeting the US interest 
rate. An expansionary policy in domestic country would widen the interest differential 
between domestic and foreign country, and entail inflow of capital putting 
appreciation pressure on the value of domestic currency. Since exchange rate is fixed, 
a central bank has to sell domestic currency in the international financial market. By 
doing so, the ex ante expansionary monetary policy is sterilized. In effect, a nominal 
anchor ‘imports’ monetary discipline and low inflation by requiring that the central 
bank follow the monetary policy of another country. Nominal anchor mainly concerns 
the price expectation by individuals. Therefore, with nominal anchor, individuals 
would expect low inflation in the future because the currency peg will prevent the 
central planners from expanding money supply even if they wanted to. Thus a country 
with a nominal anchor can attain a lower level of inflation for any given level of 
output.    
  Since the nominal anchor approach works through the individual’s expectation of 
inflation, an obvious criticism of nominal anchor is whether the announcement of 
fixed exchange rate is credible. Mishkin (1999) points out that accountability is a 
problem for many central banks in emerging markets. If central banks lack credibility, 
then fixed exchange rate may be worse than floating exchange rate, since floating 
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exchange rate can as least play a key indicator of the stance of monetary policy. 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) note that from the currency speculator’s perspective it is 
questionable that any pegged regime is truly credible. They also observe when capital 
mobility is high, even if there is no danger of a balance of payment crisis, 
government’s pledge to defend against large scale speculative attack is not credible. 
Frankel (2003) also stresses that speculators know that the harm caused to domestic 
investment and bank solvency by interest rate hikes employed in defence of fixed 
parity often has political costs severe enough to make the defence unsustainable. 
Frankel (2000) and Cottarelli and Giannini (1997) also show that even with currency 
board arrangement, in which the exchange rate is fixed by law and backed by foreign 
reserves, currency boards are unlikely to anchor expectations if law is not respected or 
authority cannot be delegated. In the case of China’s exchange rate, the revaluation in 
July 2005 implies that the credibility of this fixed exchange rate regime is no reliable. 
The fact that ‘revaluation fears’ have appeared regularly in the financial press, and 
that policymakers have had to promise repeatedly that the RMB will remain ‘stable’, 
reveals some of the insecurity with which market participants view the policy. 
Moreover, as an anchor for inflationary expectations, the policy can hardly be credible 
while China’s capital controls extend the authorities space for monetary discretion. 
Even if the authorities made the peg official by announcing buying and selling rates 
for the currency, it is unlikely that this would improve the policy’s credibility, given 
the China’s central bank nearly complete subordination to political authority, and its 
lack of financial accountability. Another crucial factor for nominal anchor to work is 
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the unexpected shocks to which foreign monetary policy responds are the same from 
those faced by the pegging country. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) note, that by giving 
up the monetary policy, domestic central planners lose their ability to respond to 
external and domestic shocks with monetary expansion or contraction policy. 
Although fiscal policy is enhanced when there is fixed exchange rate as suggested by 
the Mundell-Fleming model, empirically fiscal policy has transmission lags and 
lengthy administration costs.  
  Another reason of fixed exchange rate adoption is derived from game theory; the 
outcome of fixed exchange rate is the result of Nash Equilibrium. International trade 
normally constitutes a major part of GDP in emerging markets. Therefore, fixed 
exchange rate can prevent competitive depreciation. Frankel (2003) stresses that 
fixing exchange rates can be an efficient institution for achieving the cooperative 
solution. He also observes that each time one country in East Asia or Latin America 
devalued, its neighbours were instantly put at a competitive disadvantage, serving to 
transfer the balance of payments pressure to them (e.g., from Mexico to Argentina in 
1995, from Thailand to the rest of East Asia in 1997, and from Brazil to the rest of 
South America in 1999). However, the devaluation did not work, when its competitors 
were devaluing at the same time. Thus a cooperative agreement not to devalue may 
seem reasonable.  
  A third reason for the exchange rate to be fixed is that high exchange rate 
variability would create uncertainty, which would discourage international trade and 
investment. By fixing the exchange rate to its major trade partner can then eliminate 
P a g e  | 42 
 
exchange rate risk and transaction costs, and thus encourage investment and 
international trade. There is some debate on this argument. First, any intervention by 
government in exchange markets is a distortion in theory; exchange rate uncertainty is 
merely the symptom of variability in economic fundamentals. Second, given the 
existence of future and forward market, any exchange rate variability can be hedged 
away in international trade. Third, empirically there is no clear evidence indicating 
that exchange rate uncertainty shows adverse effect on international trade. These 
arguments seem debatable if we consider emerging markets. Many developing 
countries have no sophisticated forward or future market, and even where they do, the 
transaction cost and exchange risk premium on hedging are costly. Also most 
empirical evidence on the relationship between exchange rate variability and 
international trade are based on industrial countries. The recent econometric studies 
find strong evidence of an effect of exchange rate variability on trade based on 
developing countries (Frankel 2003). Calvo and Reinhart (2002) also use data set on a 
worldwide scale and find that exchange rates in developing countries are less volatile 
due to heavy dependence on international trade, and interest rates and financial 
reserves are much more volatile than in industrial countries. They conclude that 
emerging markets have so-called “Fear of Floating” properties. Reinhart (2000) 
concludes that:  
“The root causes of the marked reluctance of emerging markets to float their 
exchange rates are multiple. When circumstances are favourable (i.e., there are 
capital inflows, positive terms of trade shocks, etc.) many emerging markets 
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are reluctant to allow the nominal (and real) exchange rate to appreciate. … 
When circumstances are adverse, the fear of a collapse in the exchange rate 
comes from pervasive liability dollarization. Devaluations are associated with 
recessions and inflation, and not export-led growth.” 
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) argue that there are two aspects explaining fear of 
floating. First, as we argued above, fixed exchange rate can anchor one country’s 
price level.6
  “Original sin” is another reason for fixed exchange rate argued by Eichengreen and 
Hausmann (1999). “Original sin” is defined as a situation in which the domestic 
currency cannot be used to borrow abroad or to borrow long term. Their empirical 
studies on emerging markets shows that all domestic investments have either a 
maturity mismatch- long term investments financed by short term loans, or currency 
mismatch- investments using domestic currency financed by foreign currency. This 
problem is mainly due to the case that external liabilities are necessarily denominated 
in foreign exchange which is unable to hedge because of incompleteness and fragility 
of domestic financial markets, such as the forward market. In order to offset the 
non-existent future or forward exchange, the government is induced to provide an 
informal hedge when borrowing abroad by keeping the exchange rate fixed to major 
currencies. Domestic banks can then repay their foreign debts and minimize exchange 
 Second, volatile capital flows could affect nominal exchange rates and 
because the domestic price level is relatively sticky, it will lead to large changes in a 
country’s real exchange rate. Its international competitiveness could fluctuate sharply.  
                                                        
6 Especially as China have high percentage of international trade invoiced in US dollar (Mckinnon 2002). 
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rate risk. Mckinnon (2001) notes that if a country’s financial markets are condemned 
by original sin, its regulatory authorities have strong incentives to undertake exchange 
rate pegging in order to mitigate payments risk. 
3.3  Current exchange rate policy and currency revaluation 
  In this section we review the literature on current China’s exchange rate policy and 
look at its possible future policy on exchange rate. In previous chapter we have seen 
that after July 2005 China officially adapted a new exchange rate policy; instead of 
pegging purely to US dollar, RMB is targeting a basket of currencies7
  Shah, Zeileis, and Patnaik (2005) consider only four major currencies in the RMB 
basket (US dollar, the yen, the Euro, and British pound) using data only the initial few 
months after July 2005, and found that RMB is still tightly pegged to no other 
currencies except the US dollar. Frankel and Wei (2006) and Ogawa (2006) found that 
RMB exchange rate policy in the second half of 2005 was still a tight fixed exchange 
rate solely on dollar using a list of 11 currencies as constituents of the reference 
basket. Eichengreen (2006) use daily data from July 22 2005 to March 2006, and 
found that 90 percent of the weight in RMB currency basket is still US dollar, there is 
. However, 
central bank does not reveal the targeting weight on currencies. The secrecy of 
targeting basket triggers a wave of postulation on the weight of basket currencies. The 
empirical studies on this topic examine whether China’s authorities really let the 
exchange rate policy move towards more flexibility.  
                                                        
7 There is a list of 11 currencies as constituents of the reference basket, the major currencies in the basket are the 
US dollar, the euro, the yen, and the Korean won. In addition, the rest of the currencies in the basket are the 
Singapore dollar, the British pound, the Malaysian ringgit, the Russian ruble, the Australian dollar, the Thai baht, 
and the Canadian dollar.  
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not significance on other currencies.   
  All the above studies used data before mid 2006, whereas Yamazaki (2006) used up 
to date estimation and found there are considerable weights on Euro, Japanese Yen 
and Korean Won. His estimation however is in terms of levels rather than changes on 
the weight and the trend of basket weight, and had a relatively small number of 
observations.   
  Frankel and Wei (2007) allow for evolution of China’s exchange rate regime since 
July 2005, and divided the sample into six approximately equal size periods. They 
found that the first six months after the announcement of exchange rate regime 
change by China’s authorities, the RMB still heavily pegged to US dollar which is 
indistinguishable from a dollar peg. Since February 2006, the weight in the basket 
was shifted to other currencies, such as the Malaysian ringgit, the Korean won, the 
Russian rubble, and the Thai baht, but no evidence of positive weigh to the Japanese 
yen and Euro. However, the weight on US dollar is still 0.9.   
  To summarize, there was very little change in the fixed exchange rate regime within 
2005. Not only did the true weight on the dollar in the basket remain close to 1, but 
the tightness of the fit was similar to that of the Hong Kong dollar, which is on a 
currency board. In 2006, the de facto regime began to put a significant, but still small, 
weight on some non-dollar currencies.  
Is the current exchange arrangement adopted by China right, or not? China is now 
categorized by IMF as a country having a conventional pegging system, which means 
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China belongs to one of the middle group of exchange arrangements8
Robert Mundell (China Daily 2003) argued that the pegged exchange rate regime 
works well for China. He also criticized the IMF: “There’s never before in history (or 
never been a situation) that international monetary authorities ... try to press a country 
with an inconvertible currency to appreciate its currency.” He suggests that fixed 
exchange rate is still in the interest of China as long as capital account is not fully 
liberalized, as the appreciation of exchange rate will lead to deflation pressure as in 
the period of Asian Crisis
. Since the issue 
about the exchange rate and regime of RMB was initially put on table by international 
institutions IMF in the January of 2003, the debate over this issue has continued 
unabated. This led to an abrupt influx of the literature on the valuation and policy of 
the Chinese currency. A large number of interesting articles has touched upon this 
issue from various perspectives. However, the economists have not reach consensuses 
on two points: the degree of the undervaluation of RMB and the time and steps to 
adjust the current exchange regime of China.  
9. Mostly importantly there will be negative impact on 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and export sector, which will hurt GDP growth as 
these two sectors are the main contributions for GDP. However, Jeffrey Frankel10 
(2004) pointed out, “China, for one, is too large a country to dollarize or adopt a 
currency board, but is probably not ready for pure floating either. That leaves 
intermediate regimes 11
                                                        
8 On public occasion, the Chinese government declares its exchange arrangement is a ‘Managed Floating’ system. 
9 Given the current situation in China where inflation is the major concern for government, this may promote 
exchange rate appreciation in the present time.  
10 Written for a High-Level Seminar on Foreign Exchange System, Dalian, China, May 26-27, 2004. 
11 See Frankel 1999 paper for his identification of exchange rate regimes. 
, either the current adjustable peg, on the one hand, or 
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alternatives such as a target zone, centred either on the dollar or on a basket, on the 
other hand”. Conversely, if the exchange arrangement that China is pursuing at the 
moment is compatible with its economic fundamentals, should China perpetuate this 
exchange rate regime? Eighengreen (2003) argues that the fragility of China’s banking 
system and immaturity of the capital market are not excuses for maintaining a pegged 
exchange rate regime. He suggests that China’s authorities should abandon the US 
dollar peg and adopt a floating system. However, the revaluation of the RMB would 
certainly influence the international foreign exchange market since purchases of US 
government bonds by China’s authorities are one of most important ways that US 
finances its trade deficits. Some Chinese scholars, such as Yu (2004), paid more 
attention to the exchange rate regime than to the adjustment of the exchange rate 
alone. They admitted that there was pressure for Chinese exchange rate to appreciate, 
and suggested that the China’s authorities work hard towards a more flexible 
exchange rate regime, instead of simply adjusting the level of the exchange rate. 
However, regarding the timing of the adjustment, it was thought that the best time to 
adjust would be when the RMB has no attraction for speculators, in other word to 
avoid speculative attack. Li Gang-Liu (2004) suggested that the central bank should 
allow the RMB to target US dollar in a wider range. 
IMF (2004) and some other academics like Funke and Rahn (2004) concluded that 
“there is no strong evidence that the Renminbi is substantially undervalued”, such an 
opinion soon submerged in a sea of working papers that held the opposite viewpoint. 
Based on a variety of models and approaches such as traditional balance of payment 
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equilibrium, absolute or relative Purchasing Power Parity, general equilibrium models 
and some other simulation exercises, plenty of distinguished versions of predictions of 
the ‘fair’ value of RMB had been made.  
  Many economists use PPP to examine the level of RMB. Funke and Rahn (2004) 
use the simple “Big Mac index” and “Starbucks Latte index” to examine the level of 
RMB. “Big Mac index” in April 2003 shows that RMB was undervalued by 56 
percent. According to the “Starbucks Latte index” however shows RMB was 
undervalued by only one percent as of 2004. Single commodity price comparison 
approach has its own limitations. Kanamori and Zhao (2006) argue that the big 
difference may be explained by the degree of penetration of the commodity into the 
domestic market. Thus, it may be that the Big Mac has become quite common for 
ordinary PRC people and has to compete with other traditional foods, while Starbucks 
Latte is still uncommon, and may be an exclusive commodity that cannot be 
substituted by traditional commodities, and therefore is basically priced based on 
overseas prices.  
  The simple PPP approach, although simple and easy to understand, has this bias. It 
has been well recognized that PPP does not hold in short run, even in long PPP is not 
a good indicator for emerging market due to its market incompleteness.  Goldstein 
(2004) and Goldstein and Lardy (2003) consider China’s current account, capital 
account and GDP growth, using balance of payment equilibrium method, found that 
RMB was severely undervalued by 15 to 30 percent. They also argue that China’s 
authorities intended to manipulate their currency in order to gain competitive 
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advantage in international trade. They then suggest currency reform for China’s 
authorities in steps. Firstly for the interest of international community and the advice 
from IMF, RMB should appreciate to its equilibrium level, without liberalizing capital 
account and adopting floating exchange rate. They suggest that China’s exchange rate 
policy could appreciate RMB by at least 15 percent, widening the margin around the 
fixed exchange rate and switch from a US dollar peg to a basket peg. China’s 
exchange rate policy can finally reach managed floating rate with liberalization of 
capital account unless China’s banking system and financial market especially 
financial hedging instrument such as forward and future market, becoming relatively 
stronger.  
  Williams (2003) argue that it would be better off for China’s authorities to adjust 
their exchange rate at one time rather than divided into steps. His suggestion is based 
on the expectation of market participants. He notes that the adjustment should be 
significant enough to convince market participants that the change was complete and 
that there would be no second step, since otherwise a revaluation might simply lead to 
more speculative attack through capital inflow.  
  Bergstein (2003) suggested a single-step revaluation of the RMB by 20 to 25 per 
cent. The RMB trade weighted average exchange rate had been depreciated by 10 
percent and driven the dollar down against all other currencies since 2000. He 
compares the RMB exchange rate policy with other historical even and argues that 
China’s fast growth of current account surplus and overheated domestic economy can 
be regarded as classic signs of substantial currency undervaluation. He then illustrates 
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the example of Japanese economic bubble following the Plaza meeting, and 
emphasizes that the bubble and the following economic collapse was due o Japanese 
yen undervaluation. Thus in short run China’s exchange rate policy is to revaluing the 
RMB, which would help China to reduce its massive trade surplus and stabilize the 
domestic price level. The sooner the revaluation the more likely to avoid an 
inflationary bubble that would eventually burst and curtail growth.   
  Wren Levis and Benassy-Ouere (2004) use quarterly data and Behavioural 
Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) approach found that the RMB to US dollar 
should adjust to 6.5, which mean an appreciation of 28 percent, in order to restore 
current account equilibrium12
Barry Eichengreen (2004) suggested that a modest appreciation for RMB on the 
order of 5 to 10 per cent will be appropriate for the current economic conditions 
facing China. Beside these estimates, the Economist (2003) radically implied that the 
exchange rate of RMB against US dollar was undervalued by nearly 56 per cent in 
terms of the Big Macs index. Two economists from Western Connecticut State 
University, Zhang and Pan (2004), accommodated the variables like the inflation 
differential, the long-run movement of the real exchange rate and the government 
intervention into their model of exchange rate estimation. According to their 
estimation, the exchange rate of RMB should have appreciated by 15 to 22 per cent in 
. They also estimate bilateral equilibrium exchange rate, 
and found real equilibrium exchange rate stay the same since 2001, which means 
China’s exchange rate was undervalued by 47 percent in 2003.  
                                                        
12 They found that appreciation would be even larger if the objective were to balance both current accounts and 
capital flow in China.  
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2003 relative to the year 1996 without government intervention. Chang and Shao 
(2004) even proposed an exact number of 22.5% undervaluation in the exchange rate 
of RMB, with a P-value of 0.286. 
  Hughes-Cromwick (2003) points out that it is difficult to estimate the RMB 
misalignment because as in other emerging countries, data availability and reliability 
and capital controls would lead big difference between the results found through 
different approaches. Also “determining the fair value of a currency is difficult, 
particularly when there are major structural changes that are almost impossible to 
model. China’s case is arguably more difficult than most other cases, precisely 
because of the scale and speed of the structural changes that have been taking 
place13
  Although the strand of economists who had undertaken the technical calculation of 
the ‘equilibrium’ value of the RMB declared that there were clear evidence showing 
the RMB was undervalued, most of them did not agree that a swift revaluation would 
resolve the underlying problems facing China once and for all. For example, 
Goldstein (2004) instead proposed that “China should take a ‘two-step’ currency 
reform”, switching from a unitary US dollar peg to a basket peg for the first step and 
then transiting “to a ‘managed-float’, along with a significant liberalization of China’s 
capital outflows” for the second. Eichengreen
.” They summarise all the empirical studies on the RMB and conclude that the 
range of the RMB undervaluation was somewhere from 5 to 30 percent.  
14
                                                        
13 ‘The Case for a Stable Chinese RMB’ by Morgan Stanley economist Stephen L. Jen 
14  Prepared for the Asian Economic Panel, Hong Kong, April, 2004. 
 (2004) also argued that “what is 
needed is not a big step revaluation but a shift to a new regime in which China is 
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better able to tailor local financial conditions to local needs”. 
  From a long-run perspective, a managed floating or freely floating exchange 
arrangement will be unarguably a better choice for China than the current peg. 
Freidman (1953) point is that “exchange rates adjust much faster than domestic prices 
and quantities, making this insulation all the more valuable, remain a potent one.” 
Floating exchange rate has its own advantage in that is it acts as the buffer against 
external shocks. If there is positive shock exchange rate will appreciate and vice 
versa.  
Most importantly the floating exchange rate gives the monetary authority the 
independence to respond to domestic and external shocks. Chinn and Miller (1998) 
argue that since developing country normally has incomplete bond market, monetary 
policy is always better than fiscal policy. Empirical studies (Edwards and Savastano, 
1999) also suggest that the evidence of effectiveness of nominal anchor in fixed 
exchange rate is inconclusive.  
Adopting an exchange rate regime with greater flexibility would remove the 
constraints that had been put on the authorities’ monetary policy autonomy, improve 
the economy’s ability to stand up with internal and external shocks and reduce the 
volatility that frequently haunted the economic activity. However, the realities in 
China’s economy at present are rather stranded. A floating exchange rate regime 
implicitly requires both goods and capital to freely flow. Obviously, China should 
relax its strict regulation on capital flows once it allows the exchange rate of RMB to 
float freely. This is not too much different from a ‘Big Leap’ at such a moment, when 
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the exchange rate of RMB is still pegged against a basket of currencies and the capital 
flows are still under control. In addition, much empirical experience has shown that it 
may be too risky to allow cross-border capital to flow freely while maintaining a hard 
pegged exchange rate regime. Thus, China seems to face a dilemma. The way out for 
China may be the last resort i.e. gradually adopting an exchange arrangement with 
more flexibility and finally allowing the exchange rate to freely fluctuate at an 
appropriate time with the removal of control on capital movements. The appropriate 
timing depends on China’s economic fundamentals and its trade and financial 
integration with the rest of the world.  
  After China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 coupled 
with its promise to further open domestic financial market from the end of 2006, it is 
reasonable to believe that the integration of China’s economy with the outside world 
is accelerating. If China wants to enjoy the bliss brought about by the flexible 
exchange arrangement, some preparations must be done now.  
  In fact, the philosophy of gradualism also won much support from quite a few 
prominent academics although they may diverge in choosing what kind of transitory 
regimes and dealing with the sequence of opening capital account and adjusting 
exchange arrangement. With the help of capital controls, limited exchange rate 
flexibility will prompt domestic enterprises and financial intermediations to care more 
about the fluctuation of exchange rate and encourage them to employ more advanced 
financial skills and instruments, which had been already developed by industrial 
economies, to hedge the currency exchange related risks. The increased sensitivity to 
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exchange rate fluctuation and more hedging instruments will in turn facilitate the 
development of domestic capital market and foreign exchange market. If so, this will 
lay a solid foundation for the Chinese economy before removing the restrictions on its 
capital account step by step and finally transiting to a flexible exchange rate regime. 
3.4  Outstanding Costs of Maintenance of Current Peg  
3.4.1 Stylized Facts of China Growing Trade and International Reserves  
  Figure 3.1 shows China’s import and export over the past two decades. From 
1978 to 2004, the import and the export measured in US dollars has grown from 10.89 
and 9.75 billion, to 561.23 and 593.33 billion respectively, amounting to an annual 
average growth rate of nearly 17.5% and 17.7%. 
 




   
 In contrast to the steady progress of imports and exports, the net export growth 
great volatility. Between 1978 and 1990, China’s net export appeared in surplus in 
only two years -- 1982 and 1983, and a typical boom-bust cycle existed. Such a 
Source of data: National Bureau of Statistics & Ministry of Commerce of the People’s 
Republic of China. Official Website: www.mofcom.gov.cn 
Note: The right-hand scale applies to Net Export only. 
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situation only changed after 1994, when the foreign exchange policy reform was put 
into effect. Since then, the net export began to show a persistently upward trend, and a 
current account surplus lasted in the following years until to date.  
  The foreign reserves held by the central bank of China were also rapidly increasing. 
(See Figure 3.2). In the 1980s, the maximum amount of foreign reserves kept by the 
People’s Bank of China never reached 10 billion US dollars. Since 1994 reform, 
however the foreign reserves began to grow exponentially. Particularly in the three 
years to 2005, the foreign reserve rocketed up. In 2002, China’s foreign reserve was 
about 286.41 billion. 




US dollars, but it became 403.25 in 2003. In 2004, it jumped even higher, to nearly 
610 billion dollars. In the first nine months of 2005, such an explosive growing trend 
kept running on. By the end of September, the foreign reserve reached its historic 
recorded top -- more than 760 billion US dollars, which is almost one and a half times 
more than its concurrent total value of import. 
Source of data: State Administration of Foreign Exchange of China. 
Official Website: www.safe.gov.cn  
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 In 1994, China reformed its exchange rate regime. This reform did achieve 
significant successes in many aspects: the soaring inflation rate was pulled down, 
from a rate of 24.2% in 1994 to 16.9% in the following year and finally to a nearly 
1% deflation in 1998 after the outburst of Asian crisis (see Figure 3.3); at the same 
time, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the foreign trade increased substantially. 
However, the negative impacts on the economy were also becoming increasingly 
protrusive due to the changed economic situations. Such a model of stimulating 
economic growth by maintaining a fixed exchange rate to stabilize domestic price, 
reduce the uncertainty, attract foreign investment and increase export to pull up the 
employment growth, is creating for China much more costs than benefits. 
Figure 3.3 Yearly CPI Change of China: 1987-2004. 
      
 
 
   
3.4.2 Constraints on Monetary Operation 
  With the increasing of foreign reserves in the central banks balance sheet, the 
People’ Bank of China is facing mounting pressures. The space left for the PBC to 
Source of data: IMF International Financial Statistics, Nov 2005  
Data Access Provided by Economic and Social Data Service (ESDS) 
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manoeuvre its monetary policy instruments is being squeezed away little by little. 
On one hand, to keep the ex ante exchange rate system running well, the central bank 
is forced to frequently intervene in the foreign exchange market to buy the excessive 
supply of foreign currency. Without offsetting operations, this will lead domestic 
monetary base to expand remarkably. The pressure of this kind on the central bank is 
undoubtedly huge. Figure 3.4 shows the changing position of central bank held 
foreign reserves from 2002 to 2005. We can see that, the ratio of foreign reserves to 
the central bank’s total asset has climbed from about 0.4 in the first quarter of 2002 up 
to nearly 0.6 in the third quarter of 2005. Even though only half of these increased 
reserves is sterilised, the undue increment of monetary base is still considerable.  
  
Figure 3.4 Quarterly Ratio of Foreign Reserve to the Total Asset of the Central Bank 
of China. 
      
 
 
   
Source of data: The People’s Bank of China 
Official Website: www.pbc.gov.cn  
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On the other hand, to avoid the negative impacts of over expansionary monetary 
supply on domestic economy, such as the subsequent investment impulse and inflation 
soaring, the central bank has to take some inhibitive measures to curfew the excessive 
growth of domestic credit, either through raising interest rate, or by increasing the 
reserve requirement or through open market operations. 
However, to raise the interest rate, it will instantly stimulate the perceived profit 
motives of international speculators. At the present moment, it is generally believed 
that the control on capital outflow is more effectively fulfilled than that on capital 
inflow in China. Obviously, increasing the interest rate will intrigue more speculative 
money to get around the capital controls and ultimately form domestic supply of 
foreign currency. Either partly or fully sterilising this money, the pressure on domestic 
money supply will only grow up rather than climb down. This will eventually 
undermine the efficacy of the interest rate as an optional instrument of monetary 
operations.  
  Moreover, domestic regulatory authorities of banking sector also find it lacks other 
more effective instruments to harness domestic loan expansion while maintaining an 
already very low baseline interest rate, except for strengthening some non-interest rate 
measures like ‘window guidance’ or additional administration. This, in turn, will 
increase the administration cost and will also hamper the effort to marketwise 
domestic interest rate, which is an objective that the Chinese authorities has been long 
pursuing. In any way, interest rate has no substantial role to play under the framework 
of using exchange rate as a nominal anchor.  
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  In like manner, there is also no unshakable reason to believe the sterilisation 
process can be pursued unlimitedly. With the mounting up of official holding of 
foreign reserve, the underlying costs of sterilisation go up substantially. In 2004, to 
avoid pouring oil on the already flammable domestic price, the central bank 
reinforced the strength of open market operation to offset the soaring foreign reserve 
by selling a large quantity of central bank bills to domestic commercial banks. In the 
same period, the data collected by IMF shows the baseline interest rate in China is 
about 3.3 per cent, the deposit and loan rate are respectively 2.25 and 5.58 per cent. If 
domestic commercial banks do not diversify their acquired deposit asset to the central 
bank bills that only pay the base interest rate, they can gain a higher marginal profit. 
Nevertheless, because of the substantive involvement of the government in domestic 
state-owned banks and its huge leverage on them, the banks were forced to accept the 
central banks’ offers. It does make much difference for banks whether to lend to 
commercial clients or to engage them in the central bank bills. 
  In addition, facing a weak discount rate (the baseline rate) of US dollar since 2001, 
which is only 0.75 per cent in 2002, 2 per cent in 2003 and nearly 3.15 per cent in 
2004, it has little doubt to believe that even the People’s Bank itself was losing its 
position on the present financial grounds. It implies that the central bank is paying the 
bill for playing the sterilisation game, and this will finally form the implicit fiscal 
burden.  
3.4.3  Increasing Exposure of Banking Sector   
  The banking system in China is almost commonly thought of as one of the systems 
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that potentially has the greatest risk. Weak institution, discounted supervision, 
underlying moral hazard and amassing non-performing loans (NPL), any of these 
weak points can give the Chinese banking sector a fatal strike. Whereas, in a fixed 
exchange rate regime, these weakness are often masked and even neglected. Although 
some Chinese officials have expressed in public occasion that the overall exposure of 
banking system to the exchange rate risk remains controllable, there are indications 
that such an exposure is rising.  
  In China, the banking deposits account for a dominant portion of the overall 
sources of financing in China. The banking institutions intermediate a substantive 
proportion of new financing. In the past three years, the domestic deposits continue 
building up. The data of People’s Bank manifests that, since the end of 2002, the ratio 
of the total deposits to the overall funds sources, which include all kinds of domestic 
deposits, securities and the circulated currencies, has been almost constantly above 
90%. And the ratio of the sum of domestic money and quasi money (M2) to Gross 
Domestic Product has risen from nearly 160% in 2002 to more than 172% in 2004. 
This is very remarkable, particularly for an emerging market economy.  
However, in ironic contrast to its dominating position in domestic financing, the 
operating performance of the Chinese banking institutions appears to lag far behind. 
The up-to-date reality is that the big four state-owned commercial banks holds 
roughly more than a half of the banking assets, and almost all of them face the tricky 
issue of non-performing loans. For almost decades, the ratio of the NPLs that 
originated from the Big Four state banks had never dropped below 90%. Even in 
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March of 2005, the authorities could only manage to reduce this ratio to 86%. The 
detailed break-down of current distribution of the non-performing loans across 
domestic banking institutions is shown in Figure 3.5. 
Figure 3.5 Distribution of Non-Performing Loans in Different Domestic banking 
Institutions by September 2005. 
     
 
  By September of 2005, according to the statistics of the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC), the overall non-performing loan is nearly 1.28 trillion Yuan 
using the 5-tier loan classification system. It is approximately equal to 158 billion US 
dollars and account for about 10 per cent of GDP. A note that must be given here is 
that this result was achieved just after two of the Big Four banks, the Bank of China 
and the Construction Bank of China, transferred 33.9 billion US dollars of 
non-performing loans between June and July of 2004 to the designated Asset 
Management companies. This is not the first time for the Big Fours to sell off their 
NPL. To utterly remove the issue of NPL is not as easy as ever imagined, particularly 
in China’s banking system on which the government has a great influence.  
Source of data: The China Banking Regulation Commission. 
Official Website: www.cbrc.gov.cn  
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Figure 3.6 Ratio of the Non-Performing Loans of State Commercial banks to the Total 
Banking Loans 
    
 
 
  Since 2003, the NPL ratio seemed embarking on a generalised downward trend (see 
Figure 3.6). But no sufficient evidences show that the non-performing loans have 
been substantially cut down. If observing that the bank lending in recent years is also 
climbing up simultaneously, it is not difficult to understand what happened behind the 
splendid data. Before the authorities would like to slack its rope on the state 
commercial banks and transform the Big Fours into modern banks that can operate 
independently to pursue profit, self-constraint to lower risk and strengthen internal 
reforms to compete, the final effect of current administrative measures to dispose the 
non- performing loans remains worth doubting.  
3.4.4  Exacerbating Price Distortion and Misallocation of Resource   
  In recent years, China has been keen on shooting for other countries’ admittance of 
its market economy status. Of course, in comparison with the situation two decades 
ago, it is undisputable that China is striding towards a modern market economy and 
Source of data: The China Banking Regulation Commission. 
Official Website: www.cbrc.gov.cn  
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has achieved a lot in this respect. However, even now, it is not rare to see the 
phenomena of price regulation and transformation, and halfway price transmission in 
China. The governments, central or local, still have great leverages in the economic 
activities, and the state enterprises still dominate the economy. The power of market 
remains limited so far. There is still large space left for China to deepen its 
marketisation reform further.  
  Firstly, let’s focus our attention on domestic oil sector, particularly on the oil price. 
Since 2003, the international crude oil price began to step hand over hand. Whereas, 
in satiric contrast, the domestic wholesale and retail price of finished oil product 
looked almost insusceptible. Even after the State Development and Reform 
Committee granted the domestic retail and wholesale petrol price to float up slightly 
in March 23rd of 2005, the average retail petrol price among the 35 main cities in 
China was just above 4 Yuan, less than 0.5 dollar per litre.  
  In 1998, the central government had tried to align domestic oil price with a 
composite index of the finished oil product prices in New York, Amsterdam and 
Singapore. But the oil price is now still under the government’s regulation in actuality. 
The price setting mechanism percolated unwanted disturbance of external oil price 
swing to domestic economy, nevertheless, coupled with the weakening dollar and 
soaring oil price, the potential costs for China -- the second largest consumer of oil 
product around the globe, is unarguably considerable.  
  So far so good, the two largest state energy enterprises, China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) and China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (CPCC), appear 
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tolerant of the current situation, although the domestic oil price has not soared as 
much as the international oil price. However, it is very clear that the profit of domestic 
energy enterprises is being crushed. There are also indications that the restrictions on 
domestic oil price are surrendering the downriver enterprises such as refinery plants 
and oil transporters to lose little by little. In addition, due to the over-low domestic 
petrol price, most oil refiners prefer exporting their finished product to selling 
domestic customers. This has led to insufficient domestic supply of petrol in some 
coastal areas. 
  If the price distortion in the oil price cannot be removed, it will probably endanger 
domestic energy supply and even jeopardize the economic growth at last. In addition, 
with the swift expansion of domestic automobile industry and the speedy increase in 
the number of private cars, the pressure to keep domestic petrol price low is ascending. 
It will be in great question if China can withstand the lumping shock brought about by 
a sudden let-go of domestic oil price in the near future.  
  Until now, the price setting rule in domestic oil product did work. However, in 
contrast to the abstentious oil price, the real estate price in China is really dazing, 
especially in the 35 main cities. According to the data of NBSC, only in the first 
quarter of 2005, the retail house price has ascended by 9.8% in these main cities. In 
Shanghai, the most attractive place for foreign funds, the house price goes up even 
higher, a jump of nearly 20%. Behind the soaring prices, it is not difficult to see the 
trail of international hot money. According to the statistics of the PBC’s Shanghai 
branch, the weight of foreign funds flowing into the real estates of Shanghai is 16.1% 
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in 2001, up to 23.5% in 2003 and above 25% in 2003. In the first five months of 2004, 
this proportion has ascended to 32.6%.  
  The reason that the hot money chooses China as their speculative object cannot be 
explained without touching the ex ante exchange rate arrangement once more. The 
most convincing explanation so far refers to the strong expectation of RMB 
revaluation. In addition, it is also undeniable that the loose domestic monetary 
condition and the downturn of domestic equity market add fuel to this fire. As soon as 
the current exchange rate regime continues operating, it is almost impossible to 
entirely block off the speculative attack on RMB of hot money. If the authorities don’t 
want to lose control over domestic property price while maintaining current exchange 
arrangement in operation, harsher restrictions and punishments have to be exercised. 
This will inevitably incur more administration cost and efficiency loss.  
  Furthermore, the already invited risk by the hot money is not too intangible to 
ignore. Massive break-in of international speculative capital creates not only potential 
bubbles in the real estate market, but also a great amount of potential non-performing 
loans in the banking system under the circumstance that about 60% of housing 
investment comes from the bank loans15
                                                        
15Statistical Data from China International Capital Corporation Ltd. 
. This will pose new challenge to the attempt 
of domestic banks to keep the non-performing loans under control and will also affect 
the stability of domestic financial system indirectly. If the government decided to 
adjust the exchange rate, then, the possible outcome such as bubble burst and the 
disruptive ruin of fund chain even the financial crisis must be well combed out.      
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3.5  Disquiet on Moving towards a More Flexible Exchange Rate      
Arrangement 
  Albeit the growing criticism of China’s export-led growth model, so far the 
economy seems to be working well: the trade and FDI are increasing, the economy is 
growing and the job opportunity is also aggrandizing. So a natural question will arise 
if China adjusts the ex ante exchange rate – will all these good fortunes reverse? 
  On account of the large share of import and export in the Gross Domestic Product, 
the trade is widely regarded as the linchpin of current prospering economic 
development and employment growth of China. If the RMB is allowed to appreciate, 
people will be naturally worrying about the possible negative effects on the trade 
sector, like the external competitiveness, the trade position, the profits of trade 
companies and the employment environment etc. However, it is also not gratuitous to 
believe that the negative shocks to the economy of a slight appreciation will be 
mitigated to some extent if we notice the structural features of the trade industry of 
China.  
  Due to the preferential policy that the Chinese government adopted since 1978 to 
attract Foreign Direct Investment, the foreign-owned enterprises in China has boomed 
largely. According to the data from the Ministry of Commerce, the accumulative total 
number of foreign enterprises that were officially approved was approximately 
512,504 by the January of 2005. These enterprises have brought in China a total 
amount of fund exceeding 566 billion US dollars. Most of the foreign enterprises are 
distributed along the coastline in the east part of China, where the infrastructure, like 
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swift transportation and advanced communication, is more favourable. Except for 
some high-tech products that China cannot produce and some kind of products that 
may be more popular in China, a large proportion of the products manufactured by 
foreign enterprises are again exported to the overseas markets. 
  Moreover, the weight of foreign enterprises in China’ total exports was also 
ascending. In 2004, the foreign enterprises exported more than 338.6 billion dollars of 
product, which accounted for 57% of total export; the weight of import share by 
foreign enterprises was 57.8%, a value worthy of 324.6 billion dollars. Among the 
foreign enterprises in China, the formidable multi-national companies occupy the 
dominant position. The entry of foreign multi-nationals into China’s trade industry 
makes the link of domestic production of trade goods with the rest of the world even 
closer.  
  Meanwhile, the internationalization of production chain resulted in a high quotient 
of import contents in the exports of China. According to Lau (2003), the domestic 
value-added content of China’s exports only occupied a proportion less than 30 per 
cent. Besides, the capital goods, raw materials and semi-manufactured goods but not 
the consumption goods make up the bulk of China’s imports. The imports of these 
kinds have low sensitivity to price. Therefore, the impacts on the trade incurred by the 
‘expenditure switching’ of a little bit stronger RMB are believed low: a more valuable 
RMB will cut down China’s exports, but will also make the imports even cheaper.  
  In addition, the concern also exists in the corporate sector, particularly in the 
companies undertaking export. Under the current situation that China’s export 
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accounts for almost more than 40% of GDP, the negative effects on the export 
companies of the appreciation of RMB is evident. A slight, even a tiny revaluation of 
exchange rate will narrow their already very low profit margins, and probably lead 
some of them to close down. However, a conclusion of this kind can only be drawn 
from a short run perspective, and the effect should not be exaggerated. “The share of 
private domestically owned firms in total exports is still less than 10 per cent16. And, 
insofar as a large share of export content takes the form of imported component even 
for private domestically owned firms, changes in the exchange rate affect both costs 
and revenues in the same direction and therefore do not give rise to severe financial 
difficulties17
  In the long run, adjustment of RMB exchange rate may create more opportunities. 
A moderate revaluation will wash out some profitless enterprise, turn away inefficient 
low-level competition and optimize the allocation of resource on one hand; on the 
other hand, it will also prompt the enterprises to increase investments, strengthen the 
research and development and use more advanced technology. Thus, it will not only 
make domestic enterprises more competitive, but also speed up the reconstructive and 
upgrade of domestic industries. In addition, facing the possible risks of exchange rate 
volatility, the enterprises will spontaneously take advantage of currently available 
hedging skills and instruments to shun away such currency related risks. Thus, it will 
also accelerate the improvement of domestic foreign exchange market. In a nutshell, 
there is no intolerable sacrifice that is needed to stand up by the enterprises while 
.”  
                                                        
16 According to the NBSC data, this share has increased up to 17% in 2004. It is 13.7% in 2003.  
17 “Chinese Currency Controversies”, Barry Eichengreen, April 2004. 
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facing a moderate exchange rate appreciation.  
  Another concern is that an upward adjustment of the RMB exchange rate may 
affect the in-flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) significantly. Despite the 
common argument that it is the current low-valued RMB that makes China more 
attractive to FDI, so far, there is little evidence of being able to link the level of 
exchange rate with the FDI flows convincingly. The level of FDI flowing into a 
country is mostly determined by the factors such as economic prospect, market size, 
and rate of return to investment, labour cost, productivity growth, macro environment 
and interrelated regulation, and not by the exchange rate. As for China, the 
fundamentals to attract FDI are undoubtedly strong while checking against these rules. 
Given the affluent labour resource, the swiftly improving productivity and the 
far-reaching access to the world market, there is no persuasive evidence showing that 
a moderate upward adjustment of RMB rate will entomb the flourishing FDI into 
China.  
  In like manner, some worries exist in China’s banking system, too. The foreign 
assets and liabilities of banks will also change correspondently once the exchange rate 
of RMB changes. The varying margins will be finally reflected in the balance sheets 
of banks, and will inevitably affect the profit in the banking sector. But the final effect 
will depend on the net foreign asset position of domestic banks. So far, available 
evidence tends to manifest that the impacts of a slight revaluation of RMB on 
domestic banks are minor. 
  Since the central government re-valued the currency on July 21 of 2005, the stock 
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price performances of several domestic publicly listed banks, like Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank and Huaxia Bank, were rather 
stable. The following quarterly financial reports of these banks were not much 
affected. The balance sheet effects of RMB revaluation on these banks seemed not as 
amazing as ever estimated. As for the big four state commercial banks, such a slender 
exchange rate shock is also believed to have limited impact because the weight of net 
foreign asset in the total asset of these four banks is still low.  
  In addition, it will be too rash and incomplete simply departing from the aggregate 
statistical data before we have an extensive and intensive investigation on the 
asset-liability structures of individual domestic bank, such as maturity of liabilities 
and securities, currency composition. And, we are not yet very sure about if any 
possible active effects on the asset quality of domestic banks could be generated and 
spoilt over by adjusting the exchange rate of RMB. 
  Finally, because most of the foreign exchange transactions have to go through 
domestic banking institutions at the moment, the domestic banks have more 
opportunities to practice foreign currency management and develop more products of 
foreign exchange to shield away foreign exchange related risks. Accordingly, the 
sensitivity and ability of domestic banks to deal with the risks of these kinds are 
relatively higher while comparing with other sectors, although the categories and 
products of hedging instrument that can be chosen by domestic banks are still limited. 
Thus, the effect on domestic banking sector of a tender revaluation will be bounded 
and a controllable process of adjusting RMB exchange rate will be a sensible choice 
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for China. 
   
3.6  Summary 
  Although China’s economy has benefited a lot from fixed exchange rate 
arrangement, it seems that it needs a more flexible exchange rate policy when China 
opens its financial market. As for now, the soaring financial reserve accumulation has 
already shown its side effect- domestic investment overheating, inflation rate rising, 
and most importantly neutrality of monetary policy. As factor prices are raised in the 
world market, such as steel, oil, corps etc, the urge to revalue RMB is apparent.   
Sooner or later, the economy will embark on path of self-adjusting. China had better 
take the initiative than be forced to do so. Empirically, when looking back at the 
history of China’s exchange rate in the past decades, it is just a dynamic process of 
continual innovations and reforms.  
  To conclude, the literature on China’s exchange rate regime has not reached a 
consensus. The reasons why most of emerging countries are so prone to adapting 
fixed exchange rate are theoretically viable. Nominal anchor, Fear of Floating, 
Original Sin and other factors seem reasonable theoretical defence for fixed regimes. 
However, empirical studies are inconclusive. As for China, the revaluation in July 
2005 seems to renege from the commitment of fixed exchange rate. This will 
negatively affect the credibility of the RMB, and possible attract a speculative attack. 
In general, economists argue the RMB is more or less undervalued by range from 
5-30 percent. However, the theoretical models such as PPP used on empirical studies 
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are different and may not be valid for emerging market. The data availability and 
viability is also a concern for most of emerging markets. It seems reasonable therefore 
that there is still a debate on whether China’s exchange rate regime is suitable in 
present time. But one thing is certain: in the long run a floating exchange rate is the 
ultimate goal given the liberalisation of capital account and sophisticated financial 
market.  
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Chapter 4  Theoretical Analysis: A Dual Exchange Rate Model 
4.1 Introduction 
This Chapter focuses on whether the current exchange rate regime in China should 
be made more flexible, and the property of such more flexible regime in stabilising 
external shocks. To cater for the specific situations in China, a dual exchange rate 
model, in the spirit of Flood and Marion (1983), is developed. Such a model can also 
be used as a framework to organise conflicting views regarding how exchange regime 
in China should be reformed.  
 A de jure and de facto dual exchange rate system have been operating in some 
countries, like Belgium and Luxembourg, for a long time after the second world war 
while co-existing among the dominant Bretton Woods system. However, relevant 
theoretical literature on this hybrid of a purely floating and a hardly pegging exchange 
arrangement did not emerge until the early 1970s, when two of the industrialized 
countries, France from 1971 August to 1972 May and Italy from the January of 1973 
to the March of 1974, implemented the dual exchange rate scheme to shield their 
economies away from external shocks resulted from frequent capital flight between 
countries. Since Fleming published one of his articles on dual exchange rate in 1971, 
his followers, like Argy and Porter (1972), Sheen in (1974), Lanyi (1975) and 
Dornbusch (1976) and Steinherr et al (1976), have individually stated their views to 
analyse the mechanism and outcome of the dual exchange rate system. 
 The setup of a dual exchange rate system can be thought of as the result of countries 
that need to deal with the risks caused by disruptive international capital movements 
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but also want to keep certain control over the exchange rate management and the 
magnitude of fluctuation of exchange rate at the same time. For those countries that 
are exposed to highly volatile international capital flows but still want to take 
advantage of some merits of a fixed parity exchange system, it proves to be an 
effective measure to put the dodgy capital movements under control. ‘Control’ can 
take in the form of either direct Quantitative Restriction (QR), or indirect fiscal 
interventions such as taxes or subsidies affecting capital transactions, or a dual 
exchange arrangement, or other macro guides through economic policy operation.  
 As in this sense, the system of dual exchange rates and the system of hard peg but 
with capital controls are juxtaposed together for comparisons and analyses. After 
deliberate research and careful considerations of the comparison of these two regimes, 
Adams and Greenwood (1984) said, “The adoption of a dual exchange rate system 
turns out to be equivalent to levying a tariff on financial transactions with the rest of 
the world. Furthermore, dual exchange rate systems and systems of capital controls 
are isomorphic to one another in the same sense that tariffs and quotas are identical in 
the standard trade literature.” 18
                                                        
18 IMF paper, received July 1983, revised version received June 1984.  
 In their paper, they also demonstrated how the 
implementation of a dual exchange rate system is parallel to a government levying 
taxes on private capital transactions and how QR is analogous to imposing quotas on 
private financial transactions. One point that must be made here is that the working 
mechanism and channels of these two exchange arrangements to affect the net capital 
flows may be slightly different: the dual exchange rate system influences the capital 
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movements through ad valorem taxes or subsidies that will affect the price difference 
between domestic and foreign assets but the quantitative restriction measures 
determine the capital transactions by limiting the quantities of traded assets. In spite 
of this, an undisputed fact is that, “in most cases, they operate in the same manner as 
taxes to restrict transactions in one direction without operating (as subsidies do) to 
encourage transactions in the opposite sense.” 19
The standard argument for a dual exchange rate regime assumes that the 
exchange transactions of goods and capital are segregated and channelled into two 
categories of markets: one for current account transactions and the other for capital 
account transactions. In such a system, a majority of imports and export transactions 
assigned with higher priority by the government are settled in the official foreign 
exchange market; a tiny proportion of other current account transactions with lower 
priority and all the capital transactions are settled in the financial exchange market. A 
prototype of the dual exchange market system is usually assumed with a pegged 
official exchange rate, or in other name the commercial rate, and a freely adjusted 
financial exchange rate. The government holds foreign reserves to maintain the 
official exchange rate but the financial rate is mainly determined by market force. As 
a consequence, when compared with the unified flexible exchange rate regime, the 
dual exchange arrangement can, to some degree, avoid the potentially excessive 
instability of exchange rate and the begotten disturbance to trade flows; and when 
compared with a purely fixed exchange rate regime, it gives the currency authorities 
 (Fleming, 1974) 
                                                        
19 See Marcus Fleming 1974, IMF Staff Papers. 
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some space to wield monetary policy by removing the pressures on foreign reserves 
caused by cross-country capital flights. 
In a dual exchange rate system, the changes in financial exchange rate influence 
the international capital flows by exerting impact on two separate motives of expected 
returns to traded securities: one is the “rate of return motive” and the other is the 
“capital gains motive” 20
e
. The first motive stems from the fact that the interest 
payments earned from the foreign assets are settled through current account channel. 
This means the effective return on foreign assets depends not only on the foreign 
interest rate but also on the spread between the commercial and financial exchange 
rate. If we denote the commercial exchange rate as  and the financial rate as s , 
then the domestic effective interest rate must be equal to *)( ise ⋅ , where *i  
represents the foreign interest rate. The spread between these two rates immediately 
creates a premium or discount on the interest payment obtained from foreign assets.     
The second motive is more directly affected by the expected changes in the financial 
exchange rate, which will reversely determine the expected capital gain or loss on 
domestic claims on foreign assets. A change in the financial exchange rate can lead 
the formation of expectation of the future movement in financial rate in both 
directions. Specifically speaking, a rise in the financial exchange rate above the 
commercial rate can be followed either by a further upward increase or by a 
downward ‘correction’. This will lead the desired domestic holding of claims on 
foreign assets to roll up or cut off.  
                                                        
20 See Anthony Lanyi 1975 IMF Staff Paper 
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  However, a successful dual exchange rate system implicitly calls for a strict or at 
least effective separation of markets, though it may even require a perfect segregation 
in theory. Or else, the government intervention may be an inherent requisite to 
maintain such a dual exchange system in operation because the spread between the 
commercial rate and the financial rate will incur massive speculative arbitrages or 
illicit evasion, which may in turn lead these two rates to diverge from each other even 
further and disequilibria and at worst to destroy the dual exchange system. 
  In this chapter, following prior studies in the literature we adopt the assumption that 
a perfectly separated dual exchange rate regime operates. With such a rule in place, a 
natural conclusion can be drawn that such a dual exchange market immediately 
“chokes off all net capital movements into and out of a country adopting the 
regime” 21
                                                        
21 See Robert Flood 1977 paper, Journal of International Economics. 
. (Flood, 1977)  The reason is not too hard to comprehend. In such a 
system, it is still free for domestic residents to trade the internationally issued 
securities e.g. like the consol-type bond. However, to purchase the foreign securities, 
only two choices eventually face the desired demand. In the first case, the domestic 
resident can buy the securities directly from another domestic resident who want to 
sell its claims on foreign assets without involving foreign exchange. This will actually 
lead the domestic securities to change hands only among domestic residents. In the 
second case, a domestic resident can pay foreign exchange to foreign sellers for the 
securities. But this will necessitate the domestic resident to own foreign exchange first. 
Facing a purely segregated capital market from the goods market, the only source of 
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foreign exchange supply can come from an exactly opposite sale of the securities by 
another domestic resident. These parallel transactions in contrary directions 
immediately cancel off any net capital movement between this country and the rest of 
the world. In either case, there will be no net capital flow crossing the border.  
  Finally, the fulfilment of entirely segregated dual exchange markets will have the 
following impacts on the economy: although the individual can change the 
constitution of his or her asset portfolio, the domestic residents as a whole cannot alter 
their net claims on the foreign assets; the economy can only alter its net wealth 
through the central bank by means of trade surplus or deficit. In addition, the 
implementation of such kind of dual exchange arrangement can also bring some 
potential losses to the whole economy. First, such an arrangement in place will 
hamper the free flow of capital across borders and thus lead to efficiency loss; second, 
it will incur interest rate differentials between countries and lead to distortion and 
misallocation of resources. 
  After reviewing the market structure and the operating mechanism of the dual 
exchange rate regime, we discuss a specific model, which is based mainly on the 
paper of Flood and Marion (1983). In this paper, the two authors analyzed and, to 
some extent, explained the behaviour of Italian lira during the implementation of a 
dual exchange scheme between 1973 and 1974 by virtue of a model of transitory 
exchange arrangement. We hope the historic experience obtained from the Italy’s case 
could shed some light on the understanding of the exchange rate dynamics that 
charactering the operation of the current system in China. 
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4.2  Theoretical Model and some Key Equations 
  A dual exchange rate system such as a fixed commercial exchange rate but a 
flexible financial rate and perfectly separated markets applies to the model. In 
addition, the domestic residents are implicitly assumed to have made the best of all 
the information available to them at each time point to form their expectation about 
the future movement of the financial exchange rate. 
  In this model, the supply of domestic goods is assumed to be constantly maintained 
at a level of
_
yyt = , and the demand and supply for any of goods are in equilibrium. 
The foreign currency price of goods *p  is exogenously fixed and no barrier to trade 
is imposed. The constantly held commercial exchange rate e  determines the 
domestic price of goods p , which also determines the partition of domestic output 
between domestic consumption and the country’s export. The arbitrage between the 
good markets of home and the rest of the world will keep the Purchasing Power Parity 
held:  
*
ttt pep +=                             (4.1) 
  On the asset sector, only two types of financial assets are considered: domestic 
money and an internationally traded but foreign issued consol-type bond. The 
domestic money is exclusively held by domestic residents and the bond can be traded 
across the border. The accumulation of domestic holding of the consol-type bonds 
immediately represents an increase in domestic net claims on foreign assets. The 
world value of domestic holding of the consol-type bond is tk  at time t . The 
internationally traded bond yields a rate of return of *i , which is fixed by assumption 
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and repatriated to the home country by the rest of the world at the commercial 
exchange rate. Putting the two channels affecting the expected yield on foreign 
securities together, then, the opportunity cost of domestic money holding at a time 
point can be characterized by: 
ttttt sseii
•
+−⋅+= )(* α                        (4.2) 
where α  is a parameter relying on the spread between the financial and commercial 
rate with a strictly positive value.  
The domestic money market is in equilibrium. The domestic real money supply 
t
s
t pm −  is equal to domestic real money demand that is a function of domestic real 
income and the opportunity cost of money holdings: 
 ttt
s
t iypm ⋅−⋅=− 21 ββ                       (4.3) 
where 01 >β  and  02 >β . 
 
The central bank balance sheet links the domestic monetary base with the foreign 
reserve f and the domestic credit d : 
tt
s
t dfm ⋅−+⋅= )1( ωω                        (4.4) 
where, 10 << ω , i.e. the nominal domestic monetary base is a weighted average of 
the foreign reserve component tf and the domestic credit component td . 
On the side of domestic saving and wealth accumulation, let w  denotes the total 
domestic marketable asset. It consists of a portionθ  of domestic money supply m  
and the rest portion )1( θ− of domestic nominal value of the domestic held bonds 
ks + . Deflated by the price index, the domestic real wealth can be expressed as: 
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    ttttt pksmw −+⋅−+⋅= )()1( θθ                    (4.5) 
where, 10 << θ . 
The identity that links domestic real wealth accumulation with the planned savings of 





ttttt piwyw −⋅+−⋅= γγ                     (4.6) 
where 01 >γ and 02 >γ , because the behaviour of planned saving of domestic 
residents is positively affected by both the output-wealth ratio and the real interest 
rate.  
  So far, we have completed the description of the model. However, to derive a 
solution from this model, some additional conditions must be clearly specified: 
1. The commercial exchange rate is fixed at 
_
e . 
2. The Purchasing Power Parity holds, so the domestic price level is fixed once 
the foreign price level *p  is given. In this case, *
__
pep += . 
3. The domestic capital market is perfectly separated from the goods market, so 
the stock of domestic holding of foreign bond is unchanged once the dual 
exchange system is implemented. Thus, we have a constant stock of bond 
_
k . 
4. The domestic component of monetary base d  is a variable exogenously 
determined by the government. Without government led expansion or 
contraction of domestic credit, d  will not change. The change in domestic 
monetary supply will be a sheer result of variation in foreign reserve. 
Therefore, 
_
ddt =  and 
••
= fmt ω . 
Before studying the dynamics and the effects of the shocks, the Appendix A 
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provides a background to the development of the Mundell-Flemming open economy 
model, which the author studied prior to the development of the above model. The 
above model and the phase diagram analysis to understand the dynamics can be better 
understood by providing a background to the analysis, covered in the Appendix A.   
The Dynamics of s and f 












1 /))1(( eiepdyG ⋅−−++⋅−−⋅=
−
αβωβ . This schedule has vertical-axis 
intercept G− , and it is upward-sloping.  
  
In such a dual exchange scheme, according to equation (4.5), the variation in domestic 
real wealth can be characterised as:  
tttttt sfpksmw
•••••••
⋅−+⋅=−+⋅−+⋅= )1()()1( θωθθθ           (4.8) 
 In addition, substituting equations (4.2), (4.4) and (4.5) into (4.6), the change of real 




















       (4.9) 
Putting equations (4.7), (4.8) and (4.9) together, the dynamics of the government 
official reserve can be shown by: 
















γαθ               (4.10) 
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1 eidkpeyT αγωθθγ +⋅+−−⋅−−++⋅=
−
. 
Because the coefficient before tf  in the schedule 0=
•
tf  can be either negative or 
positive, the slope of 0=
•
tf  schedule is uncertain.  Put the differential equations 
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Therefore, this system shows immediate saddle-path stability, with roots 0<sρ  
and 0>uρ . The stable eigenvalue sρ  corresponds to the stable eigenvector sv . 
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ω . This means the 
unique stable saddle-path has a positive slope that is not contingent on how the 0=
•
tf  
schedule behaves.  
  In addition, the condition of 0det <A  implies that the slope of schedule 0=
•
tf  is 
smaller than that of schedule 0=
•
ts . Let 
ef  and es  denote the stationary levels of 
financial exchange rate and foreign reserve. The linear approximation to system (4.11) 
around these levels can be arranged as follows: 













































 −1  
  The qualitative solution to this dual exchange rate system is shown in Figure 4.1, 
where the saddle-path slopes upward from left to right through the equilibrium point 
E  in ( f , s )-space. Because the economy is self-stabilizing with an adjustable 
financial exchange rate and a variable foreign reserve, then, it will converge to the 
equilibrium point at last, no matter where the economy starts from. Given the 
assumption that the foreign reserve adjusts slowly, it is the financial exchange rate 
that has to jump in response to the nominal or real shocks shifting the saddle-path, and 
then moves towards the new equilibrium point along the new saddle-path.  
   
 
In this graph, the arrows show the directions of motion of both s  and f . To the 
left of the 0=
•
s  locus, 
•
s  is positive and is thus rising; above the 0=
•















Figure  4. 1   The dual exchange rate phase diagram  
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is negative and is falling. Both s  and f  evolve over time to satisfy the conditions 
that individually characterize domestic monetary market dynamics (Eq 4.7) and relate 
domestic residents’ planned saving to wealth accumulation (Eq 4.10). For any positive 
initial level of f , there is a unique initial level of s  matching on the stable 
saddle-path. The economy then moves along the saddle path to the point E . 
4.3 Implications of the Model 
4.3.1 The Effects of Domestic Credit Expansion 
  First, let’s consider the effect on the dynamics of s  and f of a permanent 
domestic credit expansion from d  to 'd , which means the proportion of foreign 
reserve in the total money supply, ω , declines. It can be derived that the decrease in 
ω  will shift the 0=
•
s  locus upward to the new schedule 0' =
•
s . In addition, using 
system (4.12) and differentiating ef and es  with respect to ω  respectively, we can 
get that 0>∂∂ ωef  and 0=∂∂ ωes . The results mean that, the equilibrium level 
of foreign reserves ef  is monotonically increasing in ω , but the change of ω  has 
no effect on the stationary financial rate es . As a result, in the long-run, a permanent 
increase in domestic credit will lead the foreign reserves to decline, but leave the 
financial exchange rate unchanged. Figure 4.2 describes the dynamics of an economy 
facing expansionary credit shock.  
  Assume the economy is initially located in equilibrium point E , through which the 
original saddle path SS  passes. In response to a permanent expansion of domestic 
credit, both the foreign reserves and the financial exchange rate need to change 
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accordingly. This will induce not only a shift in the 0=
•
S  curve to up but a shift in 
the stationary point from E  to 'E , where the long-run foreign reserve is cut down 
but the steady level of financial exchange rate remains unvaried.  
 
 
  However, in the short run, because the foreign reserves are predetermined and it 
takes time for them to adjust, the economy’s immediate response to such an 
unanticipated money shock is entirely different, i.e. the financial rates jump up 
directly from E  to point A  so that the economy can embark on the new saddle 
path 'SS . Thereafter, s  and f  adjust gradually along the new saddle path 'SS  to 
the new long-run equilibrium point 'E . Thus, the net effect of a permanent domestic 
credit expansion is that the financial exchange rate initially overshoots and then 
comes back to its original level in the long run, and the final equilibrium level of 

























Figure 4.2   The effects of a permanent expansion of domestic credit  
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4.3.2 The Effects of Output Movements 
  Now we consider the effect of an increase in aggregate output. Equation (4.7) 
implies that output increase will shift the 0=
•
s  locus rightward. In the meanwhile, 
we can work out that 
_
yf e ∂∂  is greater than 0, which means the output expansion 
will inevitably lead the long-run foreign reserves to go up. As for the sign of 
_
yse ∂∂ , 
it depends on the product of the income elasticity of money demand 1β  and the 
proportion of money holding in domestic residents’ total wealth θ .  
 
 
  The response of the financial exchange rate to output expansion depends on 1βθ ⋅ . 
If 11 <⋅ βθ  (or 11 <β  because of 1<θ ), the financial exchange rate will 
depreciate in the long run. If 11 >⋅ βθ , the financial exchange rate will appreciate 
either in the short run or in the long run. The economy’s response to a permanent 
output expansion is depicted in Figure 4.3.  
  From above figure, we can see that an increase in domestic output moves the 























Figure 4. 3   The effects of a permanent expansion of domestic output  
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from SS  to 'SS . Domestic output expansion affects not only the long run foreign 
reserves, but also the long run financial exchange rate. The increase in output leads to 
the expansion of foreign reserves.  
  In addition, without government intervention, the increase in foreign reserves will 
cause the real domestic money supply to increase one for one. If the money demand 
increase cannot catch up with the increased money supply (i.e. 11 <β ), then, it will 
lead the financial exchange rate to depreciate in the long run. Conversely, the 
shrinkage of output will lead the foreign reserve to dwindle, and long run financial 
rates to appreciate if 11 <⋅ βθ  and to depreciate if 11 >⋅ βθ .  
  Therefore, in a dual exchange rate regime, the foreign reserve will move in the 
same direction as the output change. But the new equilibrium financial exchange rate 
will depend on the particular structural parameters.  
4.4   Summary 
The model presented above takes into account the two-tier exchange rate system 
that is appropriate to the situation in China, and attempts to examine the consequences 
of a range of policy changes. Particularly, this model was used to investigate two 
cases: domestic credit expansion and output movements, representing nominal and 
real shocks. The results deduced from the model are, to some extent, in line with other 
theories of exchange rate. For example, the effects of domestic credit expansion based 
on this model are not much different from the one we obtain from Krugman’s model 
(1979) of first generation speculative attack. In both cases, domestic credit expansion 
will lead foreign reserves to decrease and generate pressure on the exchange rate to 
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get devalued. 
  By virtue of this model, we can also analyze the effects of other kinds of 
macroeconomic shocks, like the variances in foreign goods price p* and foreign 
interest rate i*. Besides, the dynamics of foreign reserves and the financial exchange 
rate caused by the portfolio adjustment that are subject to domestic residents’ planned 
saving behaviour can also be analyzed. This model manifests flexibility by allowing 
us to examine the effects of any combinations of the accommodated variables. 
However, there are also some points we do not cover in the model. First, we only 
analyze the effects of permanent changes in domestic credit and output. But the 
impacts on the economy of temporary economic policies also deserve attention at 
times. Second, while discussing the effects of output movements, the case of 11 <β  
is restrictive and the prerequisites that determine the short-run dynamics of financial 
rate need to be further specified.    
  Another feature of the model, to contrast in the spirit from the Flood and Marion’s 
model (1983), is that, the two-tier exchange rate model is represented in the transition 
from fixed but adjustable exchange rates. The general assumptions between the model 
of this Chapter and the Flood and Marion’s model are similar, which include the 
monetary sector, saving sector, foreign-exchange rate market sector, prices sector and 
exogenous variables conditions. The difference between them are that the Flood and 
Marion’s model focus on three exchange rate solutions: the two-tier float (TTF) 
solution, a fixed commercial rate (TT) solution, and the uniform flexible exchange 
rate regime (FLEX) solution, to represent semi-reduced forms of money-market 
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equilibrium and planned saving behaviour. Whereas the model of this Chapter focuses 
on one exchange rate solution, which is a fixed commercial rate (TT) solution to 
analysis the effect of real stock of wealth. Because the fixed commercial rate (TT) 
solution provides a framework to investigate the underlying working mechanism and 
the policy implication, it is particularly appropriate for those regimes with some 
degree of capital control. 
The Flood and Marion’s model is based on the assumption that the market will set 
exchange rates so as to eliminate expected speculative profits at the time of transition, 
to indicate that expectations of a transition, combined with uncertainly about the 
nature of the post-transition regime, can cause a jump in exchange rates at the 
moment of transition as well as volatile exchange rate movements prior to the 
transition. By contrast, the dual exchange rate model can clearly show how domestic 
macroeconomic policies and real stock of wealth affect the economy with dual 
exchange rates. Also it shows how such an economy responds to the external shock 
brought about by either international capital flows or trade flows. Although, in 
practice, the effects of implementing segregated exchange markets for current and 
capital transactions are limited, and the dual exchange rate regime is often used as a 
transitional arrangement, while facing an accelerating integrated international capital 
market, understanding the pros and cons of a dual exchange rate economy do bring us 
useful hints, especially on how to effectively deal with the increasing exposures to the 
capital flows across countries without entirely giving up the benefits of a fixed 
exchange rate regime. 
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Chapter 5  Research Methodology and Empirical Analysis 
 
5.1  Introduction  
  The objective of this chapter is to provide the method and tools by which the 
research generates empirical evidence relating to the case for greater flexibility of 
China’s fixed exchange rate policy. The research proposes relevant hypotheses and 
demonstrates a case for misalignment and support for greater Chinese real exchange 
rate flexibility by assessing its relative impact on the trade balance.  
  In chapter 4, a general theoretical model of exchange rate determination was 
developed to show how the exchange rate interacts with the inflation rate, interest rate 
and balance of payments, as well as some other exogenous technical and preference 
parameters. This model is nonlinear, and clear expressions of the model’s solutions 
are usually not available.  
  However, some special forms of the model have been studied qualitatively. For 
example, in the case of small countries and constant output (ignorance of the 
production sector), Shi Kuan Chen (2004) demonstrated that the exchange rate is 
endogenously determined and the fluctuation of the exchange rate depends on the 
preference parameter of consumers. Under some specific conditions, exchange rates 
perform smoothly and a long-run steady state can be achieved, but at a certain time 
the exchange rate may change explosively. However, the theory itself does not tell us 
what the shocks are or where the preference parameters are. Thus, how the exchange 
rate reacts in response to shocks is an issue of empirics rather than theory, which is 
tackled in this chapter in order to test specific hypotheses.  
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  The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section (5.2) presents three 
hypotheses that are to be tested. Section (5.3) presents the methodology to be used 
and discusses the data collection process. Section (5.4) discusses the empirical model 
and variables that will be employed. And the statistical tools (selection the lag length, 
units root test, cointegration test) to be used to analyze the data and generate results 
are presented in section (5.5).  Empirical results from the Structural VAR model 
(impulse response function and variance decomposition) are analysed in section (5.6). 
Further analysis of indicators of real exchange rate movements is discussed in Section 
(5.7). And finally, section (5.8) concludes. 
    
5.2    The Hypotheses 
  This Chapter examines whether there is a significant relationship between the real 
exchange rate and real-GDP, whether there’s a significant impact of the inflation rate 
of China/US on the real exchange rate, and whether there is a significant relationship 
between the real exchange rate and trade-openness ratio. Four fundamental 
hypotheses are developed to test these relationships between the above variables. 
Several studies in developed countries revealed that there is a highly significant 
response of real exchange rate to relevant shocks. Compared with studies on industrial 
countries with flexible exchange rate system, Eichenbaum and Evans, (1993) and 
Clarida and Gali, (1994), found that the response for demand/nominal shocks are most 
important factors, especially in the long run, and supply/real shocks are as important 
as in accounting for real exchange rate fluctuation during both short run and long run, 
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however, the case in China is different for specific reasons as their currencies are 
pegged to the US Dollar before 2006.  
Therefore the four hypotheses are: 
H1: There is a negative relationship between the Real Exchange Rate and 
Consumer Price Index of China 
H2: There is a positive relationship between Real Exchange Rate and Consumer 
Price Index of US 
H3: There is a negative relationship between Real Exchange Rate and Real GDP  
H4: There is a positive relationship between Real Exchange Rate and Trade- 
Openness 
 
5.3 Methodology and Data Collection 
To test the above hypotheses, this study employs a quantitative approach using 
secondary data. Time series data for China are documented in the China Bureau of 
statistics published quarterly.  
The quantitative approach is represented by econometric analysis. Ultimately, the 
structural VAR model that is going to be estimated will take the following form:    
Yt=∑ni=1AiYt-1+μ                                        (5.1)                                                                  
Where :  Yt:  is the vector of endogenous variables 
Aj:  is the matrix of coefficients 
t:   is a vector white noise process 
i:   is the number of lags 
P a g e  | 94 
 
In this test, Yt consist of quarterly series of real exchange rate (REER) with 
domestic and foreign inflation rates (CPIa, CPIc), trade-openness ratio(TRADE), and 
real-GDP(GDP) separately over the period (1994:1-2005:4). The data sources are 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) June 2005 edition, China Statistical Yearbook 
2004, and China Statistical Bureau. The author takes the two countries to be the U.S. 
and China. In principle, it would be preferable to consider China vs. the 
rest-of-the-world. However, data considerations, plus the fact that the misalignment 
debate revolves around the U.S.-China nexus, motivate us to adopt this perspective. 
The vector of endogenous variables can be written as: Yt = [GDP CPIc CPIa 
TRADE REER]. The VAR model is estimated in log levels using quarterly data over 
period (1994:1- 2005:4) to find the relationships between the real exchange rate, 
domestic and foreign inflation rates, and real-GDP, and trade-openness ratio in order 
to test the impact of the real exchange rate on the domestic and foreign inflation rates, 
and real-GDP, trade-openness ratio by using structural VAR approach using different 
tests (impulse response function and variance decomposition). 
5.4 The Model and Variables 
5.4.1 The Structural Vector Auto-regression (SVAR) Model  
  As a result of diverse fiscal and monetary policies, real exchange rates in some 
economies should follow a path that mirrors that effect of real shocks and in others 
they should follow a path that reflects monetary shocks.  
  A key issue in the SVAR approach is to decompose real exchange rate movements 
and gauge the relative importance of monetary and exchange rate policies.  And it 
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could also examine the effects of shocks through impulse response function and 
variance decomposition and identify the causal influences on the real exchange rate.  
Underlying this approaches is the selection of appropriate variables that constitutes 
the Structural Vector Auto-regression (SVAR), moreover the structural approach 
imposes long-run restrictions from theory and allows identification of short-run 
influences.  Therefore the Structural Vector Auto-regression (SVAR) model approach 
will be used to test this hypothesis, assuming long-run neutrality of nominal shocks; 
we decompose real exchange rate and price movements into those attributable to real 
and nominal shocks.  
5.4.2  Model variables 
  In all Structural VARs, each variable is expressed as a linear combination of lagged 
values of all other variables in the group. In practice, the Structural VAR equations 
may be expanded to include deterministic time trends, but the researcher uses 
quarterly data which appear to capture the effects of time trends.   
  In Structural VARs, as formulated by Sims (1980), all of the variables are assumed 
to be endogenous. Specifying some of the variables to be exogenous introduces 
restriction on the model, because such variables will be able to affect endogenous 
variable directly through feedback from the exogenous variables. 
  Through linearization, the nonlinear theoretical general equilibrium model can be 
transformed into a Structural Vector Auto-regression (SVAR) model that includes five 
variables: the exchange rate, domestic and foreign inflation rates, real-GDP, and 
trade-openness.  As a result, instead of using nominal exchange rates, we thus 
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consider the log of the price level CPIa, CPIc, measured by the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI), the log of real exchange rate REER, log of real-GDP and log of trade-openness 
ratio in our birariate decompositions.  
   We take the GDP deflators of the China and US as indices of inflation indicators. 
Generally, the GDP deflator is a better index than the change of consumer prices, 
since it is a more comprehensive price indicator of various goods. Another reason for 
us to choose the GDP deflator as an index of inflation indicators is that other 
indicators, such as export and import price and consumer price of the China before 
1994 are either unavailable or the time-series is too short for this study. 
  Based on the theoretical model, the following variables are used in the empirical 
model in China: 
CPIc:   per cent change of PRC deflator.  
CPIa:   per cent change of US deflator.  
GDP:   output level of the PRC versus US.  
TRADE:  trade balance of the PRC versus US. 
REER:  real effective exchange rate.  
Yt = (GDPt CPIct CPIat TRADEt REERt):  an endogenous variable vector. 
And these endogenous variables (GDP, CPIa, CPIc, TRADE, and REER) that will 
be used here are quarterly data during the period (1994:1-2005:4) in china. 
 
5.5    Statistical Analyses 
  This section examines the time-series properties of the variables in the analysis. 
Many statistical techniques can be used to explain research data. The statistical 
technique used in this research to analyze the data is the time series analysis by using 
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the structural Vector Auto-regression (SVAR) approach. 
  The structural Vector Auto-regression (SVAR) is commonly used for forecasting 
system of interrelated time series and for analyzing the dynamic impact of random 
disturbances on the system of variables (Eview User Guide’s, 2004)  
  The empirical study includes five steps: (1) Selection of the lag length. (2) Unit 
root test of level variables, Unit root test of first order difference, and second order 
difference of level variables if necessary, (3) Cointegration test, (4) Impulse Response 
analysis, and (5)Variance Decomposition. The unit root test is used to test if a time 
series is non-stationary to determine if a regression is spurious. If the test confirms 
that a series has a unit root, the series is non-stationary. Non-stationary series of the 
same order of integration may have co-integrating relations. Thus, a cointegration test 
is needed. If cointegration relations exist, the next step is a structural VAR model 
estimation, which estimates both the long-run integration equations among 
endogenous variables and the short-run fluctuations. The purpose of impulse response 
analysis is then selecting a structural VAR to investigate how one variable responds to 
the impulse shock of another variable. In the case of the Renminbi, we want to 
understand what takes place once a one-time exchange rate adjustment is made under 
the pressure of the United States and other countries. The tests are examined by using 
the “Eviews” package (release 6.0). 
 
5.5.1  Model Selection Criteria (Selection of the lag Length) 
  Selection of the inappropriate lag length may cause a problem and may cause the 
residuals regression not to behave well. For a given data set, the selection criteria are 
P a g e  | 98 
 
normally based on summary static from residuals computed from a fitted model. 
  According to Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), which is based on the residual 
variance, the appropriate lag length can be selected by choosing the minimum value 
of Akaike (residual variance) which will represent the suitable lag length.(Vogelvang, 
2005, p.344) (Eviews user’s guide, 2004, p.513).  
  The results shown in Table (5.1) are –32.21632 (AIC) and –24.69332 (SC), indicate 
a minimum lag length of 7. So the suitable lag length to be used here is (7) lag length. 
Table 5.1  
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: LNCPIA LNCPIC LNGDP LNREER LNTRADE    
Exogenous variables: C      
Date: 04/29/09   Time: 19:27     
Sample: 1994Q1 2005Q4     
Included observations: 41     
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0  219.0041 NA   2.01e-11 -10.43922 -10.23025 -10.36313 
1  450.0639  394.4924  8.77e-16 -20.49092 -19.23709 -20.03435 
2  476.8113  39.14246  8.53e-16 -20.57616 -18.27746 -19.73910 
3  523.0924  56.44045  3.51e-16 -21.61427 -18.27071 -20.39673 
4  582.4334  57.89366  9.03e-17 -23.28944 -18.90102 -21.69142 
5  618.4219  26.33304  9.69e-17 -23.82546 -18.39218 -21.84696 
6  669.9414  25.13144  8.54e-17 -25.11909 -18.64095 -22.76011 
7  840.4346   41.58370*   9.34e-19*  -32.21632*  -24.69332*  -29.47686* 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
       
5.5.2 Unit Root Testing 
  Knowing whether non-stationary in the data is due to a deterministic time trend or a 
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unit root would seem to be a very important question. Any time series data can be 
thought of as being generated by a stochastic or random process, and a concrete set of 
data can be regarded as a realization of the underlying stochastic process and its 
realization is a kin to the distinction between population and sample. Just as we use 
sample data to draw inferences about a population, in time series we use the 
realization to draw inferences about the underlying stochastic process.  
A stochastic process is said to be stationary if its mean and variance are constant 
over time. According to Engle and Granger (1987), the direct application of OLS to 
non-stationary data produces regressions that are mis-specified or spurious in nature.  
These regressions tend to produce performance statistics that are inflated in nature, 
such as high R2s and t-statistics, which often lead investigators to commit a high 
frequency of Type I errors (rejecting the true hypothesis) (Granger and Newbold, 
1974).  As is common, we therefore tested each of the variables in question for a unit 
root (non-stationary) using an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) (Dickey and 









10 )1(            (5.2) 
 
where Yt is the variable under consideration, ∆ is the first-difference operator, α0 is a 
constant and T is the time trend, p being the number of lags set to a maximum lag 
order of √N so N being the sample size. Failure to reject the null hypothesis of the 
unit root (ρ = 1) signifies the presence of a non-stationary process.  The null 
hypothesis of non-stationary (i.e. the given series is I (1)) is not rejected if ρ is not 
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significantly different from unity. 
A time series that has a unit root is known as a random walk. (Hamilton, 1994, 
pp.435-447). However, we need to have a stationary time series in our tests, otherwise, 
we’ll have spurious regression. 
   To test the presence of a unit root, we will apply the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. 
This test can also be used to help detect the presence of stochastic trend (Enders, 2004, 
p.156) (Cryer, 1986, pp.9-16) 
   If the computed ADF value exceeds the critical or tabulated value, then we fail to 
reject (accept) the null hypothesis that the variable has a unit root (non-stationary). 
However, if it is less than the critical value, then we reject the null hypothesis, so the 
variable will be stationary. (Eviews user’s guide, 2004, pp.504-505) (Franses, 1998, 
pp.80-84) 
Table 5.2 Unit Root Testing Results 
 
  Augmented Dikey-Fuller  
Variable 1% 5% 10% T-statistic H0:Variable has 




LnCPIa -3.577 -2.925 -2.600 -0.389 Don’t Reject No 
D(lnCPIa) -3.584 -2.928 -2.602 -5.827 Reject Yes 
LnCPIc -3.581 -2.926 -2.601 -2.431 Don’t Reject  No 
D(lnCPIc) -3.581 -2.926 -2.601 -3.723 Reject Yes 
LnReer -3.581 -2.926 -2.601 -2.258 Don’t Reject No 
D(lnREER) -3.581 -2.926 -2.601 -4.437 Reject Yes 
LnGDP -3.605 -2.936 -2.606 -1.424 Don’t Reject No 
D(lnGDP) -3.605 -2.936 -2.606 -2.651 Reject Yes 
LnTRADE -3.577 -2.925 -2.600 -2.320 Don’t Reject No 
D(lnTRADE) -3.581 -2.926 -2.601 -7.996 Reject Yes 
Formal stationarity tests are conducted and the results from the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller unit root tests are reported in the Table 5.2. The null hypothesis of a 
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unit root cannot be rejected for the levels of all variables LNCPIa. LNCPIc, LNREER 
LNTRADE and LNGDP, while the first difference is confirmed to be stationary for all 
of them.  
 
5.5.3 Johansen Cointegration Test 
   Cointegration is an econometric property of time series variables. If two or more 
series are themselves non-stationary, but a linear combination of them is stationary, 
then the series are said to be co-integrated. It is often said that cointegration is a 
means for correctly testing hypotheses concerning the relationship between two 
variables having unit roots. The usual procedure for testing hypotheses concerning the 
relationship between non-stationary variables was to run Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regressions on data which had initially been differenced. Although this method 
is correct in large samples, cointegration provides more powerful tools when the data 
sets are of limited length, as most economic time-series are. 
The concept of cointegration was introduced in the econometric literature by 
Granger (1981) and further extended and formalized by Engle and Granger (1987).  
This concept is based on the idea that, although economic time series exhibit 
non-stationary behavior, an appropriate linear combination between trending variables 
could remove the common trend component.  The resulting linear combination of the 
time series variables will thus be stationary, which means the relevant time series are 
co-integrated.   
According to Engle and Granger (1987) a set of variables is said to be 
co-integrated or “to move together in the long-run” if a linear combination of their 
P a g e  | 102 
 
individual integrated series I (d) is stationary where d is the order of integrated.  
From an economist’s perspective, cointegration is of interest because of the possible 
existence of a long run or a steady state equilibrium relationship.  The research on 
cointegration tests has developed in two main directions: (i) tests based on the 
residuals from a co-integrating regression suggested by Engle and Granger (1987); 
and (ii) tests based on the system of equations utilising vector autoregressive models, 
suggested by Johansen (1988, 1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990). 
The Engle-Granger (E-G) residual based test is one of the most commonly used 
cointegration tests.  For models of co-integrated variables, this test involves the 
following two steps: (a) estimation of a co-integrating regression by applying OLS on 
the levels of the variables included; and (b) testing for stationarity of the residuals by 
using augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. 
While the E-G single equation based cointegration tests have been used 
frequently in the literature, it has several limitations.  First if there are more than two 
variables in the model, there can be more than one co-integrating combination.  That 
is, the variables in a model may feature as part of several equilibrium relationships 
governing the joint evolution of the variables.  Second, even if there is only one 
cointegration relationship, estimating a single equation is potentially inefficient 
because of the loss of information that results from inability of the model to treat all 
variables as potentially endogenous.  Given that the number of cointegration vectors 
in a model is unknown, and given the need to allow all variables to be potential 
endogenous, the E-G single equation approach to testing for cointegration can give 
rise to misleading results. 
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The approach developed by Johansen (1988, 1991) and extended by Johansen and 
Juselius (1990) (explained briefly below) is considered superior to the E-G method, as 
it provides testing within a multivariate framework and allows for more than one 
cointegration vector in the estimated model thereby preventing loss of efficiency. 
For the Johansen and Juselius method, two tests are commonly used to determine 
the number of co-integrating vectors.  These are namely the trace test and the 








iTTrace λ   r = 0,1, 2, …, n-2, n-1        (5.3) 
)1ln( 1max +−−= rT λλ    r = 0,1, 2, …, n-2, n-1        (5.4) 
 
where λi are the eigenvalues corresponding to the decomposition of the matrix of long 
run multipliers in the multivariate system22
  In practice, cointegration is used for such series in typical econometric tests, but it 
is more generally applicable and can be used for variables integrated of higher order 
.  In each case, the null hypothesis that 
there are at most r co-integrating combinations amounts to: 
 
H0 : λi = 0  i = r + 1, …, n 
 
where only the first r eigenvalues are non-zero.  Thus, the alternative for r = 0 is that 
r = 1; r = 1 is tested against the alternative of r = 2; and so on.  If there is any 
divergence of results between these two tests, it is recommended that one should rely 
on the evidence based on the trace test, since the results of the latter test, as indicated 
by Banerjee et al. (1986, 1993), are more reliable. 
                                                        
22 The derivation of the eigenvalues and the corresponding eigenvectors are not of interest here, see for example 
Harris (1995), Chapter 5 for more details.  Chapter 6 briefly covers the representation of the multivariate system. 
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(to detect correlated accelerations or other second-difference effects). 
Multi-cointegration extends the cointegration technique beyond two variables, and 
occasionally to variables integrated at different orders. 
Next, we check whether the variables are co-integrated, although there is no 
economic reason to expect them to be co-integrated. However, if the variables were 
co-integrated, the structural VAR in first differences would be wrongly-specified, and 
the long-run relationship could be used to help obtain more efficient estimates of the 
short-run dynamics. Table 5.3 presents cointegration test results based on Johansen’s 
maximum-likehood procedure. Test results indicate that there are three cointegration 
relations among the four variables in consideration. 
Table 5.3   
   
Date: 05/06/09   Time: 17:01    
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q3 2005Q4    
Included observations: 46 after adjustments   
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend (restricted constant)  
Series: LNGDP LNCPIC LNCPIA LNTRADE LNREER    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   
      
      Hypothesized  Trace 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.692293  149.9597  76.97277  0.0000  
At most 1 *  0.621383  95.74384  54.07904  0.0000  
At most 2 *  0.436209  51.06722  35.19275  0.0005  
At most 3 *  0.321225  24.70595  20.26184  0.0114  
At most 4  0.138965  6.882545  9.164546  0.1327  
      
       Trace test indicates 4 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
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Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)  
      
      Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.692293  54.21588  34.80587  0.0001  
At most 1 *  0.621383  44.67662  28.58808  0.0002  
At most 2 *  0.436209  26.36126  22.29962  0.0128  
At most 3 *  0.321225  17.82341  15.89210  0.0246  
At most 4  0.138965  6.882545  9.164546  0.1327  
      
       Max-eigenvalue test indicates 4 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
 
5.6 Results from the structural VAR Model 
 
By estimating a structural VAR model containing five variables; Real exchange 
rate relative to the US dollar (its main trading partner) (Rt), real GDP relative to the 
US (Yt), consumer prices level of China (Pct), consumer price level of US (Pat) and 
trade-openness (Tradet), four structural shocks can be identified; real demand shocks 
(εtRD), nominal shocks (εtNOMc), (εtNOMa), aggregate supply shocks (εtAS) and 
trade-openness shocks (εtTP ). 
Assume for now that all variables are non-stationary integrated, I(1), variables, 
where stationary is obtained by taking first differences. Ordering the vector of 
stationary variables as Zt = (ΔTt, ΔYt, ΔRt, ΔPct, ΔPat), its moving average 
representation can be written as: 
z t = C (L ) e t                                                                                           (5.5) 
 
where et is a vector of reduced form serially uncorrelated residuals with covariance 
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matrix Ω. Assume that the orthogonal structural disturbances (εt) can be written as 
linear combinations of the innovations (et), i.e. et=D0εt. A (restricted) form of the 
moving average containing the vector of original disturbances can then be found as: 
z t = D (L ) ε t                                                                                            (5.6) 
where C(L)D0= D(L). The εt ’s are normalized so they all have unit variance. If D0 
is identified, one can derive the MA representation in (5.6). However, the D0 matrix 
contains twenty elements, so to orthogonalize the different innovations, twenty 
restrictions are needed. First, from the normalization of var (εt) it follows that  
Ω = D 0D 0 ´. A four variable system imposes ten restrictions on the elements in D0. 
Ten more restrictions are then needed to identify D0. These will come from 
restrictions on the long run multipliers of the D(L) matrix. Ordering the four serially 
uncorrelated orthogonal structural shocks: 
εt = (εtTrade, εtAS, εt RD, εt NOMc, εt NOMa,)', the long run expression 
of (5.6) can then simply be written as: 
11 12 13 14 15
21 22 23 24 25
31 32 33 34 35
41 42 43 44 45
51 52 53 54 55
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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D(1) jD indicate the long run matrix of D(L). The restrictions on the 
long-run multipliers of the system that are used here to identify the structural shocks 
are based on a standard open economy model, as that presented in Bjørnland (2000). 
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First, all shocks but the nominal shock can potentially have a long run effect on the 
real exchange rate. The restriction that the nominal shock can have only short term 
effects on the real exchange rate is consistent with most models of short run exchange 
rate variability, but long run PPP (cf. Clarida and Gali 1994). Thus: 
D34(1) = D35(1)= D45(1)= 0                                          (5.8) 
Second, the key (long run) identifying assumption that distinguishes between the 
demand and supply shocks, asserts that in the long run, the level of production will be 
determined by supply side factors (aggregate supply and real oil price shocks) only 
(cf. Blanchard and Quah 1989). However, in the short run, due to nominal and real 
rigidities, all four disturbances can influence production. Hence: 
D23(1)=D24(1)= D25(1) =0                                           (5.9) 
Finally, the trade-openness shock itself is identified as the only shock that can have a 
long run effect on the real trade. However, in the short run, all shocks are allowed to 
influence trade-openness: 
D12(1)=D13(1)=D14(1)=D15(1) =0                                       (5.10) 
No restrictions are placed on prices, although there are some over identifying 
restrictions on prices that can be tested informally by examining the impulse response 
analysis. For instance, the standard aggregate demand/supply diagram suggests that 
whereas positive real demand and nominal shocks (that increase production only 
temporarily) shall increase prices permanently, following a positive aggregate supply 
shock (that increases production permanently), prices shall fall permanently. 
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With the ten long run restrictions, the matrix D(1) will be lower triangular, and 
one can use this to recover D0. The long run representation of expression (5.6) 
implies: 
C(1)ΩC(1)´=D(1)D(1)´                                             (5.11) 
(5.11) can be computed from the estimate of Ω and C(1). As D(1) is lower 
triangular, expression (5.11) implies that D(1) will be the unique lower triangular 
Choleski factor of C(1)ΩC(1)´. 
 
5.6.1 Impulse Response Analysis 
While the sample period may be too short to assess mean reversion in real 
exchange rates, we believe that it is appropriate to model exchange rates as a SVAR 
process for impulse response analysis. This assumption allows us to estimate the 
exchange rate variability attributable to nominal and to real shocks, subject to long 
run restriction. Assuming non-stationary real exchange rates is reasonably appropriate 
for two reasons. First, purchasing power parity, which implies stationary real 
exchange rates, holds under very restrictive conditions that are unlikely to be met in 
transition economies (Brada, 1998). Second, in their analysis of equilibrium real 
exchange rates in transition economies, Halpern and Wyplosz (1997) argue that 
equilibrium real exchange rates should exhibit an upward trend over time as these 
countries catch up with the West and as productivity and real wages increase over 
time. 
  Because such shocks are generally random or stochastic in nature, real exchange 
rates will have a permanent or stochastic component during this period. Consider two 
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types of orthogonal shocks, each of which could be the source of variation in the 
observed movements in real exchange rates and prices. A real shock, ε rt, reflects 
changes in endowment, productivity shocks, and technology, and a nominal shock, 
ε nt, is caused by nominal money supply shocks or devaluation of the exchange rate. 
For simplicity let the vector ∆ yt = [∆qt  ∆pt ]’ is stationary, it can be written as an 

















           (5.12)
 
where Ai j are polynomials in the lag operator, L. In order to identify the shocks, it is 
assumed that nominal shocks have no long-run effect on the real exchange rate. This 
assumption can be imposed by restricting the coefficients in A12(L) to sum to zero. If 







                   (5.13)
 
so that the cumulative effect of ε nt on ∆qt is zero. Note that the effects of nominal 
and real shocks on prices are not restricted. This method of decomposing a series into 
its permanent and temporary components is valid provided the joint behavior of real 
exchange rate and price level contains reliable information about the underlying 
sources of fluctuations (Lastrapes, 1992). 
   
  The impulse response function (IRF) traces out the response of one variable in the 
structural VAR system to shocks in the error terms. 
  A shock in the (i-th) variable not only directly affects the (i-th) variable but is also 
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transmitted to all of the other endogenous variables through the dynamic (lag) 
structure of the lag. 
  However, it is important to clarify the usefulness of the impulse response 
methodology, as it might be a key magnitude for describing the effects of the 
monetary policy on the economy in general, and the effects on capital markets in this 
research. Its usefulness comes from testing the unanticipated and anticipated changes 
in monetary policy. It can reveal the effect of a monetary shock if it followed by usual 
policy actions. However, if only unanticipated money matter, the impulse response 
function reveals the structural coefficients of the model. Moreover, the impulse 
response function is enduring to changes in monetary regimes. And that‘s because 
none of the broadcast of a monetary shock for example output, operates through the 
subsequent effect on anticipated money. Another case can be if the policy changes so 
that money changes become more persistent, the response of output will be different. 
Therefore, impulse response function from the Structural VAR is the natural method 
for analyzing such effects. 
All variables are co-integrated with four cointegration relationship therefore 
structural VAR model is used for Impulse Response Function and Variance 
Decomposition analysis. Regarding the impulse response function, which is used to 
estimate the dynamic response of each variable to an unexpected change in another 
variable, is a practical way to visually represent the behaviour of the variable series in 
response to the various shocks and see what the relationship between the variables is 
whether the shock was increasing or decreasing. Figure 5.1 shows the impulse 
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response function of a shock in the real exchange rate, in order to establish to nature 
of fluctuations between the variables. The figure shows the impulse response with 
upper and lowers two standard error bands for the Structural VAR model of this study. 
Figure 5.1 Impulse Response Function of a Shock in the Real Exchange Rate.(The Structural 
VAR formulated as –real-GDP (shock1), Chinese-CPI (shock2), US-CPI (shock3), trade-openness 
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The first row in the figure shows the dynamic response of the GDP shock in the 
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real exchange, and the response of the dynamic response of the inflation rate of China 
ratio to shock in the real exchange rate. The figure shows that there’s a significant 
positive and negative effect from the real exchange rate to real-GDP. It is clear that 
any shock in the real exchange rate has a positive effect on real-GDP, where persists 
for the month three to month five, then turns to negative for another two months until 
month seven, then increase to positive for another three months, until month nine it 
drops again to negative until the end of the period. The dynamic response of the 
inflation rate of China to shock in the real exchange rate is similar as it has both a 
significant positive and negative effect during the period, specially the negative effect 
during month four to month nine, after that the effect of the shock increase further to 
positive until the end of the period. 
  The second row in the figure shows the dynamic response of the inflation rate of 
US to shock in the real exchange rate and the trade-openness to shock in the real 
exchange rate. As for the response of inflation rate of US to real exchange rate, the 
figure shows that the impact will be insignificant but negative for most of the period. 
Finally the shock of trade-openness’s response to real exchange rate change was 
positive and negative effect under most of the periods, particular at month six and 
nine. However it increases to positive just before the ending period of month eight.  
 
Figure 5.2 displays the impulse response functions of the real exchange rate to 
shock in the log level of real-GDP, inflation rate of China, inflation rate of US, and 
trade openness ratio to one standard deviation structural shocks. Since the variables 
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were entered in first difference in VAR, the resulting impulse responses were 
cumulated in order to obtain the impulse response reported in Figure 5.2. These 
impulse response functions are in line with the theoretical priors discussed above.  
 
Figure 5.2 Impulse Response Function of a response of the Real Exchange Rate to 
shocks in other variables. (The Structural VAR formulated as –real-GDP(shock1), 
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  The first row in the figure shows that dynamic response of the real exchange rate to 
shock in the real-GDP. The shock response of real exchange rate to the real-GDP is 
negative during the long run; especially the negative shock appears in month seven to 
month nine. Also the dynamic response of real exchange rate shock to the inflation 
rate of China was showing that similar situation, showing the negative effect until the 
end of the period. 
  The second row in the Figure 5.2 shows that dynamic response of real exchange 
rate shock to the inflation rate of US, and dynamic response of real exchange rate 
shock to trade-openness. US inflation is response to the Chinese exchange rate shock 
remain positive and continually increases during the estimate period. In contract, a 
negative shock response of real exchange rate to the trade-openness during the most 
of the period, until the end of the period.  
 
5.6.2 Variance Decomposition 
While impulse responses are useful in assessing the signs and magnitudes of 
responses to specific shocks, the relative importance of different shocks for a 
particular variable’s fluctuations can really be gauged properly through the forecast 
error variance decompositions. This is a way of characterizing the dynamic behaviour 
of the model, by breaking down the variance of the forecast error for each variable 
into components that can be attributed to each of the endogenous variables. 
   The variance decomposition of a structural VAR gives information about the 
relative importance of random innovations. And if ext shocks explain none of the 
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forecast error variance of (Yt) at all forecast horizon, we can say that the (Yt) 
sequence is exogenous. On the other hand, if ezt shocks could explain all of the 
forecast error in the (Yt) sequence at all forecast horizon, (Yt) would be entirely 
endogenous. In practice, it is typical for a variable to explain most of the forecast 
error variance at short horizons and some at larger horizons. We would expect this 
pattern if a variable had little effect on the other variable (Enders, 2004, Box, Jenkins 
and Reinsel, 1994). 
   Hence, impulse response function and variance decomposition (together called 
innovation accounting) can be useful tools to examine the relationships among 
economic variables. If the correlation among the various innovations is small, the 
identification problem is not likely to be especially important (Enders, 2004, p.280) 
(Chatfield, 1996). 
Using the estimated structural VAR, a historical decomposition can be derived to 
examine whether or not the supply, and demand shocks that have been identified can 
plausibly explain the time path followed by the Renminbi real exchange rate over the 
last ten years. For example, we can verify whether episodes of tight money or positive 
real demand shocks are associated with real appreciation of the Renminbi. Table 5.4 
shows the unconditional forecast error for the real exchange rate and shows the 
decomposition of this forecast error into the components that can be attributed to 
real/supply, and nominal/demand shocks. 
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Table 5.4: Variance Decomposition of D (LNREER) 
The Structural VAR formulated as –real-GDP(shock1), chinese-CPI(shock2), US-CPI(shock3), 
trade-openness(shock4) and REER(shock 5) 
 Period S.E. Shock1 Shock2 Shock3 Shock4 Shock5 
       
        1  0.044168  7.829051  13.60596  59.22653  0.264801  19.07365 
 2  0.053884  2.067767  57.34615  16.06630  14.66758  9.852197 
 3  0.069178  11.81354  48.09407  10.81079  22.25528  7.026318 
 4  0.100986  5.375280  58.88099  4.615820  25.21213  5.915784 
 5  0.180034  18.29863  53.89847  1.544248  21.99486  4.263799 
 6  0.197930  34.94495  43.58822  1.151045  16.80693  3.508859 
 7  0.266406  20.63565  41.57730  1.843109  28.70759  7.236352 
 8  0.467847  25.30108  44.07117  1.702317  23.11504  5.810389 
 9  0.570306  6.294846  64.34569  0.821716  23.13805  5.399698 
 10  0.911663  20.31885  50.17699  0.583452  24.09973  4.820979 
       
        
 
 
   
 
 
   
Table 5.4 reports variance Decomposition at 10 period’s horizon for the 
Structural VAR ahead of the variables. The results indicate that the inflation rate of 
China has very significant effect on the REER. The variance of decomposition of the 
forecast error of the real exchange rate is explained by real GDP doesn’t have much 
impact at beginning few months, but slight increase and decrease every few months, 
and remain about 20% until the end of the period. The most important factors 
explaining the REER are the inflation rate of China, which could explain more than 
50% of the total period. Compared with the inflation rate of US, the variance 
decomposition of the forecast error of the real exchange rate is explained by inflation 
rate of US of approximately 59% in beginning, with the percentage slight decrease to 
16 in month two, after that it continues to decrease to 0 until the end of the period. 
Unfortunately, the results from Table 5.4 indicate that the real exchange rate doesn’t 
have much impact on the inflation rate of US in long run. However, the results 
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indicate that the real exchange rate shock has a significant impact on the 
trade-openness. The variance decomposition of the forecast error of the real exchange 
rate is explained by inflation rate of China of approximately 0.26% in beginning, with 
percentage increase to 22.25% in month four, after that it continues to rise and 
remains around 24% until the end of the period. 
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    As an explanation from the variance decomposition, relative nominal demand 
shocks account for most of the fluctuation in the real exchange rate changes during 
the estimation period, as shown in the Figure 5.3, and account for about more than 
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half of the variance in exchange rate movement even in the long run. The overall 
importance of nominal shocks to the variations of real exchange rate changes is 
consistent with findings on other developing countries (e.g., Chen and Wu, 1997; 
Ahmed, 2003). Supply shocks also have a significant contribution over longer 
horizons. Compared with studies on industrial countries with flexible exchange rate 
systems (Eichenbaum and Evans, 1993; Clarida and Gali, 1994), supply shocks here 
play a significant but little less important role, maybe because china has been going 
through only minor supply side changes such as structural reforms and productivity 
shocks. Moreover, nominal shocks from US appear not to have played as large a role 
as from China in the long period, only significant in the beginning few months then 
continue to decrease sharply further until the end of the period, it was explaining the 
fluctuations in either output growth or real exchange rate movement, possibly because 
China has a de facto fixed exchange rate system with relatively closed capital account. 
The dominance of supply shocks in the fluctuations of output growth found here is 
consistent with the findings of Ahmed (2003) for Latin American economies, and 
Hoffmaister and Roldos (2001) for Korea. Hoffmaister and Roldos (2001) also find 
that nominal shocks contribute more than supply shocks to the fluctuations of changes 
in the real exchange rate in the case of Korea. 
 
5.7   Further Analysis: Indicators of Real Exchange Rate Movement 
Using the estimated Structural VAR, a historical decomposition can be derived to 
examine whether or not the real and nominal shocks that have been identified can 
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plausibly explain the time path followed by the Renminbi real exchange rate over the 
last two decades. For example, we can verify whether episodes of positive real shocks 
are associated with real appreciation of the Renminbi. 
The solid line in Figure 5.4 plot the actual (log level of the) real exchange rate, the 
data obtained from IFS during the period from 1994 to 2005. And the dashed line in 
the panels is the total forecast error; the dashed line reflects the cumulative impact of 
the three types of structural shocks between 1994 and 2005. In other words, the  
 




Figure 5.4 depicts the difference between the actual (log level of the) real exchange 
rate and the level that would have been forecast from the Structural VAR based on the 
history of the system up through 1994. Therefore, from the Figure 5.4 it is clear to see 
that during period 2000 to 2002, the RMB was overvalued, the highest overvaluation 
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months. From 2003, the RMB was undervalued gradually and continued until end of 
the research period. In year 2005, the RMB was undervalued around 11% compare 
with the result we get from the model. This was led by fiscal expansion and rapid 
investment growth in July 2005, the central bank of China implemented new policies 
on RMB exchange rate reform. Both these factors contributed to the appreciation of the 
real exchange rate. From the analysis, it could be argued that the RMB will continue 
to appreciate to catch the right level. 
 
5.8  Summary 
This chapter has focused on the research methodology employed for empirical 
analysis. The quantitive approach represented by the econometrics analysis of 
Chinese macroeconomic data has been used. In addition, this chapter also discussed 
the statistical techniques for testing the hypotheses. These statistical techniques 
included: selection the lag length, unit root test, johansen cointegration test, impulse 
response function and variance decomposition.  
This chapter has also discussed the results of impulse response function and 
variance decomposition, conducting within a structural VAR framework, and also 
examined the research hypotheses regarding the relationship among the real exchange 
rate represented by a number of macroeconomic variables for China. 
  After specifying properly the structural VAR, the restriction in Eq. (5.7) is imposed 
and the shocks are identified. The dynamic effects of the nominal and real shocks can 
be analyzed by impulse response functions (IRF) and variance decompositions (VDC). 
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It is proved that the responses of the real exchange rate to nominal shocks in the case 
of China are consistent with the standard theoretical prior of a fixed exchange rate 
system. Under a fixed exchange rate, since the nominal exchange rate is (at least 
initially) fixed, as the price level goes up in response to a positive nominal shock, the 
real exchange rate would appreciate. Subsequently, capital outflows due to lower 
domestic interest rates and/or worsening of the external current account caused by the 
initial real appreciation could then lead to a devaluation of the nominal exchange rate 
and a depreciation of the real rate. Under a flexible exchange rate arrangement, a 
positive nominal shock is expected to lower domestic interest rates relative to foreign 
rate, leading to a capital outflow and a depreciation of both nominal and real 
exchange rate while the price level and output rise in the short run. The estimation 
result here shows that, China has been under a fixed exchange rate arrangement for 
much of the estimation period, the real exchange rate appreciates immediately in 
response to a positive nominal shock. With quarterly data, the initial appreciation 
impact of a positive nominal shock on the real exchange rate is identified. Moreover, 
the contribution of nominal shocks to the variation in changes of the real exchange 
rate is quite significant compared with contribution of nominal shock coming from 
US. 
  As an explanation from the variance decomposition, relative nominal demand 
shocks account for most of the fluctuation in the real exchange rate changes during 
the estimation period, as shown in the Figure 5.1, especially in the short run, and 
account for about more than half of the variance in exchange rate movement even in 
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the long run. The overall importance of nominal shocks to the variations of real 
exchange rate changes is consistent with findings on other developing countries (e.g., 
Chen and Wu, 1997; Ahmed, 2003). Supply shocks also have a significant 
contribution that rises over longer horizons. Compared with studies on industrial 
countries with flexible exchange rate systems (Eichenbaum and Evans, 1993; Clarida 
and Gali, 1994), supply shock here play a significant but little less important role, 
maybe because china has been going through only minor supply side changes such as 
structural reforms and productivity shocks. Moreover, nominal shocks from China 
appear to have played as large important role compared with US in explaining the 
fluctuations in either output growth or real exchange rate movement, possibly because 
China has a de facto fixed exchange rate system with relatively closed capital account. 
The dominance of nominal shocks in the fluctuations of output growth found here is 
consistent with the findings of Ahmed (2003) for Latin American economies, and 
Hoffmaister and Roldos (2001) for Korea. Hoffmaister and Roldos (2001) also find 
that nominal shocks contribute more than supply shocks to the fluctuations of changes 
in the real exchange rate in the case of Korea. 
    To sum up, based on the empirical results of this study, the real exchange rate in 
the economy to domestic output, domestic price shock and external shock in the past 
appears not to have played the equilibrating role that we might expect it to play based 
on economic theory. However, these results as representative of the responses of 
China economies to various shocks, the results are mixed, and making a clear case 
against or in favour of rigidly fixed exchange rates is difficult. Since the shocks 
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appear to cause fluctuations in the real exchange rate, the case for more independent 
use of monetary policy supported by a flexible but gradual approach is appropriate.  
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Chapter 6   Conclusion and Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
Ever since China’s economic reform in 1978, China’s exchange rate regime kept 
evolving along with its reform, in order to pave the way for its rapid economic growth 
over ten years. The reform can be seen as a gradual process. While doing so, China’s 
exchange rate regime has to accompany this liberalization in order to keep pace with 
its economic growth. Starting with the evolution of China’s exchange rate regime, this 
study surveyed the literature on China’s exchange policy, and analysed the current 
regime theoretically and empirically. This final chapter discusses the main findings 
and evaluates the case for greater exchange rate flexibility.  
  
6.2  Evolution of China’s exchange rate regime  
Before 1979 the relatively tiny amount of foreign trade meant the exchange rate 
of RMB had an insignificant effect on the planned economy. This monopolistic 
structure helped china insulate against foreign economic shocks. The authorities could 
manipulate foreign trade plans in accordance with the target of central planned 
economy in which exports generate enough foreign exchange to support imports, 
while imports were expected to fill the gap made up the differenced between domestic 
demand and supply. This foreign exchange system was inefficient, since central 
planning could deprive firms’ autonomy which leads to low incentive and moral 
hazard. The pre-reform exchange rate was not a functional tool for the foreign trade to 
regulate the market demand and supply.  In 1979 Chinese authorities began the 
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economic reforms. Foreign exchange allocation mechanism transformed, from one 
controlled by government to the one more or less determined by market. Authorities 
set up foreign currency control department and allowed export sector to retain a 
fraction of foreign earning aiming to introduce incentives among exporters. In 1981 
authorities introduced RMB Internal Settlement Rate for export sector, while still 
retaining the overvalued exchange rate in non-trade transaction.  The introduction of 
ISR was the first attempt for authorities to adjust the RMB exchange rate according to 
the structure of domestic prices since 1949. Although the ISR was not adjusted by 
following market supply and demand force, the ISR more or less alleviated the extent 
of the RMB overvaluation and to the appreciated official exchange rate.  The 
overvalued RMB became a heavy burden for the authorities as they wanted to further 
open up the domestic market. To offset the adverse effect of export subsidies and 
distortion effects of the overvalued official exchange rate, from the mid 80s to early 
90s the foreign exchange swap market played a significant role in China’s foreign 
exchange system. To motivate the capital inflow, government allowed the foreign 
firms to swap foreign exchange among which the buyers and sellers negotiated the 
swap price. Aiming to get access to the WTO, in 1994 China deepened the economy is 
reform on foreign exchange, foreign trade and investment. As for foreign exchange 
reform, the RMB official and swap rates were unified at the rate of 8.7 Yuan per dollar 
at the end of 1993. The foreign exchange control on imports was also abolished. 
After the exchange rate unification, the trade balance turned from deficit in 1993 
into a surplus in 1994 and FDI also increased in 1994. This led to appreciation of 
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RMB; in turn by the end of 1996 RMB was around 8.28 Yuan per US dollar. In 1996, 
the government mainly focused on the full convertibility of current account. The 
government relaxed the control on private foreign exchange transactions and China’s 
average tariff level was brought down from 35.9 percent to 23 percent. The capital 
account on the other hand was still in tight control because of the lesson from Asian 
Crisis. During Asian Crisis, China’s authorities announced a stability of RMB 
exchange rate. The RMB exchange rate fluctuated in the range of 0.1 percent. In 
addition, depreciations in its neighbouring countries imposed strong deflationary 
pressure on China, the consumer prices grew at a negative rate in early 1998. 
However, China’s defend of its peg during the Asian Crises helped avoid the collapse 
of currency values among Asian countries and stabilized the regional economy growth. 
The experience of the Asian Crisis has shown how vulnerable a country is to a 
financial crisis if it has fixed exchange rate and liberalized capital market, especially 
when country has large short-term dollar indebtedness.   
After its accession to the WTO in 2001, China was finally accepted. China has 
liberalized its trade and investment policy, whereas capital account is still in tight 
control, reflecting the authorities’ concern about illegal capital flight, macroeconomic 
instability, and undeveloped domestic financial sector. However, to further liberalize 
the foreign exchange regime, China has to free the capital account in future. In this 
respect, China needs to have sound financial system, prudent fiscal and monetary 
policy, equilibrium exchange rate, and an adequate level of foreign reserves. The 
reform of financial sector is a crucial task for the Chinese authority in turning it into a 
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sound system. Especially since the WTO accession has led to a direct competition 
between foreign and domestic financial institutions, the reform seems formidable task.  
After the Asian Crisis, China’s economic growth is back on fast track, the net export 
and foreign direct investment grew synchronously, which led the official foreign 
reserve to accumulate quickly. In 2005, China modified its exchange rate arrangement 
from a single peg against US dollar to a basket peg regime. This can be seen as a 
further step for the authorities to more towards a floating exchange rate, and in doing 
so China is now preparing to open its capital account.  
 
6.3  Literature review on China’s exchange regime 
  The 1997 Asian Crisis generated a wide debate between fixed and floating 
exchange rate among scholars. Some Economists attribute the cause of crisis to the 
combination of fixed exchange rate and dollar indebtedness. However, empirical 
studies show that after Asian Crisis the fluctuation of East Asian countries’ exchange 
rates is not the sign of flexible exchange rate; rather the over depreciation during 
crisis leads to appreciation, there is trend for exchange rates to be pegged against 
dollar. Also their foreign exchange reserves accumulation has been far above their 
pre-crisis levels. There are several reasons to adopt fixed exchange rate. Firstly, the 
nominal anchor argument for monetary policy is of most interest by economists. This 
argument is derived from the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy conduct 
in a closed economy. In an open economy, a nominal anchor can ‘import’ monetary 
discipline and low inflation by requiring that the central bank follow the monetary 
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policy of another country. Therefore, with nominal anchor, individuals would expect 
low inflation in the future because the currency peg will prevent the central planners 
from expanding money supply even if they wanted to. Thus country with nominal 
anchor can attain a lower level of inflation for any given level of output.  The 
nominal anchor argument, however, works only through individual’s expectation on 
inflation, and the credibility of authorities’ announcement. Many economists argue 
that many central banks in emerging market have accountability problem.  If central 
banks lack credibility, then fixed exchange rate may be worse than floating exchange 
rate, since floating exchange rate can at least play a key indicator of the stance of 
monetary policy. In the case of China’s exchange rate, the revaluation in July 2005 
implies that the credibility of this fixed exchange rate regime is not reliable. Another 
reason of fixed exchange rate adoption is derived from game theory; the outcome of 
fixed exchange rate is the result of Nash Equilibrium. International trade normally 
constitutes major part of GDP in emerging market. Therefore, fixed exchange rate can 
prevent competitive depreciation. Third reason for exchange rate to be fixed is that 
high exchange rate variability would create uncertainty, which would discourage 
international trade and investment. By fixing the exchange rate to its major trade 
partner can then eliminate exchange rate risk and transaction costs, and thus 
encourage investment and international trade. Although this argument seems 
debatable from empirical point of view, yet since emerging markets have less 
developed forward and future market, the fixed exchange rate is a good tool to ensure 
the stability of their currencies. The last reason for fixed exchange rate is “Original 
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Sin”. The empirical studies on emerging markets shows that all domestic investments 
have either a maturity mismatch- long term investments financed by short term loans, 
and currency mismatch- investments using domestic currency financed by foreign 
currency. In order to offset the non-existent future or forward exchange in emerging 
markets, the government is induced to provide an informal hedge when borrowing 
abroad by keeping the exchange rate fixed to major currencies.  
In July 2005 Chinese official announced a new exchange rate policy of targeting 
a basket of currencies. But until late 2006 the de facto regime began to put a 
significant weight on some non-dollar currencies. There is a large scale of articles on 
the evaluation of China’s exchange policy from various perspectives. The economists 
could not reach consensuses on two points: the degree of the undervaluation of RMB 
and the time and steps to adjust the current exchange regime of China. However, 
majority of empirical studies show that the RMB is undervalued in between 5 to 30 
percent.  Although the strand of economists who had undertaken the technical 
calculation of the ‘equilibrium’ value of the RMB declared that there were clear 
evidence showing the RMB was undervalued, most of them did not agree that a swift 
revaluation would resolve the underlying problems facing China once for all.  
However, there is a certain consensus among the economists, that is as long as 
China’s capital market is free the adoption of floating exchange rate is inevitable, in 
other words, it is just matter of time for China’s exchange policy to end up with 
floating exchange rate.    
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6.4  Concluding theoretical model 
The theoretical model we have seen in Chapter 4 analyses the effect of nominal and 
real variables on financial exchange rate. The basic idea is that the system of dual 
exchange rates and the system of hard peg with capital control are juxtaposed together 
for comparisons and analyses. The standard argument for a dual exchange rate regime 
assumes that the exchange rate for transactions of goods and capital are segregated 
and channelled into two categories of markets: one for current account transactions 
and the other for capital account transactions. In such a system, a majority of imports 
and export transactions assigned with higher priority by the government are settled in 
the official foreign exchange market; a tiny proportion of other current account 
transactions with lower priority and all the capital transactions are settled in the 
financial exchange market. A prototype of the dual exchange rate system is usually 
assumed with a pegged official exchange rate, or in other words the commercial rate, 
and a freely adjusted financial exchange rate. The government holds foreign reserves 
to maintain the official exchange rate but the financial rate is mainly determined by 
market force.  
The results deduced from the model were in line with the traditional theories and 
conclusions. For example, the effects of domestic credit expansion based on this 
model are no much different from the one we obtain from Krugman’s model of first 
generation speculative attack. As a result, in the long-run, the net effect of a 
permanent domestic credit expansion is that the financial exchange rate initially 
overshoots and then comes back to its original level in the long run, and the final 
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equilibrium level of foreign reserve decreases.  Domestic output expansion affects 
not only the long run foreign reserves, but also in the long run financial exchange rate. 
The increase in output leads to the expansion of foreign reserves.  Therefore, in a 
dual exchange rate regime, the foreign reserve will move in the same direction as the 
change in output. But the new equilibrium financial exchange rate will depend on the 
particular structural parameters. By virtue of this model, we can also analyze the 
effects of other kinds of macroeconomic shocks, like the variances in foreign goods 
price *p and foreign interest rate *i . Besides, the dynamics of foreign reserves and the 
financial exchange rate caused by the portfolio adjustment that are subject to domestic 
residents’ planned saving behaviour can also be analyzed. This model manifests 
flexibility by allowing us to examine the effects of any combinations of the 
accommodated variables.  
  However, there are also some points we do not cover in the model. First, we only 
analyze the effects of permanent changes in domestic credit and output. But the 
impacts on the economy of temporary economic policies also deserve attention at 
some times. Second, while discussing the effects of output movements, the case of 
11 <β  not investigated into and the prerequisites that determine the short-run 
dynamics of financial rate have not been explored.    
  Finally, despite some insufficiencies, the dual exchange rate model provides a 
framework to investigate the underlying working mechanism and the policy 
implication, particularly for those regimes with some degree of capital control.  
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6.5 Model application  
It has to be admitted that the fixed exchange rate arrangement has contributed a lot 
to the continuous improvement of China’s economic fundamentals. Nevertheless, this 
should not be seen as a reason for perpetuating such an exchange rate regime. With 
the gradual lifting of some protectionist measures that the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) permitted and China was enjoying so far, like opening domestic financial 
market by the end of 2006 and lowering foreign commodity tariff inch by inch, the 
sustainability of such a fixed exchange arrangement albeit with strict capital controls 
is questionable.  
The abrupt surges in the current account surplus and thereby the foreign reserves 
have been able to help China build up strong ability to withstand external risks and 
crises; however, they have been also producing some kinds of potential costs. Either 
domestic investment over-heating, or the inflation soaring, or the hang-up of domestic 
prices of oil and other staple raw materials, or even the obstinate issue of 
non-performing loans, all of them can be again connected back to the ex ante RMB 
exchange arrangement, and the engendered slack monetary condition. 
The fast rising foreign reserves not only cause huge pressure on the currently 
maintained exchange rate regime but also render the efficacy of monetary policy 
gradually losing away. Excessive accumulation of foreign reserves lead domestic 
monetary base to enlarge inappropriately, and also press down domestic interest rate 
at a very low level. With the capital outflow still prohibited, the domestic equity 
market carrying on shrinking and the downturn of domestic consumption, the only 
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outlet for the superabundant domestic fund may be the investment.  
If so, it will certainly stimulate the domestic investment to soar inappropriately. In 
the short term, over-investment will pull up the economic growth but will also raise 
inflation, especially the production factor prices while China still exercises price 
regulation of consumption products. If the rising factor price finally crushes such a 
price setting rule and drives domestic consumption price up, the pressure on the 
exchange rate to revalue is imaginably compulsive.  
Moreover, immoderately cheap domestic credit further deepens the concerns on the 
NPL issue of domestic banking sector. After all, the enterprise profitability is at the 
core of any domestic risk. Without the support of strong profit margin of corporate 
sector, the issue of non-performing loan can only get worse but not better. 
Notwithstanding domestic price will go up shortly with increasing investment, the 
long-run trend of inflation is still unclear without a substantive improvement of 
domestic consumption component. If the current over-investment is ultimately 
transformed in to excessive ability of production in the future, then, where to find the 
way to exit such an over capability will be crucial. Resorting to either the 
international markets or domestic investment stimulus will only keep the current 
vicious circle running on.  
However, to break such a dilemma, again we have to pin our hope on the exchange 
rate reform. The sticking point remains lying in the ex ante exchange rate regime. The 
vast amount of foreign reserves that China has accumulated so far cannot coexist 
permanently with its fixed exchange rate regime. The external disequilibrium of the 
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Chinese economy cannot last for ever. Sooner or later, the economy will embark on 
path of self-adjusting. China had better take initiative than be forced to do so. 
Empirically, when looking back at the history of China’s exchange rate in the past 
decades, it is just a dynamic process of continual adjustment and reforms. The 
sustainable economic growth of China relies on sequential economic reconfiguration 
including the rearrangement of its exchange rate and monetary policy.  
 
6.6 Empirical Findings and Conclusions 
To accomplish the objectives, this study employed a quantitative approach to 
gather information that helps to meet the research objectives. The quantitative 
approach is represented by the econometric analysis of secondary data. (See Chapter 
Five) 
The empirical part is applied to analyzing and interpreting the results obtained 
from the econometric analysis (time series analysis) (Structural VAR method) as the 
approach of the research methodology. This method includes many tests: selection of 
the lag length, unit root test, johanson cointegration test, impulse response function, 
and variance decomposition. These test were used to examine the impact of two type 
of macroeconomic shocks—real/supply, and nominal/demand shocks on output, and 
relative price. The estimation results are generally in line with theoretical priors.  
 The research hypotheses were set up in chapter five to examine the relationship 
between the exchange rate and a number of explanatory variables (domestic and 
foreign inflation rates, real-GDP and trade-openness ratio.). These hypotheses were 
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tested in chapter seven using structural VAR analysis.  
 The result indicated that there is a significant negative relationship between the 
Real Exchange Rate and Consumer Price Index of China. Moreover the relationships 
between Real Exchange Rate and Consumer Price Index of US, and also between 
Real Exchange Rate and Real-GDP are both positive. These findings are consistent 
with the results of similar techniques applied by the previous studies, Ahmed (2003) 
for Latin American economies, and Hoffmaister and Roldos (2001) for Korea.  
From the results of structural VAR impulse response function (Figure 5.2), 
clearly we can see that the results are consistent with Purchasing Power Parity, the 
higher inflation rate in China, the more undervalued RMB. And also we can see that 
the lower inflation rate in US, the more undervalued RMB. Examining relative output, 
evidence shows that China’s long term GDP growth leads to appreciation of RMB 
which is compatible with Balassa-Samuelson effect.  
 
6.7  Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
The main limitations are relative to the empirical analysis and data collection.  
The researcher faced some restrictions while gathering data for China, as monthly 
data were not available and so she used quarterly data for variables during the period 
1994:1-2005:4, GDP quarterly data are also not available before 1994. And she also 
couldn’t find the data for some variables like production rate, unemployment rate and 
so on for China. Therefore, the analysis could be restricted to five major variables.   
While this study has provided valuable insight, further research could address, 
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several issues associated with the empirical analysis. The current study examined the 
impact of the relative nominal/ demand and real/supply shocks account for the 
variations in the real exchange rate changes during the estimation period. Although 
this research represents a start, more work needs to be done to sort out whether 
exchange rate flexibility would prove to be more useful for emerging market 
economics. A proper examination would be to estimate an econometric model to 
evaluate the degree of exchange rate misalignment, on the basis of which the case for 
exchange rate flexibility would be made. Because of data constraints this was not 
possible; however it would be a useful extension for the future. 
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Appendix A 
Exchange rate Determination, Theories, Evolution, and Models 
A.1 Introduction  
This chapter reviews some basic models exchange rate determination. Throughout 
the analysis, the exchange rate (Symbol S) will be defined as the domestic currency 
price of foreign currency. So a rise in S means a rise in the price of foreign exchange, 
hence a relative cheapening of the domestic currency, or depreciation. Conversely, a 
fall in S implies a reduction in the number of units of domestic currency required to 
buy a unit of foreign exchange, that is, a rise in the relative value of the home 
country’s money, or an appreciation. The Bilateral exchange rate between, say, the 
UK and USA is the price of dollars in terms of pounds. A change in the UK-US 
bilateral exchange rate in favour of the dollar could be indicative of either a decline in 
the international value of the pound or a rise in that of the dollar, or both. Mark price 
of dollars= Mark price of pounds/ Dollar price of pounds. 
Fixed exchange rate or pegged rate is a rate the government (central bank) sets and 
maintains as the official exchange rate. A set price will be determined against a major 
world currency (usually the U.S. dollar, but also other major currencies such as the 
euro, the yen, or a basket of currencies). In order to maintain the local exchange rate, 
the central bank buys and sells its own currency on the foreign exchange market in 
return for the currency to which it is pegged. 
Unlike the fixed rate, a floating exchange rate is determined by the private market 
through supply and demand. A floating rate is often termed "self-correcting", as any 
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differences in supply and demand will automatically be corrected in the market. Take 
a look at this simplified model: if demand for a currency is low, its value will decrease, 
thus making imported goods more expensive and thus stimulating demand for local 
goods and services. This in turn will generate more jobs, and hence an auto-correction 
would occur in the market. A floating exchange rate is constantly changing. 
In this chapter we review the exchange rate determinant under different model with 
consideration of monetary and fiscal policy. Three theoretical models are of interest- 
the monetary model, the Mundell-Flemming model, and the Dombusch Model. These 
models are different with respect to their assumption on the rigidity of price. 
Generally in the long run prices are flexible whereas in the short run it is fixed. Given 
this assumption different models generate different exchange rate movement under 
monetary and fiscal policy as we can see below.  
The rest of this chapter consists of several parts. Section A.1 introduces basic 
concepts. Section A.2 gives brief review on the historical revolution of the exchange 
rate since World War 2. Section 3 gives preliminary settings on open economy and 
financial market which are used in the models. Section 4 presents models and section 
5 concludes.  
 
A.2 Exchange Rate since World War II: a brief History 
1) The Bretton Woods system:1944-68 
Under the Bretton Woods system, countries undertook two major commitments: 
firstly to maintain convertibility and secondly to preserve a fixed exchange rate, until 
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unambiguous evidence of ‘fundamental disequilibrium’ appeared, at which point they 
were expected to devalue or revalue, as the case may be- in other words, announce a 
new parity. The Bretton Woods system worked on a principle known as the Gold 
Exchange Standard, which evolved from the pre-war Gold Standard. Under this 
arrangement the USA operated a fully-fledged Gold Standard, in other words it 
pledged to keep the dollar price of gold fixed irrevocably (at the price of 35$ per 
ounce), by standing ready to exchange gold to US currency on demand via the 
so-called Gold Window. Other countries then fixed their currencies in terms of dollars, 
devaluing or revaluing as necessary in order to counteract disequilibrium, whether it 
was deemed to originate in their own deviant behaviour or in that of the USA. In other 
words, the USA anchored the system as a whole, by virtue of the fixed dollar price of 
gold. Other countries then had to accommodate themselves by changing their 
exchange rate when required. 
 
2)  The Breakdown of Bretton Woods: 1968-73 
Broadly, the net demand for dollars shifted downward progressively throughout the 
1950s and 1960s. In the event, the disintegration came in stages, starting in 1968 with 
the inception of an unofficial free market in gold, form which central banks were 
barred. The system final broke down on 15 August 1971, when President Nixon 
announced the closing of the Gold Window. In the 1950s, while the fixed exchange 
rate system was at its most robust, the advocates of floating were relatively few, 
though they included the formidable figure of Milton Friedman. In the 1960s, 
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however, as national inflation rates began to diverge and the inconsistencies in 
Bretton Woods became increasingly obvious, the demand for a floating system 
appeared more and more attractive as a possible solution to the problems created by 
the incompatible macroeconomic policies of the major industrial countries. In 
particular, the argument that a floating exchange rate country behaves like a closed 
economy seemed convincing to many economists. A corollary of this view was that 
fears were largely groundless that floating exchange rates would be highly volatile. 
 
3) The floating rate era: 1973 to date 
The main features of the floating exchange rate period so far have been: 
(i) A growing US current deficit, approaching $200bn by 1987, by contrast, 
both Japan and West Germany enjoyed large surpluses in the 1980’s.  
(ii) Two massive increases in the price of Crude oil, engineered by the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel, in 1973-4 and 
1979. The first shock was accommodated by the fiscal and monetary policies of 
the oil-importing countries, and therefore led to accelerated inflation. The second 
shock, by contrast, was not accommodated, and was associated with a short, 
sharp recession in the USA and a more prolonged slump in Europe. 
(iii) The problems of sovereign lending were further exacerbated by the third 
world Debt crises of the 1980’s. 
(iv) A perceptible acceleration of post-war trends in terms of the balance of 
economic power. By the end mid 1980s, Japan was in most respects the world’s 
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largest trading nation. 
(v) Much greater international capital mobility brought about technological 
advance, increasing internationalization of commerce and industry, and 
deregulation of capital markets in all the major financial centres. 
For all these reasons, there is no justification for the conclusion that floating 
exchange rate regimes have somehow failed to deliver the tranquillity promised in 
advance by their advocates. 
 
A.3 The International Setting 
A.3.1 Prices in the Open Economy: Purchasing Power Parity 
The real exchange rate is far too volatile to be consistent with the constancy 
implications of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). It based on ‘no arbitrage argument’ 
or ‘law of one price’; PPP is a flow model of the ‘inflation theory of exchange rates’ 
vis-à-vis the balance of trade. Only relative PPP seems to hold in the long run. Shifts 
in technology, tastes, commercial policies or labour force growth will structurally 
change national productivity and hence will permanently change the real exchange 
rate. Hence, PPP is usually a benchmark currency valuation. 
The Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) theory, sometimes called the ‘inflation theory 
of exchange rates’ can be traced back to the Salamanca school in sixteenth century 
Spain, and to the writing of Gerard de Malines appearing in 1601 in England. Though 
Keynes (1923, 1971) gave credit to David Ricardo for the concept of PPP, the 
Swedish economist Gustav Cassel (1918) was first to name the theory PPP. After 
World War I, Cassel became the outstanding protagonist of the theory. Cassel once 
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argued that without PPP, there would be no meaningful way of discussing over- or 
under- valuation of exchange rates. Basically, PPP relies on the ‘law of one price’ in 
an integrated, competitive ‘product’ market with an implicit assumption of a 
risk-neutral world. The concept is based on a flow theory of exchange rates where the 
demand for currency is to pay for exports and the supply is to pay for imports. Despite 
the fact that the theory has been known for centuries, PPP remains as controversial as 
ever. Much of the theory is reviewed and discussed by Officer (1984), Dornbusch 
(1988), Levi (1990) and Levich (1998). 
When an asset market is taken into account, an interest parity condition, like PPP, 
follows the essence of international manifestations of the law of one price. In the 
absence of friction, the dollar rate of return on security investments, or the dollar costs 
of borrowing, will be equal in different countries where there is perfect capital 
mobility and perfect capital substitutability. Thus, interest parity, exchange rates and 
inflation rates are interdependent as discussed below: 
 
A.3.2 The Financial Markets in the Open Economy 
A.3.2.1 Covered Interest Rate Parity 
Covered interest rate parity (CIRP) states that there will be no advantage to borrow 
or lend in one country’s asset market rather in that of another country. If there is an 
advantage, then interest arbitrageurs will move the market toward covered interest 
rate parity. Mathematically, the partial equilibrium equation based on arbitrage or ‘law 
of one price’ argument (in log form) is: 
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i - i* = f - s 
where i, i* are interest rate at home and abroad respectively, f is forward exchange 
rate and s is spot exchange rate. Empirically, Frankel and Levich (1975) using weekly 
observations from Jan. 1962 to Nov. 67 confirmed that CIRP holds. That is to say 
covered interest arbitrage does not seem to entail unexploited opportunities for profits. 
Later Frankel and Levich (1977) extended their studies into three periods : 1962-67, 
the ‘tranquil peg’; 1968-69, the ‘turbulent peg’; and 1973-1975, the managed float 
confirmed their previous study that CIRP still holds during these periods even though 
the effect of transaction costs is taken into account. They furthermore found that the 
cost of transactions (expressed in terms of widening bid and ask spreads) associated 
with CIRP increased dramatically during the managed float period compared to other 
periods. Clinton (1988) later examined CIRP and transaction costs with a similar 
conclusion. Moreover, one of Frankel and Levich (1977)’s conclusion is that 
transactions costs play a similar role in accounting for deviations from parity during 
‘quiet’ periods, but not during ‘turbulent periods. 
 
A.3.2.2   Uncovered Interest rate Parity 
Resembling CIRP, it can be argued that an unhedged-interest-parity condition may 
hold in a rational expectations framework. The forward exchange rate may be strongly 
influenced by the market expectations about the future exchange rate, since 
participants’ currency expectations change as the result of new information. The 
interest rate spread between two substitutable assets with different currency 
denominations is equal to the difference between the expected future (log) exchange 
P a g e  | 155 
 
rate and the current spot (log) exchange rate. Mathematically, UCIRP is (in log) at t = 
0 : 
i - i* = E [ st+1 - st ] 
where E [ st+1 - st ] is expected changes in future rate and i, i* are interest rate at home 
and abroad between t to t+1 respectively. Very little empirical evidence supports 
UCIRP consistent with stylized facts on nominal exchange rate return by Vries (1994). 
Originally using a k-step-ahead forecasting equation and overlapping techniques on 
seven major currencies weekly data during the 1970’s and 1920’s, Hansen and 
Hodrick (1980) reject the simple market efficiency hypothesis for exchange; hence, 
UCIRP does not hold. Again Ito (1988) applies time-domain vector autoregression 
techniques and finds that UCIRP is rejected. Cumby (1988) later on asserts that the 
forward risk premiums are time varying with changing signs and question whether 
one should call it ‘risk’ at all. Finally, in the weak sense of UCIRP, expected changes 
in the nominal exchange rate should be positively related to the differences in the 
nominal interest rate across countries. But Adjaoute (1995) concludes that the risk 
premium arises in exchange because exchange risk is not totally diversifiable. From 
this cause, there are rewards for risk adverse investors for open positions in assets 
denominated in currencies other than their home currency. Alternatively, Bansel (1997) 
still finds UCIRP is violated in the weekly data for the U.S., Germany and Japan from 
January 1981 - May 1995 by using a generalized method of moment on a term 
structure model. Bansel claims one possible reason is each country may utilize 
different monetary policies over time. 
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A.4 Consideration of exchange Rate Determination 
A.4.1 Flexible Prices: The Monetary Model 
The monetary model is the earliest approach to explaining the related phenomena 
of exchange rate variations. It represents a benchmark for comparing the other 
approaches to modelling exchange rate determination, many of which grew out of the 
monetary model (such as Mundell-Fleming model and Dornbusch overshooting 
model which will be seen later in this section.). It consists of two basic building 
blocks: the purchasing power parity and the long run aggregate supply and demand 
relationship. The monetary model thus may be inadequate in explaining the short run 
exchange rate fluctuation; it nevertheless provides some useful insights into the broad 
picture of long term trends.  
There are three essential assumptions on which the monetary model rests: First the 
aggregate supply curve is vertical. Thus any monetary or fiscal policy is impotent to 
affect the output, except the changing of productivity of the economy such as 
technology, human capital etc. Secondly, the vertical aggregate supply curve implies 
the perfect price flexibility. The demand for money is a function of only price level 
and real output: 
Md =kPy                             (A.1)  
where Md is the nominal money demand, P is the price level, y is the real output, and 
k is the positive parameter. Given the money supply is Ms the equilibrium implies: 
Ms =kPy                              (A.2) 
Thus it follows that the nominal output, Y, is constant along the aggregate demand 
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curve. More importantly given the increase of money supply say doubling the money 
stock, the outcome has to be a shift of AD curve outward that doubles the nominal 
output, since real output is fixed by long run vertical AS curve it must be the case that 
the price level is doubled. Thirdly, purchasing power parity must hold at all time. Two 
price levels follow the relationship as: 
SP*=P                              (A.3) 
where P* is the foreign price level. The PPP implies that economy cannot gain from 
international trade and purchasing power of each country’s currency must be the same. 
Consider left diagram of figure A.1, where the purchasing power parity relation lies in 
the P, S plane. The ray from the origin is the locus of all combinations of S and P that 
satisfy PPP relation we call it PPP line. The slope of the line is just the foreign price 
level. We can see that any point above the line makes domestic economy 
uncompetitive since the domestic price level is relatively high, it is better off 
importing from the foreign country. In terms of real exchange rate (Q): 
Q=SP*/P                               (A.4) 
It means for purchasing power parity to hold it must be equal to one. Hence the 
relatively high domestic price level indicates the real appreciation of the exchange 
rate. In contrast any point indicates the competitiveness of the domestic economy is 
below the line.       
 
Recalling the money market equilibrium equation A.2 and purchasing power parity 
relation, we can combine these two equations into: 
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Ms =kPy=kySP*                                       (A.5) 
So we can solve for S: 
S=Ms/kP*y                              (A.6) 
The exchange rate is determined by three variables: foreign price level, real domestic 
output and domestic money stock. Next we will consider the effect of these variables 
under fixed and exchange rate regime. 
 
Under floating exchange rate: 
A monetary expansion: considering the increase of money stock, assuming other 
variables are unchanged. The AD curve shifts outward. Equation A.2 gives us the 
explicit indication that since the real output stay constant given the increase of money 
supply the domestic price level must increase the same proportion. Figure A.1 shows 
that at initial price level P0 there must be excess supply of money which cause 
economic agents to increase spending so as to reduce their money balance by buying 
goods or services. Given the real output stays constant the extra spending must drive 
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As the price of domestic goods rises, price of foreign currency must increase in order 
to keep domestic output competitive. Hence the nominal exchange rate increases from 
S0 to S1conresponding to the PPP line from A to B. 
 
In the monetary model, assuming other things being equal, a given percentage 
increase in the domestic money supply leads to a depreciation of the same proportion 
in the value of the domestic currency.  
    
An increase of real income: the change of real income only can be done by the shift 
of long run AS curve. Figure A.2 demonstrates the effect of increase of real income. A 
higher real income implies a greater demand for money. With a given money supply 
the nominal income must be constant, thus the higher is real output the lower must be 
the price level. The price level changes from initial level P0 to P1 otherwise if the 
price level stays constant the nominal income will be at point c where there is excess 
demand for money and excess supply for goods. 
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Therefore the result must be deflation at the point b; all the markets are at 
equilibrium. To ensure PPP must hold, the lowered domestic price level must leads to 
the fallen exchange rate from S0 to S1 hold foreign price. Otherwise the fall of in 
domestic prices would have made domestic economy competitive, causing a massive 
excess demand for domestic currency. PPP is preserved by exchange rate appreciation, 
so that the fall in the price of domestic output is offset by a rise in the price of 
domestic currency.  
The result of real income increase hence is that since it swells the demand for 
money, it must cause a contraction in the demand for goods, which in turn must lead 
to a fall in the domestic price level, holding money supply and foreign price level 
constant, the home currency must appreciate.  
 
A foreign price increase: having mentioned above the foreign price level P* is the 
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PPP line, so that the original domestic price level P0 is associated with a lower price 
of foreign currency thus domestic currency appreciates. Figure A.3 shows that with 
higher foreign price level, domestic goods are competitive at the old exchange rate. 
The demand for domestic currency by foreign importers drives up the domestic 
currency price until the foreign and domestic economies are equally competitive. In 
the new equilibrium point B the higher foreign price level is offset by the higher 
relative price of the domestic currency. The foreign price change under monetary 
model has significant proposition which suggests that world inflation need have no 
impact on the domestic economy. The domestic price level is determined in home 
money markets exactly the same way it would be. Copeland (1989) suggests that 
under monetary model the floating exchange rate acts like a valve, continually sliding 
up or down as required to preserve PPP in the face of disturbances originating in 
either or both countries’ domestic money market. Thus the implication is that each 
country’s macroeconomic policy is independent because of the exchange rate 
flexibility. Its independence is to be regarded as a desirable feature of an international 
monetary order; the floating exchange rate system appears highly attractive. 
 




Under fixed exchange rate:  
Consider a situation where the exchange rate is fixed. Unlike the case in floating 
exchange rate, here the money supply is an endogenous variable where money supply 
is the sum of foreign currency reserves (FX) and domestic credit (DC): 
Ms=FX+DC                          ( A.7) 
In order to keep the exchange rate fixed central bank has to manipulate the volume of 
foreign currency reserve, in turn will affect the domestic money supply. The right 
diagram of figure A.4 plots the money stock change in the Ms and FX plane. The 
intercept is thus the domestic credit, and the slope of the ray is one. The ray shows 
how the money stock increases with additions to the reserves, given the initial 
quantity of domestic credit.   
A monetary expansion: figure A.4 shows that the initial foreign reserve and money 































In order to link figure A.4.b and A.4.c we set the value of money supply and the price 
level equal. As with the floating exchange rate case, the left diagram plots the PPP 
line, however with the exchange rate fixed hence S always pegs at Ŝ0. Since the 
equilibrium requires the economy should be at PPP line, it follows that the domestic 
price level must end up at point A where it is the intersection of the PPP line with the 
fixed exchange rate line. Thus the initial equilibrium is shown at points A, a and H. 
The effect of money supply increase by increasing domestic credit shifts the intercept 
from DC0 to DC1; the money stock now is Ms1 at point J. the new money stock 
implies a increased price level P1. The new price level implies that the domestic 
economy is uncompetitive, given unchanged foreign price and the fixed exchange rate. 
At point C there is an incentive for domestic firms to import from abroad, thus the 
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Figure A.4 
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domestic currency. To tackle this downward trend of exchange rate central bank must 
use foreign reserves to buy the domestic currency. The result is that the reserves start 
to fall, in turn money supply decreases. Therefore, the system moves from J to K, 
from b back to a, and from C down to A. the process ends up with competitiveness 
restored, back at A on the PPP line. Under fixed exchange rates, domestic credit 
creation will be neutralized, given other variables being constant, by a fall in the 
reserves as a result of a temporary current account deficit. Conversely, domestic 
credit contraction will cause a temporary balance of payments surplus and a 
consequent offsetting rise in the reserves.  
 
An income increase: with the price level unchanged, an increase in real income 
leads to a rise in the demand for real money balances, then the impact will cause 
domestic residents to spend less. In doing so, there is excess supply in goods market 
that force the price level down, which with a fixed exchange rate makes the home 
country’s output competitive on world markets, leading to a balance of payments 
surplus, thus rise in the foreign reserves. This process will end up when the domestic 
money stock has grown enough to match the demand. Under fixed exchange rate, the 
result of a rise in real income will cause an increase in the reserves as a result of 
temporary balance of payment surplus. In the new equilibrium the domestic money 
stock has risen and the home price level decrease back to PPP line. 
  
A foreign price increase: as for a foreign price level rising, the PPP line will be 
steeper. The effect under a fixed exchange rate is to increase the home country’s 
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competitiveness, causing a payments surplus and consequently increase of the foreign 
reserve. This in turn brings about a rise in the money stock, pushing up the home 
country price level until it reaches the equilibrium of purchasing power parity. 
Starting from a position of equilibrium, the result of a rise in the foreign price level 
will cause an increase in the reserves as the result of a temporary balance of payments 
surplus, given other variables being fixed. The new equilibrium implies the domestic 
money stock will be greater, and the home price level will have risen. Unlike floating 
exchange rate, the foreign price change implies that domestic economy has to import 
inflation from the rest of the world. The fact that it cannot control its own money 
supply means it cannot choose its price level or inflation rate independently. The 
important conclusion is that a country cannot follow an independent monetary policy 
under fixed exchange rates nor can it choose a price level or inflation rate different 
from that of the rest of the world.  
 
The use of devaluation: A fixed exchange rate regime is sometimes referred to as 
an adjustable peg, monetary authorities can adjust the domestic currency price aiming 
to gain competitiveness in goods market. We will then see the effect of devaluation of 
currency price under monetary model. Figure A.5 shows the effect of devaluation, 
once and for all rises in the price of foreign currency.  
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Suppose the economy starts off in equilibrium at points A, a and G in the three graph. 
The initial exchange rate is fixed at Ŝ0, a price level under PPP of P0 and a money 
supply of Ms0 is the sum of domestic credit DC0 and reserves of FX0. The home 
country then devalues the domestic currency price to Ŝ1. The short term impact is to 
move the economy instantaneously to a point like C where home economy is now 
over competitive. With both domestic and foreign price level unchanged, the increase 
of the nominal as well as real exchange rate makes the foreign goods artificially 
expensive, while domestic goods are unchanged in price. The result must be a 
tendency for home country consumers to buy more domestic output than previously. 
Conversely, foreigners find the home country’s products more attractively priced than 
prior to the devaluation. The outcome has to be a balance of payments surplus. This 
surplus leads to the accumulating foreign reserves, hence the domestic money supply 
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Figure A.5 
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unchanged, the money supply must be growing, shifting the aggregate demand curve 
upwards. In terms of the money market, with real income and output constant, hence 
the price level must be higher as agents attempt to reduce their excess real balances 
by buying additional goods. As the price level rises the competitive advantage is 
eroded, until the new equilibrium is reached at B in the PPP line. In terms of the 
goods market, if output is fixed, the increased demand by domestic residents and by 
foreigners cannot be satisfied. The excess demand must generate an inflation, which 
persists until enough of the additional demand has been priced out of the market in 
order to restore equilibrium.  
  
Thus under fixed exchange rates the result of a devaluation will be a temporary 
improvement in the competitiveness of the home country and consequently a balance 
of payments surplus, leading to a rise in its foreign currency reserves. However, the 
accompanying inflation will emerge; hence erode the country’s price advantage, until 
economy move to a new equilibrium where it is with higher price level, greater 
reserves and a larger nominal money stock, but the same real money supply.  
 
A.4.2 Fixed Prices: The Mundell-Fleming Model 
The Mundell-Fleming model is consistent with Keynesian tradition- aggregate 
supply curve is flat which takes the passive role of fixing the price level, while 
aggregate demand variations determine the level of economic activity. It means that 
we can concentrate on the demand side of the economy. Since output adjusts 
passively, the IS-LM framework is used in which aggregate demand is determined. 
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The distinctive feature of the Mundell-Fleming model is the current balance is 
determined independently of the capital account, so that the achievement of overall 
balance requires adjustment in the domestic economy. The model assumes that the 
purchasing power parity does not hold, even in the long run. Instead, the current 
account (CA) depends positively on the real exchange rate (Q) and negatively on real 
income (y): 
CA=F(y, Q)         Fy<0, FQ>0              (A.8) 
Given both domestic and foreign price levels, the real and nominal exchange rates are 
in fact identical. The role of interest rates is central to the model. Here we assume that 
capital mobility is imperfect which means international interest rate differentials are 
assumed to provoke finite flows into or out of a country. Given the foreign interest 
rate (r*), the capital account (KA) surplus depends positively on the domestic interest 
rate where: 
                        KA=K(r-r*)       Kr>0                    (A.9) 
The equation implies that the domestic capital inflow is an increasing function of the 
extent to which the home interest rate is greater than the one ruling in foreign country. 
It should be noted that in the Mundell-Fleming model the current account does not 
need to balance neither in short or long run. The current account deficit (surplus) can 
be offset by a capital account surplus (deficit) of the same size. Therefore balance of 
payment should be always at equilibrium which obtains when the flow of capital 
across the exchanges is just sufficient to finance the current account deficit or absorb 
the surplus. This means that the sum of depends on the surplus on capital and current 
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account must be zero. Thus adding equation 8 and 9 the following condition to apply 
at all times: 
CA(y,Q)+KA(r-r*)=0   (A.10)                      
Consider Figure A.6, the BP line plot the combinations of y and r consistent with 
balance of payments equilibrium for different values of S. The upward sloping line 
implies as income increases at any given exchange rate, the current account 
deteriorates as import demand grows, in order to preserve equilibrium, the capital 
account must improve by increasing the domestic interest rate. Thus higher income 
must be associated with higher interest rates for balance of payment equilibrium and 
vice versa. The extent of the interest rate increase required to offset a small rise in 
income depends on the interest elasticity of net capital flows. Under the assumption 
of perfect equilibrium the slope of BP line will be zero (flat). On the other hand, a rise 
in domestic currency price means a current account surplus, and hence requires a 
more capital inflow, and thus a lower interest rate. Thus increases in S will shift the 
BP line downward. However if the line is flat, domestic interest rate must be equal 
world interest rate at all time in order to prevent the flood of capital into or out of the 
country. We then consider the effect of expansionary monetary policy and fiscal 
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Under floating exchange rate  
Monetary expansion: suppose the IS, LM and BP curve is initially at equilibrium at 
point A in figure A.6. The monetary authority decides to double the money stock. 
Since the price level is fixed, the increase in the nominal money stock is equivalent to 
a rise in the real money stock. Hence the LM curve moves downwards, so that the 
interest rate has to fall. At first the LM can shift as far as r2. However the point C is 
not an equilibrium point because with a lower interest rate the capital inflow is 
smaller than it was before the monetary expansion. At the higher real income level, 
the current account balance must be deteriorated. Thus at point C the balance of 
payment is disequilibrium. Since the domestic interest rate is lower than world 
interest rate the domestic currency price will depreciate for the sake of capital outflow. 
As exchange rate depreciates, the competitiveness of domestic production improves 
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boost to demand has the effect of pushing interest rates part of the way back to the 
original level. Finally the economy settles at B where the interest rate is at the level r1. 
Balance of payment is back to equilibrium because the moderate increase of the 
interest rate has the effect of reducing the capital account deficit to a level where the 
current account surplus created by the depreciation in the currency is sufficient to 
cover it. Thus under the floating exchange rate the monetary expansion leads to a 
depreciation in the exchange rate and an increase in income. Moreover, the an 
improvement in the current account and capital account deficit because of the lower 
interest rate ensure the balance of payment is zero. 
 
Fiscal expansion: By contrast, Figure A.7 illustrates the effect of a pure fiscal 
expansion e.g. an increase in government expenditure. Given fixed money stock and 
constant price level the LM curve therefore does not move at all. Whereas, fiscal 
expansion shifts IS curve to the right. However since money stock is fixed, the 
government can only finance it’s spending by borrowing. Since we assume all the 
markets are at equilibrium, borrowing is only feasible at the cost of a higher interest 
rate. The impact of the fiscal policy is to increase income and the interest rate. 
However, point C in the figure is inconsistent with equilibrium in the balance of 
payment. A higher interest rate implies an influx of capital into home country, 
accordingly an emerging excess demand for domestic currency leads to the price of 
the domestic currency must appreciate. As the exchange rate rises, domestic goods 
becomes less attractive to foreigners, shifting the IS curve back down to the left, and 
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pushing the interest rate some of the way back to its initial level. The process ends 
when the combination of exchange rate and interest rate are such that domestic 
equilibrium is at point B. consider the balance of payment the outcome is a current 
account deficit and capital account surplus. The interesting case here is if we are 
facing perfect capital mobility. When the BP is flat, the IS cannot move in the long 
run. The reason is with BP and LM curves fixed the interest rate cannot change; the 
system must remain at the point A in the IS-LM diagram. It follows the exchange rate 
must move so as to keep the IS curve unchanged, that is enough to offset the 
expansionary effect on demand of the increase in government spending. Thus with the 
interest rate pegged by international capital markets, the adjustment falls totally on 
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Consequently, fiscal expansion cause an appreciation in the exchange rate which 
causes current account deficit, an increase in income if capital is not completely 
mobile. Also with imperfect capital mobility a rise in the interest rate provide capital 
account surplus. 
 
Under fixed exchange rate      
Monetary expansion: let us focus on fixed exchange rate regime. In figure A.8 the 
initial equilibrium is at A. Consider the effect of monetary expansion. The impact 
effect of the increase in the total money stock has to be the downward shift in the LM 
curve, thus the new equilibrium is at point B. Concerning the balance of payment 
equilibrium, the fall in the interest rate must worsen the capital account balance, at the 
same time the increase in income with an unchanged exchange rate also causes 
deterioration in the current account. Thus point B cannot be an equilibrium point 
because the overall balance of payment deficit and excess supply of domestic 
currency means that the fixed exchange rate can only be preserved by running down 
the foreign reserves. The process only ends when the money stock is back where it 
starts at point A. Although at the new equilibrium interest rate, income and the 
balance of payment are back at the previous level, yet the composition of the money 
stock is now made up of a lower quantity of foreign currency, and a greater quantity 
of domestic credit. In the extreme case i.e. with perfect capital mobility it must be 
assumed that any fall in the interest rate is ruled out since it would provoke an 
immediate run on the foreign currency reserves. So the adjustment process would be 
instantaneous. The conclusion is in the short term; given capital is not perfect mobile, 
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the interest rate falls, income increases and the balance of payment deficit on both 
current and capital account. In the long run a fall in the foreign currency reserves, but 




Fiscal expansion: finally we see the effect of government spending financed by 
borrowing in the context of a fixed exchange rate. Consider figure A.9 the effect is 
firstly to shift to IS curve upward. The interest rate must rise as the government try to 
expand their borrowing, the IS curve intersects the unchanged LM at C. However, 
point C is not long run equilibrium. The higher interest rate improves the capital 
account by more than the deterioration in the current account brought about by the 
increase in income. Again the solution lies in a change in the domestic component of 
the money supply which as foreigners takes advantage of the high domestic interest 
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appreciation, to keep exchange rate fixed the monetary authority must buy more 
foreign reserves, thus the domestic money stock swells which leads to the LM curve 
shift down to generate a long run equilibrium at B, where the further increase in 
income and fall in the interest rate worsen both current and capital account 
sufficiently to bring balance of payment equilibrium. The outcome is a balance of 
payment that shows a deficit on current account and capital inflow attracted by the 




The general conclusion is that in the short run a rise in the interest rate and income, 
and an overall surplus on the balance of payment. In the long run a further increase in 
income, interest rate falls and the overall balance of payment shrinks to zero, leaving 
a substantial current account deficit. Under the assumption of perfect capital mobility 
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be increase further.                 
 
A.4.3 Sticky Prices: The Dornbush Overshooting Model  
As we have seen above, both monetary model and Mundell-Fleming model have 
their drawbacks. The monetary model is incapable of explaining the facts because it 
relies on the unrealistic assumption of purchasing power parity and it ignores the role 
of played by expectations. In particular the day-to-day exchange rate fluctuation is far 
more violent than could be explained by the movements of relative money stocks and 
national incomes. The Mundell-Fleming on the other hand also does not take account 
of expectations, and it assumes a fixed price level which cannot explain the long run 
trend of exchange rate movement. The Dornbush model in contrast is a hybrid of 
these two models in which it fits into the Keynesian tradition assuming the stickiness 
of prices in the short run, and it also displays the long run features of the monetary 
model. The model is based on the observation that when product markets adjust 
slowly, financial markets appear to adjust for more rapidly. The consequence of 
allowing for this feature of the real world turns out to be that financial markets have 
to over adjust to disturbances, in order to compensate for the stickiness of prices in 
goods markets. The reason is that, with goods prices initially fixed, a change in the 
nominal money stock, for example, amounts to a change in the real money stock. It 
follows that there has to be an instantaneous change in the demand for real balances if 
the money market is to clear, and the change can only be brought about by an upward 
or downward movement in interest rates if output is assumed fixed. However, the 
deviation of domestic interest rates from world levels can only be temporary. As 
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product prices begin their delayed response, the change in the real money stock starts 
to reverse itself, and with it, the whole process goes into reverse, driving interest rates, 
aggregate demand and the real exchange rate back to the initial values. 
 
More specifically the Dornbush model assumes that financial markets adjust 
instantaneously. In particular, investors are risk neutral, so that uncovered interest rate 
parity holds at all times. In other words: 
                                r=r*+Δse                                    (A.11)                                  
where r is the domestic interest rate, r* is the world interest rate, and Δse is the 
expected rate of depreciation in the value of the domestic currency relative to the 
foreign currency. The way of exchange rate expectation determination is essential for 
the model. It assumes that there exists a long run equilibrium exchange rate Ŝ which 
is assumed to be determined at any moment by the level of domestic money stock, 
national income and interest rate relative to the world. In the Dornbush model the 
exchange rate is assumed to be at its equilibrium level only in the long run, the in 
short run it will deviate from its equilibrium level as a result of the sluggishness of 
goods market reaction. When the exchange rate is below its long run equilibrium 
level its future path will be a upward direction towards equilibrium and vice versa 
when its above equilibrium. Moreover the exchange rate will be expected to converge 
quicker on its long run level the greater the distance it has left to cover. The 
expectations mechanism can be expressed as: 
     Δse=θ(ŝ-s)                           (A.12) 
The equation is taken by natural logarithm. The right hand side is the gap 
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between the logarithm of the actual exchange rate and the logarithm of the long run 
exchange rate. The parameter θ is the sensitivity of market expectations to the over or 
under valuation of the currency relative to equilibrium. The greater it is, the more 
rapidly the exchange rate is expected to depreciate for any given degree of 
overvaluation.  
 
As for goods market, the price level is sticky. In other words, the aggregate 
supply curve is horizontal at the beginning, increasingly steep in the adjustment phase, 
and eventually vertical in the long run equilibrium. In the long run, the exchange rate 
is at its equilibrium level, in other words its market clears. However, in the short run 
the price is fixed due to the rigidities of the labour and goods markets caused by e.g. 
long run contract. As a result shocks which move the nominal exchange rate are 
associated with changes in the real exchange rate. The economy moves back to its 
long run real exchange rate, as a result of movement in both the nominal exchange 
and the price level.  
 
Monetary expansion an illustration     
We now consider the effect of an unanticipated money supply increase in the short 
run and long run. Like the monetary model, the monetary expansion has no real effect 
on the economy in the long run. The vertical aggregate supply curve AS (LR) implies 
that the aggregate demand has to equal the natural rate of income. The interest rate 
will have to equal world interest rate r* since long run equilibrium requires no further 
change in the exchange rate. Having seen in the monetary model the effect of change 
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in money supply is offset by the same proportion change in the domestic price level 
thus leaving the real money supply unchanged. In the long run the purchasing power 
parity also holds, implying the nominal exchange rate must also increase by the same 
proportion to the price level which ensures that there is neither a surplus nor a deficit 
in the current account of the balance of payments. Thus the new equilibrium is at 
point G, D, J and A.     
Figure A.10  
  Having measured the long run effect of money supply we now work out the impact 
effect. Consider the IS-LM diagram figure A.10 where it can be seen that the LM 
curve shifts down because with the nominal money stock increased and the price 
level unchanged, the real money supply is increase. With national income unchanged 
and the real money stock grater than before, there would be an excess supply of 
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incipient excess supply of money will be instantaneously choked of by a fall in the 
interest rate, offsetting the increase in the supply of real balances by a compensating 
increase in the demand. To prevent the flood of money out of domestic economy, 
there needs to be some compensating attraction for holders of domestic securities. 
Assuming the uncovered interest rate parity always holds the compensation is 
provided by an instantaneous depreciation in the exchange rate to a point at which the 
market views the pound as being undervalued as to offer the prospect of appreciation 
sufficient to offset the lower interest rate on domestic securities. However, the fall in 
the interest rate is mitigated by an induced shift in the IS curve. Since the nominal 
exchange rate has fallen while the domestic price level fixed, the competitiveness of 
home economy has improved, stimulating demand for its output and pushing the IS 
curve to the right. The net effect is to leave the economy in short run equilibrium at 
point b where the interest rate has fallen to r1 and aggregate demand has risen to y1. 
With an interest rate lower than world interest rate, the temporary exchange rate must 
be higher than the new long run exchange rate. Having said above in the long run the 
monetary expansion will cause price level and nominal exchange rate increase by the 
same proportion. Thus the temporary exchange rate needs to overshoot in order to 
generate the negative expected rate of depreciation in the value of the domestic 
currency. On balance the domestic currency is going to appreciate by just enough to 
compensate for the lower interest rate on home deposits in other words, at the rate 
r*-r1.  
Turning to the adjustment process, the excess demand for goods and services will 
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tend to push up prices in the domestic economy, at a speed which will depend on the 
rapidity with which the individual product and labour markets respond. As prices rise, 
the excess demand is eliminated in two ways. First, the domestic temporary 
competitive advantage is gradually eroded by the rise in domestic prices, so the 
demand for home output is reduced, the IS curve shifts back towards its original 
position. Secondly, the real money supply is progressively reduced by the inflation, 
shifting the LM curve back to its initial position. As the real money stock falls back, 
the interest rate rises to choke off the additional demand for money. As the domestic 
interest rate rises, the exchange rate appreciates, further eroding the home’s 
competitive advantage. In general the adjustment phase is the process of firstly 
domestic currency is appreciating in diminishing rate, secondly a decreasing current 
account surplus, thirdly decelerating price inflation and finally a rising interest rate.  
We now extent the Dornbush model further to somewhat formal explanation. First, 
we set down the equations.  
r=r*+Δse                                  (A.13) 
Δse=θ(ŝ-s)                                  (A.14) 
m-p=ky-lr                                  (A.15)  
yd=h(s-p) q=s-p                              (A.16) 
Δp=π(yd-ŷ)                                  (A.17) 
All the equations are taking logarithms terms. We are familiar with equation A.13 and 
A.14 above. Equation A.15 is simply a log linear formulation of the demand for 
money where it depends positively on real income and negatively on real interest rate. 
The important implication is since the money stock is given exogenously, thus money 
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demand is equal money supply. Equation A.17 is simplified aggregate demand. The 
equation captures the essential link between aggregate demand for domestic output 
and the log of the real exchange rate which is q=s-p, assuming foreign price level is 
unity. The higher the real exchange rate, the more competitive are domestic products. 
Equation 17 is a price adjustment equation which says that the wider the gap between 
demand and natural output the higher the rate of inflation, Δp. The equations above 
can be reduced to two equations. Substituting from equation A.13 and equation A.14 
to eliminate the domestic interest rate from the demand for money equation A.15 we 
have: 
                            p=m-kŷ +lr*-lθ(ŝ-s)                   (A.18)                         
and using equation 16 to replace aggregate demand in equation A.17: 
                             Δp=π(hs-hp-ŷ)                       (A.19)                              
In long run the inflation is zero, thus: 
                              s-p=Q= ŷ/h                        (A.20)                                                          
where Q denotes steady state values of real exchange rate. In the long run the only 
thing in the model which changes the real exchange rate is growth in natural output. 
Otherwise any change in the nominal exchange rate is matched by a change in the 
price level. Also the expected rate of depreciation is zero in the long run. The 
exchange rate is static, and is not expected to change because it is at its equilibrium 
level. Thus: 
                             P= m-kŷ +lr*                       (A.21)                             
where the capital P stands for steady state price level. Equation A.21 says the 
equilibrium price level is the ratio of the money stock to the level of demand when it 
is at its long run level that is when the domestic and world interest rates are equal. 
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Using equation A.21 and A.20, it follows that the nominal exchange rate settles at the 
level: 
                             S=(h-1-k) ŷ+m+lr*                   (A.22)                          
The capital S stands for the steady state nominal exchange rate. A given percentage 
rise in the money stock pushes up the long run values of the both the nominal 
exchange rate and the price level in the same proportion, and hence leaves the real 
exchange rate unchanged.  
 
Let us see how the model behaves out of equilibrium. having said that in the long run 
the inflation is zero, hence the equation A.19 implies: 
                           0=π(hs-hp-ŷ)                        (A.23)                                   
Subtracting this from equation 19 we get: 
                           Δp=πh(q-Q)                        (A.24)                                   
In other words, the rate of inflation is positive whenever the real exchange rate is 
above its equilibrium level, and vice versa below. So the combination of s and p 
consistent with zero inflation lie along 45o line in figure A.11.  
 




Applying the same treatment to the money market equation, take equation A.21 from 
equation A.18 to give: 
                                p-P=-lθ(s-S)                     (A.25)                                
which shows the conditions necessary for short run equilibrium in the money market. 
Even in the adjustment phase, the economy lies somewhere along a downward 
sloping line in figure A.11. The money market lines have a gradient of -1/lθ. It follows 
that they are steeper the less sensitive the demand for money to changes in the 
exchange rate relative to its equilibrium level. This sensitivity is the product of the 
interest elasticity and the expectations adjustment parameter.  
Return to the initial assumption of monetary expansion. The eventual outcome is to 
raise both the exchange rate and the price level. However, the sticky price level deters 
the immediate move from point A to B. Since the good market line is only determined 
by long run real exchange rate, hence that is going to remain unchanged. On the other 
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Figure A.11 
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any given exchange rate is consistent with a proportionately higher price level, so that 
the MM line shifts outward. Again the economy must be on the MM line at all times, 
but the price level is initially fixed at old level, thus the exchange rate must jump to s2, 
carrying the system to point C on the downward sloping path. This confirms that the 
nominal and real exchange rate overshoots in response to a monetary shock. The scale 
of the overshooting is dependent on the slope of the money market line- the steeper 
the line, the greater the overshoot.   
 
A.5  Conclusion 
To summarize, in this chapter the researcher intend to overview the exchange rate 
determination in the literature. It began with the definition of the exchange, then the 
research deepened in to purchasing power parity, and covered and uncovered interest 
rate power parity. All these research in fact is to pave the way to understand the three 
exchange models that could explain the exchange rate determination.  
The monetary model combines the theory of the demand for money and purchasing 
power parity to generate conclusions about the effect of changes in exogenous 
variables on a floating exchange rate or fixed exchange rate. However, the monetary 
model can only be regarded as a long run explanation of exchange rate movement, 
since the purchasing power parity does not hold at any time.  
The Mundell-Fleming model is set in the context of a flat aggregate supply curve 
that is stagnate price level instead of purchasing power parity. Thus this model could 
explain the exchange rate fluctuation at short term. The Mundell-Fleming model 
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contrasts with the monetary model in a number of respects: its emphasis on the level 
of activity and interest rates rather than price level, its concentration on flows of 
spending and capital movements rather than stocks of assets. With a floating exchange 
rate, the expansionary monetary policy causes depreciation and a fall in interest rate, 
while fiscal expansion has the opposite effect. Whereas with a fixed exchange rate, 
expansionary monetary policy has the long run effect of causing a fall in foreign 
exchange reserve, while fiscal expansion generate a rise in income and the interest 
rate in short run. However, the Mundell-Fleming model has the weaknesses of 
constant price level, which cannot explain the long run exchange rate determination, 
and static expectations. 
As for Dornbusch overshooting model, it appears to explain both long run and short 
run exchange rate movement. The model’s assumption of sticky price is credible and 
the model demonstrates that a consequence could be over reacted by the exchange 
rate to a shock. Moreover the model really adopts the idea that the purchasing power 
parity only holds in long run, thus it generate the same conclusion as the monetary 
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Appendix B  Derivation of Equation 4.11 in Chapter 4 
This Appendix gives a description of how the stationary level of financial exchange 
rate and foreign reserve adjust with the changes in domestic credit, output, foreign 
goods price level and foreign interest rate. 
By equations (4.7) and (4.10), we know that the 0=
•
s  schedule and 
the 0=
•
tf schedule respectively have an intercept of G−  and H  in the vertical 
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In addition, the equilibrium financial exchange rate es and foreign reserve ef , which 
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Appendix C Variables’ Graphs                                                   
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Appendix D   
Unit Root Test Results for Variables: REER, GDP, CPIa, CPIc, TRADE. 
D.1 .1  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on LNREER 
Null Hypothesis: LNREER has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=9) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.258282  0.0229 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.581152  
 5% level  -2.926622  
 10% level  -2.601424  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LNREER)  
Method: Least Squares   
   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q3 2005Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LNREER(-1) -0.116256 0.035680 -2.258282 0.0022 
D(LNREER(-1)) 0.266245 0.130565 2.039175 0.0476 
C 0.534326 0.162989 3.278301 0.0021 
     
     R-squared 0.319007     Mean dependent var 0.005582 
Adjusted R-squared 0.287333     S.D. dependent var 0.023609 
S.E. of regression 0.019930     Akaike info criterion -4.930146 
Sum squared resid 0.017081     Schwarz criterion -4.810887 
Log likelihood 116.3934     F-statistic 10.07154 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.985769     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000259 
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D.1.2  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on D( LNREER) 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LNREER) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=9) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.437418  0.0009 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.581152  
 5% level  -2.926622  
 10% level  -2.601424  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LNREER,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q3 2005Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(LNREER(-1)) -0.613455 0.138246 -4.437418 0.0001 
C 0.003354 0.003340 1.004269 0.3207 
     
     R-squared 0.309161     Mean dependent var -0.000180 
Adjusted R-squared 0.293460     S.D. dependent var 0.026174 
S.E. of regression 0.022001     Akaike info criterion -4.752970 
Sum squared resid 0.021298     Schwarz criterion -4.673463 
Log likelihood 111.3183     F-statistic 19.69068 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.025457     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000060 
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D.2.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on LNGDP 
 
Null Hypothesis: LNGDP has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 7 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=9) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  1.424405  0.9988 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.605593  
 5% level  -2.936942  
 10% level  -2.606857  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LNGDP)   
Method: Least Squares   
   
Sample (adjusted): 1996Q1 2005Q4  
Included observations: 40 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LNGDP(-1) 0.131359 0.092221 1.424405 0.1643 
D(LNGDP(-1)) -0.411392 0.322213 -1.276770 0.2112 
D(LNGDP(-2)) -0.463819 0.382258 -1.213367 0.2342 
D(LNGDP(-3)) -1.846678 0.359254 -5.140312 0.0000 
D(LNGDP(-4)) 0.495535 0.176696 2.804449 0.0086 
D(LNGDP(-5)) -0.208958 0.284742 -0.733850 0.4686 
D(LNGDP(-6)) -0.155767 0.346058 -0.450119 0.6558 
D(LNGDP(-7)) 1.339786 0.345288 3.880195 0.0005 
C -0.094263 0.083848 -1.124216 0.2696 
     
     R-squared 0.986764     Mean dependent var 0.012506 
Adjusted R-squared 0.983348     S.D. dependent var 0.416776 
S.E. of regression 0.053782     Akaike info criterion -2.812639 
Sum squared resid 0.089668     Schwarz criterion -2.432641 
Log likelihood 65.25278     F-statistic 288.8779 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.788366     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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D.2.2  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on D( LNGDP) 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LNGDP) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 6 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=9) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.651279  0.0915 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.605593  
 5% level  -2.936942  
 10% level  -2.606857  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LNGDP,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
   
Sample (adjusted): 1996Q1 2005Q4  
Included observations: 40 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(LNGDP(-1)) -1.826498 0.688912 -2.651279 0.0124 
D(LNGDP(-1),2) 0.720475 0.681160 1.057719 0.2981 
D(LNGDP(-2),2) 0.670439 0.704167 0.952103 0.3482 
D(LNGDP(-3),2) -0.802006 0.722171 -1.110549 0.2750 
D(LNGDP(-4),2) -0.239873 0.609707 -0.393423 0.6966 
D(LNGDP(-5),2) -0.589967 0.469633 -1.256231 0.2181 
D(LNGDP(-6),2) -1.041880 0.279123 -3.732686 0.0007 
C 0.023443 0.014433 1.624311 0.1141 
     
     R-squared 0.995477     Mean dependent var -0.001532 
Adjusted R-squared 0.994488     S.D. dependent var 0.735973 
S.E. of regression 0.054640     Akaike info criterion -2.799242 
Sum squared resid 0.095537     Schwarz criterion -2.461466 
Log likelihood 63.98485     F-statistic 1006.234 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.726261     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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D.3.1   Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on LNCPIa 
 
Null Hypothesis: LNCPIa has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=9) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  0.389086  0.9804 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.577723  
 5% level  -2.925169  
 10% level  -2.600658  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LNCPIa)  
Method: Least Squares   
   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q2 2005Q4  
Included observations: 47 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LNCPIA(-1) 0.002399 0.006166 0.389086 0.6990 
C -0.004640 0.028292 -0.164012 0.8705 
     
     R-squared 0.003353     Mean dependent var 0.006366 
Adjusted R-squared -0.018795     S.D. dependent var 0.003432 
S.E. of regression 0.003464     Akaike info criterion -8.450936 
Sum squared resid 0.000540     Schwarz criterion -8.372207 
Log likelihood 200.5970     F-statistic 0.151388 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.639500     Prob(F-statistic) 0.699048 
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D.3.2  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on D( LNCPIa) 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LNCPIa) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=9) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.827729  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.584743  
 5% level  -2.928142  
 10% level  -2.602225  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LNCPIa,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q4 2005Q4  
Included observations: 45 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(LNCPIA(-1)) -1.088494 0.186778 -5.827729 0.0000 
D(LNCPIA(-1),2) 0.340107 0.150386 2.261567 0.0290 
C 0.006836 0.001281 5.334882 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.473878     Mean dependent var -8.22E-05 
Adjusted R-squared 0.448824     S.D. dependent var 0.004465 
S.E. of regression 0.003315     Akaike info criterion -8.516537 
Sum squared resid 0.000461     Schwarz criterion -8.396093 
Log likelihood 194.6221     F-statistic 18.91468 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.866813     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001 
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D.4.1   Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on LNCPIc 
 
Null Hypothesis: LNCPIc has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=9) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.431094  0.1391 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.581152  
 5% level  -2.926622  
 10% level  -2.601424  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LNCPIc)  
Method: Least Squares   
   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q3 2005Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LNCPIC(-1) -0.059382 0.024426 -2.431094 0.0193 
D(LNCPIC(-1)) 0.463479 0.124511 3.722406 0.0006 
C 0.273794 0.113410 2.414190 0.0201 
     
     R-squared 0.357759     Mean dependent var -0.004004 
Adjusted R-squared 0.327888     S.D. dependent var 0.013579 
S.E. of regression 0.011132     Akaike info criterion -6.094956 
Sum squared resid 0.005329     Schwarz criterion -5.975697 
Log likelihood 143.1840     F-statistic 11.97654 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.817852     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000073 
     
      
 
 
P a g e  | 200 
 
D.4.2   Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on D( LNCPIC) 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LNCPIc) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=9) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.723626  0.0068 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.581152  
 5% level  -2.926622  
 10% level  -2.601424  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LNCPIc,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q3 2005Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(LNCPIc(-1)) -0.480315 0.128991 -3.723626 0.0006 
C -0.001886 0.001809 -1.042485 0.3029 
     
     R-squared 0.239615     Mean dependent var 7.28E-05 
Adjusted R-squared 0.222333     S.D. dependent var 0.013309 
S.E. of regression 0.011737     Akaike info criterion -6.009648 
Sum squared resid 0.006061     Schwarz criterion -5.930142 
Log likelihood 140.2219     F-statistic 13.86539 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.814127     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000555 
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D.5.1   Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on LNTRADE  
Null Hypothesis: LNTRADE has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=9) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.320341  0.0195 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.577723  
 5% level  -2.925169  
 10% level  -2.600658  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LNTRADE)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/29/09   Time: 19:28   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q2 2005Q4  
Included observations: 47 after adjustments  
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LNTRADE(-1) -0.356878 0.107482 -3.320341 0.0018 
C -0.134818 0.052697 -2.558357 0.0140 
     
     R-squared 0.196782     Mean dependent var -0.011077 
Adjusted R-squared 0.178933     S.D. dependent var 0.281885 
S.E. of regression 0.255424     Akaike info criterion 0.149838 
Sum squared resid 2.935865     Schwarz criterion 0.228568 
Log likelihood -1.521193     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.179465 
F-statistic 11.02466     Durbin-Watson stat 1.997366 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001789    
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D.5.2   Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on D(LNTRADE)  
Null Hypothesis: D(LNTRADE) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=9) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -7.996494  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.581152  
 5% level  -2.926622  
 10% level  -2.601424  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LNTRADE,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/29/09   Time: 19:29   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q3 2005Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(LNTRADE(-1)) -1.170384 0.146362 -7.996494 0.0000 
C -0.005962 0.041285 -0.144406 0.8858 
     
     R-squared 0.592381     Mean dependent var 0.006571 
Adjusted R-squared 0.583117     S.D. dependent var 0.433367 
S.E. of regression 0.279810     Akaike info criterion 0.333090 
Sum squared resid 3.444911     Schwarz criterion 0.412596 
Log likelihood -5.661073     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.362874 
F-statistic 63.94391     Durbin-Watson stat 2.072691 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Appendix E  Johansen Cointegration Test 
Date: 05/06/09   Time: 17:01    
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q3 2005Q4    
Included observations: 46 after adjustments   
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend (restricted constant)  
Series: LNGDP LNCPIC LNCPIA LNTRADE LNREER    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   
      
      Hypothesized  Trace 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.692293  149.9597  76.97277  0.0000  
At most 1 *  0.621383  95.74384  54.07904  0.0000  
At most 2 *  0.436209  51.06722  35.19275  0.0005  
At most 3 *  0.321225  24.70595  20.26184  0.0114  
At most 4  0.138965  6.882545  9.164546  0.1327  
      
       Trace test indicates 4 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)  
      
      Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.692293  54.21588  34.80587  0.0001  
At most 1 *  0.621383  44.67662  28.58808  0.0002  
At most 2 *  0.436209  26.36126  22.29962  0.0128  
At most 3 *  0.321225  17.82341  15.89210  0.0246  
At most 4  0.138965  6.882545  9.164546  0.1327  
      
       Max-eigenvalue test indicates 4 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):   
      
      LNGDP LNCPIC LNCPIA LNTRADE LNREER C 
 6.679126  7.467374 -16.12334  0.504145  4.392003  13.88141 
 2.904502  32.01611 -2.654956  0.112225  26.10810 -260.2940 
-2.058078  29.89589  15.86384 -2.528068  9.901277 -254.8916 
-1.133268  18.08308  7.703045  2.117935  20.21419 -208.8648 
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 0.037654 -21.41325  4.180407 -3.059097 -12.01214  134.0662 
      
            
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):    
      
      D(LNGDP) -0.228416 -0.084803  0.073411  0.036555 -0.023945 
D(LNCPIC) -0.003209 -0.003077 -0.006145 -0.000484  0.001239 
D(LNCPIA)  0.002601 -0.001926 -1.50E-06  0.000217  0.000307 
D(LNTRADE)  0.005067 -0.008314  0.052021 -0.024563  0.086953 
D(LNREER)  0.002598 -0.003614  0.000849 -0.009925 -0.002586 
      
            
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  463.8484   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
LNGDP LNCPIC LNCPIA LNTRADE LNREER C 
 1.000000  1.118017 -2.413989  0.075481  0.657572  2.078327 
  (0.82894)  (0.34022)  (0.07050)  (0.56879)  (7.13015) 
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(LNGDP) -1.525616     
  (0.24858)     
D(LNCPIC) -0.021432     
  (0.01148)     
D(LNCPIA)  0.017369     
  (0.00331)     
D(LNTRADE)  0.033842     
  (0.26425)     
D(LNREER)  0.017352     
  (0.02060)     
      
            
2 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  486.1867   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
LNGDP LNCPIC LNCPIA LNTRADE LNREER C 
 1.000000  0.000000 -2.583291  0.079639 -0.282820  12.42848 
   (0.33048)  (0.08083)  (0.28978)  (1.42502) 
 0.000000  1.000000  0.151431 -0.003720  0.841125 -9.257605 
   (0.08307)  (0.02032)  (0.07284)  (0.35819) 
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(LNGDP) -1.771926 -4.420711    
  (0.25286)  (1.14135)    
D(LNCPIC) -0.030369 -0.122477    
P a g e  | 205 
 
  (0.01201)  (0.05419)    
D(LNCPIA)  0.011776 -0.042235    
  (0.00284)  (0.01283)    
D(LNTRADE)  0.009693 -0.228360    
  (0.28800)  (1.29997)    
D(LNREER)  0.006856 -0.096294    
  (0.02207)  (0.09963)    
      
            
3 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  499.3674   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
LNGDP LNCPIC LNCPIA LNTRADE LNREER C 
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -0.887136 -7.074378  32.79058 
    (0.43711)  (1.55879)  (7.11542) 
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.052952  1.239241 -10.45122 
    (0.03737)  (0.13327)  (0.60834) 
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000 -0.374242 -2.629033  7.882232 
    (0.15439)  (0.55058)  (2.51326) 
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(LNGDP) -1.923012 -2.226013  5.072554   
  (0.24764)  (1.45393)  (0.74517)   
D(LNCPIC) -0.017722 -0.306185 -0.037577   
  (0.01008)  (0.05917)  (0.03033)   
D(LNCPIA)  0.011779 -0.042280 -0.036840   
  (0.00295)  (0.01734)  (0.00889)   
D(LNTRADE) -0.097370  1.326856  0.765633   
  (0.29273)  (1.71866)  (0.88085)   
D(LNREER)  0.005109 -0.070909 -0.018824   
  (0.02291)  (0.13453)  (0.06895)   
      
            
4 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  508.2791   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
LNGDP LNCPIC LNCPIA LNTRADE LNREER C 
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -4.142616  20.10739 
     (1.65675)  (7.64343) 
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.064248 -9.694173 
     (0.13570)  (0.62605) 
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 -1.392258  2.531780 
     (0.60995)  (2.81402) 
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  3.304750 -14.29678 
     (1.00544)  (4.63862) 
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Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(LNGDP) -1.964438 -1.564990  5.354138 -0.232840  
  (0.24646)  (1.54502)  (0.77427)  (0.10751)  
D(LNCPIC) -0.017174 -0.314937 -0.041305  0.012547  
  (0.01017)  (0.06378)  (0.03196)  (0.00444)  
D(LNCPIA)  0.011533 -0.038359 -0.035170  0.001558  
  (0.00297)  (0.01865)  (0.00934)  (0.00130)  
D(LNTRADE) -0.069533  0.882673  0.576420 -0.181915  
  (0.29450)  (1.84614)  (0.92517)  (0.12846)  
D(LNREER)  0.016356 -0.250381 -0.095276 -0.022263  
  (0.01981)  (0.12421)  (0.06225)  (0.00864)  
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Appendix F  Vector Auto-regression Estimates Result 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates    
 Date: 05/05/09   Time: 17:22    
 Sample (adjusted): 1995Q4 2005Q4    
 Included observations: 41 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
       LNGDP LNCPIC LNCPIA LNTRADE LNREER 
      
      LNGDP(-1) -0.308128 -0.167447 -0.068880 -0.589893  0.657900 
  (1.01774)  (0.12598)  (0.06528)  (3.49909)  (0.15546) 
 [-0.30276] [-1.32920] [-1.05509] [-0.16858] [ 4.23190] 
      
LNGDP(-2) -1.006483  0.073878 -0.078202  0.803713  0.189148 
  (0.88349)  (0.10936)  (0.05667)  (3.03754)  (0.13496) 
 [-1.13921] [ 0.67556] [-1.37991] [ 0.26459] [ 1.40156] 
      
LNGDP(-3) -1.902518  0.093415 -0.036156  0.224514 -0.144641 
  (0.56345)  (0.06974)  (0.03614)  (1.93718)  (0.08607) 
 [-3.37657] [ 1.33941] [-1.00037] [ 0.11590] [-1.68055] 
      
LNGDP(-4)  0.836607 -0.015365 -0.020227 -1.298343  0.026704 
  (0.22677)  (0.02807)  (0.01455)  (0.77967)  (0.03464) 
 [ 3.68915] [-0.54737] [-1.39049] [-1.66524] [ 0.77089] 
      
LNGDP(-5) -0.034163  0.171261  0.059008 -1.770757 -0.558601 
  (0.99261)  (0.12286)  (0.06367)  (3.41268)  (0.15162) 
 [-0.03442] [ 1.39390] [ 0.92676] [-0.51888] [-3.68416] 
      
LNGDP(-6)  0.795156 -0.123457  0.079131 -3.295990 -0.107856 
  (0.87781)  (0.10866)  (0.05631)  (3.01800)  (0.13409) 
 [ 0.90584] [-1.13623] [ 1.40533] [-1.09211] [-0.80437] 
      
LNGDP(-7)  1.870196 -0.136249  0.030293 -1.543696  0.177737 
  (0.54411)  (0.06735)  (0.03490)  (1.87072)  (0.08311) 
 [ 3.43714] [-2.02301] [ 0.86794] [-0.82519] [ 2.13846] 
      
LNCPIC(-1) -4.651812  1.289338 -0.058987  17.22523 -0.368395 
  (2.70715)  (0.33509)  (0.17365)  (9.30742)  (0.41352) 
 [-1.71835] [ 3.84776] [-0.33968] [ 1.85070] [-0.89087] 
      
LNCPIC(-2)  1.070982 -1.013900 -0.361076 -9.717693  3.085581 
  (4.40818)  (0.54564)  (0.28277)  (15.1557)  (0.67336) 
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 [ 0.24295] [-1.85818] [-1.27695] [-0.64119] [ 4.58238] 
      
LNCPIC(-3) -1.660447  1.151849  0.069933 -22.63979 -1.124043 
  (4.68677)  (0.58013)  (0.30064)  (16.1136)  (0.71591) 
 [-0.35428] [ 1.98552] [ 0.23262] [-1.40501] [-1.57008] 
      
LNCPIC(-4)  3.745507 -0.820834  0.269711  2.191470 -1.113541 
  (3.30072)  (0.40856)  (0.21173)  (11.3482)  (0.50419) 
 [ 1.13475] [-2.00909] [ 1.27386] [ 0.19311] [-2.20857] 
      
LNCPIC(-5)  0.454447  0.138173  0.016768  12.86402 -0.849538 
  (2.56718)  (0.31776)  (0.16467)  (8.82621)  (0.39214) 
 [ 0.17702] [ 0.43483] [ 0.10183] [ 1.45748] [-2.16641] 
      
LNCPIC(-6) -1.103995  0.134174 -0.012194  9.203778  1.270916 
  (2.01718)  (0.24969)  (0.12939)  (6.93526)  (0.30813) 
 [-0.54730] [ 0.53737] [-0.09424] [ 1.32710] [ 4.12463] 
      
LNCPIC(-7)  1.210142 -0.061718  0.006083 -16.61041 -0.256723 
  (1.75289)  (0.21697)  (0.11244)  (6.02661)  (0.26776) 
 [ 0.69037] [-0.28445] [ 0.05410] [-2.75618] [-0.95879] 
      
LNCPIA(-1) -2.505454  2.049990  1.046932 -31.06039  2.582792 
  (5.85274)  (0.72445)  (0.37543)  (20.1223)  (0.89402) 
 [-0.42808] [ 2.82973] [ 2.78864] [-1.54358] [ 2.88897] 
      
LNCPIA(-2)  4.748401 -3.642772  0.630903 -17.96111 -2.499035 
  (12.7527)  (1.57853)  (0.81803)  (43.8452)  (1.94801) 
 [ 0.37234] [-2.30771] [ 0.77124] [-0.40965] [-1.28287] 
      
LNCPIA(-3)  9.673716  1.380254  0.249472  63.74422 -2.880430 
  (10.4084)  (1.28834)  (0.66765)  (35.7849)  (1.58990) 
 [ 0.92942] [ 1.07134] [ 0.37366] [ 1.78131] [-1.81171] 
      
LNCPIA(-4) -1.967065 -0.542249 -0.864850  21.45549  0.290836 
  (11.2876)  (1.39717)  (0.72405)  (38.8077)  (1.72420) 
 [-0.17427] [-0.38811] [-1.19447] [ 0.55287] [ 0.16868] 
      
LNCPIA(-5) -12.88522  2.589744  0.502120 -68.25345  4.763866 
  (12.5219)  (1.54995)  (0.80322)  (43.0514)  (1.91274) 
 [-1.02902] [ 1.67086] [ 0.62513] [-1.58539] [ 2.49060] 
      
LNCPIA(-6)  10.92661 -4.472078 -0.272390 -0.430001  4.443083 
  (13.3458)  (1.65194)  (0.85608)  (45.8842)  (2.03860) 
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 [ 0.81873] [-2.70717] [-0.31818] [-0.00937] [ 2.17948] 
      
LNCPIA(-7) -4.109025  2.898396 -0.052993  50.60869 -8.133646 
  (9.36283)  (1.15892)  (0.60058)  (32.1903)  (1.43019) 
 [-0.43887] [ 2.50094] [-0.08824] [ 1.57217] [-5.68711] 
      
LNTRADE(-1) -0.013824 -0.000469 -0.002824 -0.516383  0.026577 
  (0.06998)  (0.00866)  (0.00449)  (0.24060)  (0.01069) 
 [-0.19754] [-0.05417] [-0.62920] [-2.14623] [ 2.48625] 
      
LNTRADE(-2)  0.077531 -0.015836 -0.005211 -0.271866 -0.023578 
  (0.05929)  (0.00734)  (0.00380)  (0.20385)  (0.00906) 
 [ 1.30762] [-2.15773] [-1.37023] [-1.33365] [-2.60328] 
      
LNTRADE(-3) -0.046127  0.027506  0.007140  0.149919 -0.002818 
  (0.08777)  (0.01086)  (0.00563)  (0.30175)  (0.01341) 
 [-0.52556] [ 2.53189] [ 1.26823] [ 0.49683] [-0.21019] 
      
LNTRADE(-4)  0.058219 -0.036318 -0.000126 -0.004857  0.013635 
  (0.09881)  (0.01223)  (0.00634)  (0.33971)  (0.01509) 
 [ 0.58922] [-2.96953] [-0.01994] [-0.01430] [ 0.90344] 
      
LNTRADE(-5) -0.003533  0.015732  0.000698  0.227886 -0.020199 
  (0.09223)  (0.01142)  (0.00592)  (0.31709)  (0.01409) 
 [-0.03830] [ 1.37804] [ 0.11794] [ 0.71868] [-1.43379] 
      
LNTRADE(-6) -0.057064  0.004757 -0.007099 -0.024860 -0.019114 
  (0.08207)  (0.01016)  (0.00526)  (0.28215)  (0.01254) 
 [-0.69533] [ 0.46832] [-1.34856] [-0.08811] [-1.52474] 
      
LNTRADE(-7) -0.008677 -0.006802 -0.004381 -0.789433  0.084970 
  (0.09876)  (0.01222)  (0.00634)  (0.33955)  (0.01509) 
 [-0.08786] [-0.55641] [-0.69150] [-2.32497] [ 5.63247] 
      
LNREER(-1) -1.530619  0.201024  0.034871 -1.167499  0.747533 
  (0.95659)  (0.11841)  (0.06136)  (3.28885)  (0.14612) 
 [-1.60008] [ 1.69774] [ 0.56829] [-0.35499] [ 5.11584] 
      
LNREER(-2)  0.737987 -0.552703 -0.201087 -4.662835  0.205798 
  (1.57077)  (0.19443)  (0.10076)  (5.40047)  (0.23994) 
 [ 0.46982] [-2.84269] [-1.99573] [-0.86341] [ 0.85771] 
      
LNREER(-3) -0.587804  0.641586  0.060629  2.080018  0.062026 
  (2.19640)  (0.27187)  (0.14089)  (7.55142)  (0.33550) 
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 [-0.26762] [ 2.35992] [ 0.43033] [ 0.27545] [ 0.18487] 
      
LNREER(-4)  0.454511 -0.413745 -0.020785  0.071479 -0.247402 
  (2.02675)  (0.25087)  (0.13001)  (6.96817)  (0.30959) 
 [ 0.22426] [-1.64924] [-0.15988] [ 0.01026] [-0.79913] 
      
LNREER(-5) -0.503725  0.059537  0.088829 -1.158932  0.641245 
  (1.66204)  (0.20573)  (0.10661)  (5.71425)  (0.25388) 
 [-0.30308] [ 0.28940] [ 0.83319] [-0.20281] [ 2.52578] 
      
LNREER(-6) -0.888229 -0.136789 -0.046290  2.721394 -0.151944 
  (1.53765)  (0.19033)  (0.09863)  (5.28660)  (0.23488) 
 [-0.57765] [-0.71870] [-0.46932] [ 0.51477] [-0.64690] 
      
LNREER(-7) -0.454292  0.145339 -0.078659 -6.994929  0.465248 
  (1.36036)  (0.16838)  (0.08726)  (4.67705)  (0.20780) 
 [-0.33395] [ 0.86314] [-0.90142] [-1.49559] [ 2.23895] 
      
       R-squared  0.996837  0.995385  0.999770  0.970475  0.997615 
 Adj. R-squared  0.978911  0.969232  0.998469  0.803164  0.984098 
 Sum sq. resids  0.011705  0.000179  4.82E-05  0.138356  0.000273 
 S.E. equation  0.044168  0.005467  0.002833  0.151853  0.006747 
 F-statistic  55.61066  38.06096  768.4160  5.800448  73.80503 
 Log likelihood  109.1308  194.7903  221.7414  58.49922  186.1674 
 Akaike AIC -3.616138 -7.794650 -9.109337 -1.146304 -7.374019 
 Schwarz SC -2.153333 -6.331845 -7.646532  0.316502 -5.911213 
 Mean dependent  0.970259  4.622673  4.612517 -0.349481  4.586891 
 S.D. dependent  0.304146  0.031168  0.072415  0.342272  0.053501 
      
       Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  1.82E-19    
 Determinant resid covariance  1.22E-23    
 Log likelihood  790.7028    
 Akaike information criterion -30.03428    
 Schwarz criterion -22.72026    
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Appendix G  Structural VAR Estimates Result  
 Structural VAR Estimates    
 Date: 05/06/09   Time: 17:22    
 Sample (adjusted): 1995Q4 2005Q4    
 Included observations: 41 after adjustments   
 Estimation method: method of scoring (analytic derivatives)  
 Convergence achieved after 13 iterations   
 Structural VAR is just-identified    
      
      Model: Ae = Bu where E[uu']=I    
Restriction Type: long-run pattern matrix   
Long-run response pattern:    
C(1) 0 0 0 0  
C(2) C(6) 0 0 0  
C(3) C(7) C(10) 0 0  
C(4) C(8) C(11) C(13) 0  
C(5) C(9) C(12) C(14) C(15)  
      
       Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.    
      
      C(1)  0.277478  0.030642  9.055385  0.0000  
C(2)  1.639992  0.192788  8.506711  0.0000  
C(3)  1.579442  0.185196  8.528467  0.0000  
C(4) -0.044140  0.028757 -1.534930  0.1248  
C(5)  1.577929  0.185326  8.514347  0.0000  
C(6)  0.423166  0.046731  9.055385  0.0000  
C(7)  0.398086  0.044077  9.031699  0.0000  
C(8)  0.153226  0.022735  6.739583  0.0000  
C(9)  0.402792  0.044755  8.999972  0.0000  
C(10)  0.020400  0.002253  9.055385  0.0000  
C(11)  0.032494  0.014755  2.202294  0.0276  
C(12)  0.030586  0.003610  8.472961  0.0000  
C(13)  0.091638  0.010120  9.055385  0.0000  
C(14) -0.007063  0.001007 -7.013939  0.0000  
C(15)  0.004078  0.000450  9.055385  0.0000  
      
      Log likelihood   593.7170     
      
      Estimated A matrix:    
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  
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Estimated B matrix:    
 0.015163  0.034014  0.005386 -0.020177 -0.011305  
-0.003613  0.002402 -0.003254  0.000654 -0.000227  
-0.002219 -0.001561  0.000474 -6.59E-05 -0.000663  
-0.030833  0.028413 -0.018178  0.139965 -0.037158  
-0.001888  0.002489  0.005192 -0.000347  0.002947  
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